LATEST. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
- (The. following is the text of a resolution adopted by. ‘the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International at neeting held in July.]
a a
“The “object of this resolution is not to examine the world situation as a whole, this having already been done in the political resolution passed at the last World Congress,* but rather to bring that resolution up.to date, in the light of the events that have taken place since the World Congress. and on this basis to see whether we have to modify our conclusions and our tasks.
The main question facing us arises from the present escalation of the Vietnam war by American imperialism. The escalation points dangerously towards an extension.of this war in the direction of a war against the People's Republic of China. Taking into account the setbacks suffered by the colonial revolution in this last . period, the most recent example of which is Ghana, we must examine whether a fundamental change in the world situation has taken. place in comparison with the preceding period. More precisely the question posed is whether the colonial revolution which started after World War II, which received an enormous impulse through the victory of the Chinese revolution and which has been.the main sector of the socialist revolution in the course of the past twenty years has exhausted its energy and entered a period of ebb and decline.
The Colonial Revolution
The almost continuous development of the colonial revolution during a period of several years was the expression of the will of the colonial masses who wanted to put an end to foreign domination of their countries-.and to their poverty, all of which stem from the economic and social underdevelopment of the colonial and semi- ~ colonial countries. The weakening of the colonial powers during and after World War II, as well as the greater weight of the workers states in the world made possible almost everywhere the conquest of political independence, as imperialism retreated either immediately or after bloody colonial wars, to indirect forms of domination enabling it to maintain the essential part of its economic position.
On the other hand, the native ruling classes then exercising political power were unable to stimulate an overall economic development of their countries, which in the end stimulated the process of permanent revolution, bringing to power, after the conquest of formal independence, bourgeois and petty-—bourgeois nation-
*See International Socialist Review, Spring 1966.
alist leaders who used the aroused mass movement and the pressure it generated to obtain more.or less important . concessions from imperialism. 4 ~ During the whole of this period the major confrontation took blade: between the old colonial powers and the colonial revolution. . With the exception of-some-Latin-American countries the great sweep of colonial revolt did not come up directly against the power of Anerican imperialism. On the contrary American policy at that time . was designed to achieve an alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie. It intervened in several of the colonial wars to pressure the old colonial powers to make concessions to the revolution; it did not hesitate to.side openly with Nasser against the British-French aggression during the Suez crisis. Its fundamental orientation was. that .of trying to canalize the colonial revolution in favor of "progressive" layers and governments which would maintain then-. selves within the framework of the world capitalist. market with the help of American. capital. Even the "neutralist" course adopted at . Bandung did not cause a fundamental change in Washington's course.
The change that has occurred followed in consequence of two experiences. On one hand the development of the Cuban revolution into a socialist revolution -- something unforeseen by Washington -has taught it the logic of permanent revolution, the danger of allowing the development. of a revolution even under the leadership of liberal and petty-bourgeois.forces running the risk of being: overthrown by the masses. The "Johnson doctrine," proclaimed at the time of the intervention in Santo Domingo, clearly means that — American imperialism will intervene militarily not only in the case where the masses led by Communist forces are advancing towards power (this decision has been theirs since the beginning of the cold war) but also where. these masses. are still under the leadership of non-communist "liberals. ae
On the other hand the incapacity of traditional nationalist leaderships that have come to power to resolve the economic and social tasks of the colonial revolution. led to a progressive loss. of support by the masses and therefore a.loss of their usefulness in the eyes of imperialism. The latter prefer the substitution :of. . open: neocolonialist agents who claim less concessions for their. services.
The direct confrontation between the colonial revolution and imperialism which was during the fifties a confrontation between the old colonial powers and this revolution has, since the experience of both the Cuban revolution and the Algerian conquest of independence, become more and more a global. confrontation between American imperialism and revolution. The closeness of victory of | the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam (bringing the risk . of a loss of all of Southeast Asia for imperialism); the tactical. weakening of the position of the workers states in consequence. of © transferring the Sino-Soviet conflict into state relations; theshamefully weak responses of the workers states' bureaucracies before the escalation of the imperialist aggression against Vietnam
-2ec-
has led to a more resolutely offensive and aggressive policy on the part of Washington, a policy of support to the indigenous reactionary forces in the semicolonial countries. The succession of setbacks undergone by the colonial revolution can be fundamentally explained by this passing over to a general counteroffensive against the colonial revolution on the part of American imperialism in the face of mass movements without any international coordination, without an effective leadership or correct political orientation, without a leadership prepared to step in and replace the traditional nationalist leadership of the earlier stage which is now openly bankrupt. -
The initiative during this last period has entirely favored American imperialism. What objectives has it attained? What reactions have these setbacks produced in the mass movements? In no single sector of the colonial revolution which suffered a setback has the reaction been able to establish. a stable power. not even where the masses received the severest blows. Moreover nowhere in the colonial or semicolonial countries have the objective causes driving the masses to action time and again been removed.
; In Latin America it is in Brazil where the resistance and the revival of the mass movement is more difficult. Here the military junta passes from one crisis to another and can rely only on feeble support from the people. In Bolivia the attempt of the military. junta to destroy the mass movement has ended in failure. In Chile the Christian Democratic experiment of Frei clashes with the combativity of important sections of the masses (miners strike). If the Peruvian guerrillas seemed to have received grievous blows and suffered considerable losses,. and if also in Venezuela tne movement has suffered serious losses, the guerrillas ‘in Colombia and Guatemala continue their struggle with inevitable hazards, but without the governments of these countries being able to reduce considerably their capacity of action.
In Latin America the "reformist" policy of the Alliance for Progress has been exposed as bankrupt for a long time. The policy of force which has seen its greatest success in Brazil has not stabilized anything. The mass. movements continue to shake the unstable social equilibrium there. Thus although American imperialism has been able to register some very limited gains at great cost it has been unable to gain a decisive victory. Signs of regrouping and a recovery of the mass movements in several countries are beginning to appear.
‘It is in Africa that imperialism seems to have gained the most spectacular reversals of the situation. First of all we have to underline the overthrow of Ben Bella and then of Nkrumah and the temporary suppression of the left wing in Morocco. The segregationist regimes of Smith in Rhodesia and Verwoerd in South Africa are consolidating themselves. In a big section of Africa important political changes are now possible because of the extreme fragility of the old forms of rule and the steady decomposition of the old structures without anything new taking their place. To this must
be added the big weakness of the leaderships, cadres and political.. movements. In general ‘the evolution has been to the right. However, the events in Nigeria, the most important country in Africa, were first of all an attempt by the military to prevent a mass movement by attacking the feudal forces. After its initial success the new power was quickly challenged by the popular forces that continue to press their demands. In Uganda a similar attempt was made to eliminate the feudal forces. In Congo Brazzaville the attempt to eliminate the left-oriented regime failed: Moreover the fact that the revolutionary forces are far from being crushed. is shown in Algeria where Boumedienne's government was forced, Jess than one year after the coup d'état that brought it to power, to proceed toward important nationalizations. The regime continues to be submitted to the pressure of the masses principally expressed by ~ the UGTA [Union Générale des. Travailleurs Algériens].
The developments in the Near East show a maturing towards © decisive: tests in this part.of the world. The struggle between the: reactionary forces. and the progressive forces goes on in Yemen. ~The struggle. is. gaining in pintensity in Aden and in a number of — emirates of South Arabia. Iraq is still unstable and the struggle 7 of the Kurdish people continues. Finally and above ail in Syria the revolutionary movement led by the Syrian Baath party, after _purging.its right wing, has advanced a program of struggle against imperialism that is to a certain extent. anticapitalist, marked however by vacillations and conciliations bearing some similarity’ to the experience in Algeria at the time of the decrees of March 1963.
. In Asia imperialism secured its. greatest success in the =| victorious counterrevolution in Indonesia. We have given the reasons for this setback in the documents adopted at the last World Congress and the declaration made by the United Secretariat. The subsequent slaughter of hundreds of. thousands of Communists opened up new political possibilities for the new leaders. They came to agreement with the neocolonialists of Malaysia and then turned, to begging of aid from American, Japanese and West German imperialism. But: despite the significance of the new overtures, the agreement with” Malaysia remains secondary in face of the gigantic. economic ‘problems of unemployment , inflation and widespread misery existing in: Indonesia.
On the other hand the stability of the Indian subcontinent has been shaken. The divisions within the ruling Congress party have increased steadily since Nehru's death, reflecting the pressures arising from the failure to solve any of | the great problems facing India, as.well as the pressure now coming from the poor peasantry raising their. demands. 1966 saw the greatest mobilization of masses (Bengali movement against famine) that India has known since the. struggle for independence , ;
Finally in ‘that part of the world the struggle of the Vietnamese people against American imperialism is a testimony above all to the power. of revolution. despite the material weight of the. forces thrown against it. Thanks to its intervention imperialism = avoided the defeat that seemed imminent eighteen months ago. It has
no real prospects of victory and that is why the prospect of an escalation driven as far as a war against China has become an actual danger.
If.
The Workers States
_ The twenty-third Congress of the CPSU and the congresses of the other CP's in the Eastern European workers states confirmed and illustrated several points made in the resolution of the last World Congress of the Fourth International:
-- The general slowdown in economic growth in the past few years. So
~— The ruling bureaucracies seeking solutions in reforms of the ‘Liberman type; i.e., reforms that imply besides administrative adjustments, measures favorable to the bureaucracy at the managerial level of the enterprises.
-~ At the same time tendencies: have developed in several states for independent action separate from the other workers states both with regard to thé capitalist world ana to China (Rumania).
~~ Not only have we not seen any further | progress in "liberalization," but the twenty-third congress confirmed the line of the ruling circles of repressing even the most timid positions of the intellectuals and the university students in favor of democratic liberties. :
The end of the Khrushchev period corresponded to the end of a period in which "de-Stalinization" raised new reformist hopes concerning both material welfare and the democratization of Soviet society. Khrushchev's successors are attempting to adjust the situation on the economic level, but at the same time they attempt to tighten control politically and socially. They collide and will. continue to collide even more with the demands of the workers and with the more Polaticalized oppositional currents of intellectuals and students.
The Sino- Soviet controversy has not been taking spectacular forms during the past period, but has been developing to the advantage of the Soviet leadership. (Castro's attack against the | Chinese; the crisis within the Chinese leadership). But in this dispute the aspect of an "ideological conflict between parties" (which favored the decomposition of Stalinism) has tended to recede and give way to a full-blown "conflict between states" which brings grave consequences on the international level. It weakens the defense of. the Vietnamese revolution and encourages American imperialism to adopt. a more aggressive stance toward China.
‘In Cuba some’ serious economic problems as well as differences within the leading team have given rise to a certain bureaucratic development, of which Che Guevara's leaving and Castro's violent - attack’ against the Fourth International at the Tricontinental Conference. have been partially at least. the. objective expression. However! both. in this. conference's decisions and in the subsequent behavior of: the Fidelista leaders (Armando Hart's. speech at the twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, Castro's. speech against Frei and his: speech on May 1) it has clearly. appeared. that the. Fidelista current maintains its positions in favor of the revolutionary. road and of the socialist nature of the Latin-American revolution. In practice, in almost all Latin-American countries the followers of this current differentiate themselves from the neoreformist official CP's.
In China a serious process of purge and suppression of differences appeared and has struck successively at the cadres of the. army, the literary and scientific circles, the youth organizations and. the. party; at the present time it has culminated in the elimination of a core of leaders grouped around Peng Chen, a member of. the Political Bureau. From all evidence this is an interbureaucratic struggle, but like all conflicts within the bureaucracy in workers states without workers democracy, these necessarily reflect actual social. tensions in the country. Although we lack information about the actual content of the differences it is-highly likely that they not. only encompass problems related to internal life of the party and country (freedom of criticism for the ranks, agricultural policy, etc.) but also international policies (the tactical line toward the Soviet government; the line on the colonial revolution). The terrible defeat suffered by it in Indonesia cannot help but raise controversies within a party whose leadership shares in. large part the responsibilities of the leaders of the Indonesian Communist party in this disaster. Thé blind sectarian refusal of. a united front with the Soviet government for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution considerably weakens the positions of the” Chinese CP in Asia, and at the same time Chinese diplomacy has suffered important setbacks in Latin America (Castro's attack) and in Africa. The internal struggle has been taking place in such-a . way as if the Chinese bureaucracy would like to be on the safe: ‘side in order to crush an opposition before it adds to its strength ° through the setbacks to Mao's international policy as well as set= backs in internal politics which seem imminent.
The attempt to maintain a monolithic image before the. asses, the stifling of dissent by Stalinist- -type violence ‘and the frantic construction of the Mao.cult make impossible the free discussion of the actual differences and the difficult problems that the Chinese revolution faces at this stage and cannot but cause grave prejudice to the interests of the revolution.
- However, ‘the propaganda of the Chinese “leaders” against ‘the. formation of material privileges, such as those existing in the ~' Soviet Union during this internal struggle, testifies that despite the Mao cult and the avowal of Stalin there is not a pure and
simple reproduction of the dictatorship of Stalin and the pattern that developed in the USSR. China's objective position in the world, the aggressive preparations of American imperialism against her ; are in the same direction. By avoiding any declaration of solidarity with China in the face of the imperialist menace, the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy encourage this aggression, the ultraleftism of the Chinese leaders on the question of the united front with the Kremlin and. their attempt at militarizing the whole of social life in China which is their bureaucratic attempt to secure the defenses of the revolution in the face of the threat from the Pentagon.
Til.
The Imperialist States
The economic situation in the imperialist states has not changed fundamentally during the past period. The war in Vietnam continues to strengthen the American "boom" and at the same time weakens the stability of the dollar and the pound. It has also helped to overcome the recession in Japan. Signs are now appearing of the exhaustion of the West German "boom."
In the United States the continuation of the. escalation in Vietnam continues to provoke differences within the bourgeoisie and in their two major political parties. Certain important sections of the American bourgeoisie are aware of the fact that in the absence of a fundamental modification of the relations of force on a world scale, this escalation brings increasing hazards for American imperialism. While these differences are only tactical they make it difficult for the government to resort to a McCarthy-type repression against opposition at least on the scale of the fifties. The exis-tence of this difference in turn helps encourage the growth of a popular opposition against the war in Vietnam.
In this same period the principle new element has been the NATO crisis, made public by de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French troops from the "integrated" command. This decision is taken at a time when the situation within the capitalist world after the war has been modified on one hand because of the economic recovery in | capitalist Europe and on the other because of the lessening of the war danger in Europe in the immediate future. The NATO crisis may result in a certain reorganization of the forms of alliance in the capitalist world, adapting the relations of political-military force to the reality of the changed economic relations of force; but it is excluded, contrary to the wishful thinking of the workers state bureaucracies, that it will be dislocated let alone mean the creation of a "neutralist" Europe. The widespread "anti-American" feelings and moods can be used for certain political maneuvers within the different European states, but no European bourgeoisie can permit itself to "go it. alone," nor can the European capitalists allow the loss..of the military protection of the USA. It suffices to appraise
exactly ‘de Gaulle's policy to see: how even: he stops before certain limits’ (maintenance of the: Common Market , “keeping of French troops in* Gempeny
“The: new "developments in the internal situation in the various itiperialist countries have been many and’ ¢ontradictory.:In general they have helped encourage a politicalization of the young generation ina direction hostile to thé. reformism of the old traditional parties} this'is true both in America and in Western Europe. Even though the objective effects of this new movement are’ still-limited they have great importance for our movement and. ensure: its growth at this time. It is above all in the United States (and to a certain extent in Canada and Australia) that this politicalization has taken dimension with the development of a mass opposition against the war in Vietnam, an opposition that is growing and which begins to influence mass, currents and. essential. forces of American society (antisegregation movement as well as "liberal" fringes of the tradeunion. movenent) . oe, a > We must underline the importance of the antiwar movement in. the United States, which constitutes today one of the major centers of anti-imperialist struggle in the world and. whose strength has grown steadily during this past period. The interconnection between the colonial revolution and the. growing anti-imperialist mass force in the United States has become. evident. The antiwar movement in the United States stimulates in turn, anti-imperialist actions in other parts of: the world and radicalizing. the emancipation movement. of the American Negroes threatens the stability of bourgeois society in the United States.
In the European Communist parties the tendency toward a right-wing evolution has been accentuated. In Italy, at the congress of the Italian Communist party the center grouping adopted to all intents and purposes the political position of the right wing. ‘In France, since the Mitterrand campaign the leadership of the French Communist party has, if anything, increased the tempo of this evolution,: even if it conflicts with the attitude of its expected "allies" (censure motion against de Gaulle's policy .on NATO) in the field.of foreign politics and on domestic issues. (refusal. to .., elaborate a common program for the 1967 elections). It comes as. no. surprise then when the Finnish CP carries this evolution to the point of. participating in the bourgeois government, something which has not been seen in Europe since the Prague "coup" eighteen years . ABO. 8. - :
The evolution of the situation in Europe has had contradic-:. tory effects on the-Social Democracy. While the British Labour panty brought to power with a largely increased majority, is launching | into a policy of renewal of British capitalism at the expense of. the working class, which is beginning to show a growing resistance against such a policy (seamen's. strike) the Austrian elections put the Austrian Social Democracy into opposition .for the first time .... since the restoration of Austrian independence. This will have as a consequence the encouragement of the workers struggles despite the
resistance :of their leadership which is seeking to-confine and limit the: class struggle to their despicable parliamentary shadow boxing. In Germany after the failure of the Bad Godesberg orientation. (which envisaged accession to power through identification with the bourgeois parties) the Social Democracy has turned toward differentiation from. the bourgeois parties; :this can give a little more.elbow room for the development of the left-wing currents which have. been. _crushed- during the past several years. Meanwhile there is the serious risk. that the trade-union bureaucracy will yield without a struggle before the "emergency laws" (Nodstands-Gesetze) which would-be a serious blow to the workers movements.
IV.
_ The Balance Sheet of World .Developments
The balance sheet we can make out of the foregoing is that the colonial revolution despite the setbacks suffered in the last period is not at all exhausted and remains what it has been for the past twenty years -- the main sector of the world revolution. The defeats suffered have not been the’ result of the weakening of the combativity of the masses or the result of some modification of the objective conditions, but are due rather to the absence of a ‘qualified revolutionary leadership at a’time when American imperialism after some hesitation has taken a stance all the more aggressive since it has the advantage of the disunity of the two leading workers states. The increasing war danger does not come from a . decisive change in the relationship of forces but rather from the limited success that capitalism has had against revolution. It is this limit and especially the victorious resistance of the Vietnamese revolution that pushes capitalism onto the road toward escalation which unfortunately to date has had no vigorous and , united response. Dos
The cumulative. effect of the defeats suffered by the colonial revolution in the last period is not of such weight to neutralize the decisive influence that economic and social instability has on the mass movement. It is still in this sector where the most likely probability exists of highly explosive social and political conflicts.
However, the key to the world situation remains at present in Vietnam. It is the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people against the imperialist aggression which largely neutralizes in the eyes of the colonial masses, the demoralizing effect of the setbacks suffered by the revolution on other fronts. It is the bogging down of the mobile forces of the American army in Vietnam which make it difficult for Yankee imperialism to intervene on a large scale on other fronts.
Up to now the setbacks ‘suffered by the colonial revolution have not at all led to a modification of the relation of forces on a world scale. But a defeat of the Vietnamese revolution by the
forces of imperialism could bring the gravest consequences. This is why the number one task of the world proletariat is the campaign to aid the Vietnamese revolution on every front and in every way.
Among the workers states one can see the first signs of a political renewal after ten years of relative stabilization, the. "§@e-Stalinization"; that is to say, the policy of self-defense of . the bureaucracy by means of limited reforms. Finally, in the. imperialist states, though the economic level and social.stability . have not shown any fundamental. damage there can also be seen signs of political renewal which promise much for the future. vo
With regard to the preceding years, when the colonial revo-. lution in particular had the most spectacular success it is the problem of leadership and of an International that show themselves. as the imperative necessity, to insure victories. The Vietnamese war at present stresses this need even more in face of the single leadership of imperialism (only contested in a small and limited “way) while the world's revolutionary mass movements suffer the burden and monstrous handicap of rival state leaderships in the | USSR and China to say nothing of the opportunist political orientation.of the traditional organizations including the mass CP's. under pro-Mao leadership. — oe
The imperative necessity to make up for this terrible lack breaks through with varying consciousness and intensity in mass movements and even in various centrist currents; this explains the origin of the Tricontinental Conference of Havana (January 1966) | whose object was to find the means to coordinate the efforts and | struggles of the peoples who are at present directly at grips with. world imperialism. rae
The conference at Havana revealed the difficulties on the road towards a coordination of the struggles on an international scale, showing the weight of the state apparatus of. the workers states and of the petty-bourgeois forces still leading the anti-~ — imperialist movement in most semicolonial and colonial countries. It confirmed once more how illusory is the hope to see these state bureaucracies and petty-bourgeois forces take a correct political position "under the pressure of the masses and the objective conditions." It confirmed that the revolutionary victories snatched from the enemy by surprise thanks to ‘objective conditions so favorable | that they could accomplish this even without a revolutionary “Marxist leadership represent an exception and not the rule and that the building of a new revolutionary leadership is the most important task of our epoch.
‘Finally, the main lesson that can be drawn from the latest vicissitudes of the world revolution confirms the message that the Fourth International has advanced since its foundation to the revolutionary vanguard; there is no lasting definitive victory against capital on an international scale without the building of a new revolutionary Marxist International.
Our Tasks
The conclusions of this analysis are evident; revolutionary Marxists must concentrate their efforts at the present stage on defense of-the Vietnamese revolution and on organization of maximum effective aid to this revolution. To secure the victory of this revolution; to check the aggression of American imperialism is the surest way of discouraging the most aggressive forces of this imperialism which dream of a-preventive attack against the Chinese nuclear centers. It is also the surest way of giving to new revolu- ‘tions in other parts of the world the possibility of consolidating without being forced immediately to face the certainty of a military intervention of Yankee: -imperialisn. _
This concentration of efforts implies in particular:
(1) The éontinuation of the efforts of revolutionary Marxists to involve in the struggle against the war of aggression of. imperialism ' in Vietnam the largest possible mobilization of the workers and “ anti-imperialist movements on the basis of a united front without exclusion and with every organization maintaining its right of... criticism within the united front.
(2) The © attempt to create everywhere where ‘they are not..yet “in existence ad hoc organizations of struggle against the war of aggression of American imperialism and of defense of the Vietnamese revolution, organizations able to respond immediately to new stages of the escalation as for example the recent: bombing of Hanoi: and: Haiphong. ae
(3) The attempt to involve progressively. in the struggle against the war of aggression the organized forces of the workers movement and particularly the trade-union movement on the basis | of a genuine:united front without any confusion of: program with. reformists, neoreformists,- Khrushchevites, Maoists, etc., but with a concentration of effort on the part of all militant forces in the _ Struggle against imperialist aggression. ;
(4) The attempt to: internationalize the. struggle against the
imperialist war of aggression, beginning with the countries or the movements which because of the similarity of objective conditions make possible such an effective international (above all the students “on a world scale and the youth organizations on a European scale).
(5) A strong denunciation of the shameful role played in the war by the workers bureaucracies; particularly a reformist bureaucracy like the British, which act as shameful agents of American imperialism;’ the Soviet bureaucracy which gives limited aid and | cannot find it possible to respond to the escalation even with the responses of its old leader Khrushchev. They are: the only ‘ones who have the technical means that would enable the heroic Vietnamese
fighters to stop the imperialist aggression; the Chinese bureaucracy whose refusal of a united front with the USSR for the defense of the: Vietnamese revolution makes the deception of the Kremlin much easier and. accentuates the purely verbal character of its denunciations of the "Soviet-American plot" against the colonial revolution.
Our primary slogans today:
_-+ For-a united front on a world scale of all forces of the workers and anti-imperialist movements against the American aggression in Vietnam.
‘For the defense of the Vietnamese revolution.
For maximum aid to this revolution.
Full. Text of Correspondence:
HEALY BREAKS WITH VIETNAM SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN IN BRITAIN
[Among that hardy. breed who for one reason or another follow The Newsletter, the weekly organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League, the June 25 issue looked like a collector's. item. It featured an appeal.by Bertrand Russell announcing formation. of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign,- whose purpose was to seek "to . make clear the basic issues in this struggle and to organise a series of actions in Britain supporting the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the Americans." Publication of Russell's appeal appeared to mark a decided shift in atti-: tude on the part of the CC of the SLL, which has been following a "eo it alone" policy in supporting the Vietnamese, varied with an occasional "barge in on others" tactic.
[The impression that the CC of the SLL might have decided to participate in an organized united front campaign was given a further boost in the July 9 issue of The Newsletter which reported that the Young Socialists under the influence of the SLL had participated in a demonstration called by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and had succeeded in barging in on a demonstration sponsored by the Communist party and other organizations.
LEven more out of character -- to judge solely from the columns of The Newsletter --~ was the action reported in the August 13 issue, that the SLL had participated in a meeting and march sponsored by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. To those who may have wondered. if the world was about to see a case of the self-reform of a bureaucracy (if only a microscopic one), two indicators suggested that premature conclusions should not be drawn. The report mentioned only one speaker -- the representative of the SLL; and a front-page... . bulletin signed by the "London Area Committee, Socialist Labour.
League," gave notice that the SLL "is not in any way connected with this united front agreement" of the Vietnam Solidarity Committee.
[Next, the August 20 issue made public a letter from G. Healy, secretary of the SLL, to Ralph Schoenman of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, further dissociating the SLL from the ‘Vietnam Solidarity Campaign.
‘“(Pinally, the September 3 Newsletter published excerpts from Ralph Schoenman's reply, together with a response occupying almost. a page of The Newsletter. The response, signed by Michael Banda, ends with the following affirmation: "To Messrs. Schoenman snd Russell we say: To hell with your rotten ‘united front' of state capitalists, Pabloites, Stalinists and centrists. Your campaign stinks and will continue to do so until you learn to fight in a principled manner. The Vietnamese will win, in spite of you." This put the CC of the SLL back where it was before The Newsletter published Bertrand Russell's appeal.
[Ralph Schoenman has released the full text of the corres-'— . pondence. For the sake of the record, we are making this available below and in our next: issue will offer some comments by. our London correspondent.
[Those who may wish to compare the texts below with what was_ published in The Newsletter, will note some minor discrepancies in ' the two texts of Healy's August 8 letter. We have followed the photostatic copy supplied by Ralph Schoenman. Where The Newsletter went so far as to substitute a word, we have noted it. Healy's August 16 letter is published here for the first time.
[To facilitate comparing the text of Schoenman's August 17 letter with the ¢xcerpts published in The Newsletter, we have underlined and enclosed in brackets what was omitted. ]
* kx x
8th August, 1966.
Mr. R. Schoenman, Jo Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 3 Staveley Lsic] Place, ~ Haymarket, S.W.1. oe Dear Mr. Schoenman ,
May we take this opportunity to explain the position of the Socialist Labour League towards the Vietnam Solidarity Committee Lchanged to "Campaign" in the August 20 Newsletter], and more especially to its public meeting on Saturday, August 6th.
‘When we mét you towards the end of July, we explained that. we agreed with the Statement of the Committee {changed to "Campaign" in The Newsletter] that it proposed to campaign for the victory of
the National Liberation Front and the complete withdrawal of all American Armed Forces from Vietnam. During the course of this conversation:the role of the 1954 Geneva Agreement came up and you suggested that this should not be placed in the forefront of the campaign at the present time. We in turn agreed with the proviso that this Agreement was in fact largely responsible for the present state of affairs and-that this should be kept in mind, in case the Soviet bureaucracy..should attempt in the future to foist another similar reactionary agreement on the Vietnamese people. We have kept to that agreement. Te oee
ma During our talk we made it clear that we were not affiliated to your Committee {changed to "Campaign" in The Newsletter], but that we would support your public meeting on August 6th and the torchlight procession to the American Embassy at Gosvenor Square, W.L. [sic] afterwards, on these grounds, and these grounds alone.
~ Subsequently, attempts were made by members of your Committee [changed to "Campaign" in The Newsletter] such as E. Taite that Mike Banda, the assistant General Secretary of the S.L.L. should not speak at the public meeting, because he was too forthright in his condemnation of the war in Vietnam, and that he might embarrass any Labour M.Ps. who would be on the platform. Naturally, we did not agree to this, since it is out of the question for anyone, apart from members of the S.L.L. to determine who should speak for our organisation at any meeting.
Then it was agreed that he should speak, so we called upon our members and supporters to attend the meeting and join the demonstration which of course they did.
At that meeting we were faced with an extraordinary situation in which you as chairman tried to determine by your control of the meeting what our people should or should not say in relation to the role of the British Communist Party and the Soviet bureaucracy. You wrongly accused the Socialist Labour League of breaking the united front of the Solidarity Committee.
. We did nothing of the sort, since we were not in the first place members of the Committee and we would never under any circumstances agree not to criticise the British Communist Party and its Soviet overlords who are in our opinion betraying the Vietnamese revolution.
A united front agreement is one that relates the specific issues of agreement whilst enabling those who participate to criticise if necessary, the political shortcomings of others who subscribed to the agreement. Since neither we, the British Communist Party or the Soviet bureaucracy are members of your Committee [changed to "Campaign" by The Newsletter], how could the S.L.L. spokesman from the floor have broken any agreement.
The most charitable conclusion we can draw is that a serious mistake was made by you due to a misunderstanding of your powers
as Chairman. . You must appreciate that the members of the Socialist Labour League are indignant over what they believe to be an unwarranted interference with the rights of their organisation.
They participated in the demonstration when others who are affiliated to your Committee [changed to "Campaign" by The News- | letter] sought refuge in a public house by Baker Street tube station, rather than march. _
Before we decided as to whether or not to continue our support to your Committee [changed to "Campaign" by The Newsletter] we would appreciate your comments.
Yours truly,
G. Healy Lsignature ]
oo G. HEALY GH/JS Secretary
16th August, 1966. Mr. R. Schoenman, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 3 Shaveley [sic -- it should be Shavers] Place, Haymarket, S.W.1. Dear Mr. Schoenman,
Since you have not replied to our letter to you dated 8th August, 1966, we would now like to take the opportunity of break-. ing off all relations with the Vietnam Solidarity Committee.
We think that this Committee is not engaged in a reai defence of the Vietnamese revolution but that it consists of a hodge podge of unrepresentative middle class semi-pacifist elements whose main aim is to attack and slander the Socialist Labour League as you did as Chairman of the public meeting on August 6th.
We shall presently speak out publicly in the columns of the Newsletter about the political implications of your action.
Yours truly,
G. Healy [signature ]
GH/JS National Secretary
17 August, 1966.
G. Healy, Esq., Secretary Socialist Labour League, 186A Clapham High Street, London, S.W.4. Dear Mr. Healy,
~ Thank you for your Letter of August 8. I cannot agree with | your account of our meeting last month, for it is at variance with. the facts. You were asked not to attack the Geneva Agreements: from the platform of: the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. The Solidarity Campaign supports'the Vietnamese revolution and the organs of struggle leading it. It is impossible to make solidarity with the Vietnamese while they are under siege, waging a bitter struggle against their oppressors and, at the same time, attack agreements signed by their leaders as a betrayal of their revolution. The S.L.L. can do this in its own organs, as can other organisations, but the Solidarity Campaign is not a forum for attacking the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. You accepted this point during our discussion and agreed that the Geneva Agreements would. not be attacked by you from our platforn. 7
No proviso concerning the responsibility of the Geneva Agreements for the present crisis was entertained, and I can only repeat that this discussion is no part of the objects of the Solidarity Campaign, which is a united front of all those committed to support the Vietnamese in their struggle against aggression.
' You reconstruct and misrepresent the reasons why some members of this Campaign (not Committee) expressed doubts about Mike Banda as a speaker. |No-one ever stated that Banda was "too forthright in his condemnation of the war in Vietnam" or that “he might embarrass: the Labour M.P.'s who would be on the platform". This is a presentation which may suit you, but it is utterly unrelated to the truth. |* The objections were based on something other than fear of consistent support for revolutionary positions or consistent condemnation of the war in Vietnam. The objections about Banda were based on the apprehension that he would place factional considerations before condemnation of the war in Vietnam or support for the Vietnamese revolution. Factionalism was the worry, not revolutionary consistency. If there was any concern about consistency, it was as a result. of recollection that Banda and the S.L.L. condemned in print the Congolese rebels at the time of the Stanleyville inva- Sion and that you condemned the Algerian revolution as a petit-. > bourgeois formation. At the time, the S.L. L. and the Newsletter supported Messali Hadj.
*As indicated above, portions of this letter enclosed in brackets end underlined, were omitted by The Newsletter, which confined itself to making only "excerpts" available to its readers.
_ = 36-
{No-one denies you the right to take these views, but it is a_bit much to both maintain such a position and then contend that it _is your revolutionary consistency which is at issue. Needless to say, many people in this Campaign have evolved in their political thinking, and no-one is interested in demanding qualifications for supporting the Vietnamese revolution other than sincerity and willingness to place that support in the forefront of their minds. The Labour M.P.'s who were invited to Speak on our platform were not being spared by us the revolutionary fervour of Mr. Banda. The point was something quite other, as you know. We asked that they should not be attacked while on our platform, speaking for solidarity. This is a bit different. The whole issue is one of what is the real interest of the organisations participating in the Vietnam Solidarity . ~ Campaign. Are those organisations interested in forging a united campaign in support of the Vietnamese or are they interested in . using the Vietnamese revolution as a vehicle for slating everyone else? The Solidarity Campaign is predicated on the view that a _ united front is possible in support of Vietnam. We shall stand or fall as a Campaign on this premise. ]
I should remind you that you telephoned me for a meeting and ‘ you made the suggestion that the S.L.L. should speak at our meeting and participate in our demonstrations. In response to this overture , I made three points as Chairman of the Campaign:
1. No attack on the N.L.F. and the D.R.V., whether with
' regard to the signing of the Geneva Agreements or any-
thing else, for this was at variance with our raison
d'etre.
2. No factional attacks on other participants in this
Campaign, but concentration upon exposing the aggres-
sor and supporting the victim of the aggression. :
3. No further use of the neo-fascist and colonial term
"Vietcong", which has been used repeatedly in the
Newsletter and by the Young Socialists.
{On all these points you agreed and the Campaign was pleased that the Socialist Labour League was prepared to support a united front minimum programme of solidarity with the people of Vietnam. :
(Indeed, after Mike Banda's effective speech, I congratulated him, as Chairman, and stated that he had spoken with force and clarity, expressing the views of every serious person in this Campaign. There was no animus shown the S.L.L., nor was there any predisposition to deny you a platform. |
The turning point came with your own violation of your word, when you came on the platform to denounce the Soviet leadership, the British Communist Party and all those who work with them. You have been around long enough to know that this was an attack on’all our main speakers and the principle of a united front. In fact, what you did was to give a signal, in effect, to break up our meeting.
As. Chairman, I acted in. support of.the united. front of the Solidarity . Campaign. Individual views concerning the Soviet Union or revolutionary change , or the role of the Communist Party in Britain, are ‘irrelevant to the call. we have made to everyone who takes the minimum ‘Position of supporting ‘the’ Vietnamese’ struggle (against imperialism: “Unite. together’. a
[These were: “the factional. considerations which | had iven rise originally to apprehensions about your presence on our platform. It is too easy to envisage spokesmen from the ¥.C.L., Communist Party in Britain or any other grouping coming on our platform, nominally in support of the Vietnamese revolution, but_actually to denounce "the Healyites" as wreckers or agents of American imperialism. If anyone had done this, I should have stopped them as quickly as I stopped your own attack on members of our platform. We insist that you understand that these questions can be discussed. in all..the ~ . respective organisations vi orousl but to intrude them in a united front campaign is to betray a complete, total inabitit to underand what a united front is, how it is to be run. and how: it can develop.
[You gave assurances that factionalism would not characterise your participation in our Campaign and Mr. Banda's speech conformed to those undertakings. Your own interruption was utterly destructive of this agreement and we would ask your well-disciplined supporters not to shout: "We will smash you", from the audience. We would further ask that shouting out slogans based on the term "Vietcong" should..not- continue articularl rou. agreed that this would be done.] There were many tendencies at that meeting and they are indignant about the tactics that you employed. [Your interest in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign was late, and I should give you two examples of your behaviour which enforce indignation about your ‘behaviour:
[L. In your report of our meeting in the Newsletter
_ you excluded mention of every other speaker, of
their contributions and of the activities of the
Solidarity Campai Your - Solidarity Campaign. Your -entire report consisted report consisted
Sf the tent of your own sbeakers the text of your own speaker. °
Le. When you were asked to participate in a demon-
‘'. stration against the presence in London of the
Deputy Premier of the puppet government in Saigon,
you_sent two people to sell the Newsletter at the
demonstration.
[All these things, combined with the intolerable behaviour at the meeting, make indignant the different groupings who were | present at the meeting and who were active in the Campaign. You must choose either to participate in united front activity and honour its decisions, or to stay out of the united front and attack it _as opportunist, or whatever you choose. If you come in and speak on its platform, then you cannot attack its very basis, having asked to participate. Here is a very clear political principle. Your con-
tinued support is welcome, but we want support for the aims of our Campaign and with the understanding that there will be no repetition . of your intolerable performance at_our last meeting. We do not want — you to join our ranks for the purpose of attacking imperialism, and then to.concentrate all your fire on other tendencies in our Campaign. The S.L.L. can conduct that struggle outside our Campaign, but _the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign was not set up for faction fighting by the 5.L.L. or by those whom it attacks.
[Yours faithfully,
[Ralph Schoenman
[P.S. Your letter of August 16 calls the Campaign: "A hodge podge of unrepresentative middle-class semi-pacifist elements whose main aim is to attack and slander the Socialist Labour League...". How curious of you to notice it so late. Perhaps it is because unable either to take over this Campaign or wreck it. You might explain that to your supporters. ]
JAPANESE UNIONS SCORE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM |
In a declaration, issued during its convention July 31- August 4, SOHYO, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (68 unjons, representing 5,670,000 members), said about the war in Vietnam:
"The American aggression in Vietnam is being intensified, and the United States is committing outrageous acts in bombing nonmilitary areas in Vietnam.
"These American actions will increase the possibility of an all-out war. The Sato government is lending active support to this American policy. Bases on Okinawa and in Japan are being used to serve America's aggressive purposes in Vietnam.
"The imperialist policy of capitalist monopoly is becoming more apparent in its designs and is reviving the prewar militarism of Japan.
"This is being demonstrated in the massive discharge of workers, and in the intensifying attacks against wage increases. The moves to establish a single-member constituency system and to amend . the constitution are but a few examples of such imperialist designs. |
"At this critical juncture, we must reaffirm the need for . unity and solidarity and establish a national front to fight against . the imperialists." -