Un service He presse ouvrier
Vol. 4, No. 3 . February 18, 1966
SENATE WITNESSES DEPLORE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
Johnson's hastily .contrived Honolulu sideshow succeeded in capturing newspaper headlines for a few days in the United States. But the spotlight placed on Hitler-loving Gen. Cao Ky, the favorite puppet of the president of the United Stetes, failed to dislodge the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from the attention being paid to them by the American public, which is becoming increasingly worried over the administration's escalation of the war in Southeast Asia. What the key witnesses said last week is being discussed from coast to coast.
New York, N. Y. 10010. HP
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Lieut. Gen. James Gavin appeared before the committee February 8. A paratroop commander in World War II and later ambassador to France, he is considered to be a leading authority in the field of military strategy. It was Gen. Gavin who advised President Eisenhower in 1954 not to send U.S. troops to back French forces in their effort to maintain French colonial domination of Indo-China.
The general made clear that in view of the extent of current U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he was opposed to withdrawing from the scene. He held that U.S. troops should be maintained in south Viet- » nam... But he argued insistently against any major escalation of the war. It would affect the capacity of the United States to meet what he considered to be more important "commitments" elsewhere in the world. He warned about the possibility of provoking China into intervening in the situation.
He charged that the government had become so "mesmerized" with Vietnam that it had allowed its involvement to become "alarmingly out of balance." As a. result, "we have been escalating at the will of our opponents rather than on our own judgment."
If the escalation of the war were carried too far, China, in the general's opinion, would be provoked into intervening. And the Chinese might not.confine themselves to Vietnam. They might open a ‘second front in Korea. Embroiled in: an Asian land war, the U. S. would be tempted to resort to nuclear weapons.
Gen. Gavin also argued that "if. you got far down the road" of a "war with China," this might well bring in the Soviet Union at some point.
The military expert stated that he felt. that the U.S. was "slowly creeping" toward "urban bombing" in Vietnam. He deplored — _this trend. "The bombing of Hanoi or Peking would achieve little, he said. After World War II, he recalled, a survey showed that "strategic bombing" had not "achieved either its projected military or psychological aims. Moreover, to borb cities would have a bad effect on world opinion.
‘George F. Kennan testified February 10. “The airthor of the Marshall Plan and the postwar policy of the "containment of Communism," Kennan is viewed in knowledgeable capitalist circles as one of the country's top experts in the diplomatic field, particularly with regard to the Soviet. Union. ; _ Kennan backed the position of Gen. Gavin, holding that the U.S. should not undertake further escalation but simply "dig: in." When asked if this position did not contradict his 1947. policy, Kennan said’ that at that time there had been only “one center of world Communism," Moscow, and that the policy had aimed.at protecting Western Europe, a big industrial complex with the will and capacity to contribute in carrying out the policy.
"Vietnam is not a region of major industrial-military impor-
tance," he said. "It is difficult to believe that any decisive development of the world situation is going to be determined by what happens on thet territory." Even if "the Vietcong" gained complete control in south Vietnam, Kennan said he saw no dangers "great enough to justify our direct military intervention." Only "considerations of prestige" are involved in maintaining U.S. ‘troops in Vietnam today.
Kennan held that it was "a most, dangerous assumption" to believe that if "sufficient military pressure" is brought to bear in south Vietnam "there will occur at. some point something in the nature of a political capitulation by the other side." The fighters of the National Liberation Front have much "space and manpower to give up, if they have to, and the Chinese can give them more if they need it."
To attempt to crush Hanoi "would almost certainly have the effect of bringing in Chinese forces at some point, whether formally. or in the guise of ‘volunteers,’ thus involving us in a military conflict with Communist China on one of the most unfavorable theaters of hostility thet we could possibly choose."
Not only. are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not receiving, as a consequence of our preoccupation with Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy, and hopeful possibilities we should be developing, are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater of activity."
Kennan indicated some of the things he had in mind. "Our relations with the Soviet Union have suffered grievously, as was to be expected -- and this at a time when far more important things — were involved in those relations than what is involved in Vietnan, and when we had special reason to cultivate them."
Besides the Soviet Union, Kennan expressed concern about relations with Japan. "The confidence and the good disposition of the Japanese is the greatest asset we have had -- and the greatest asset we could have in East Asia." With its war-making potential, "Japan is of vital importance to us..." Yet relations with Japan are being seriously affected by the "military struggle in Vietnam, . and particularly when we press it by means of strategic bombing."
Kennan likewise deplored the injury to the "image" of the United States due to "inflicting grievous injury on the lives of a poor and helpless ‘people, and particularly a people of different race and color..."
_. Neither Gavin nor Kennan fundamentally oppose the war in — Vietnam. They represent the view of the sector of the capitalist = class that believes this to be the wrong war at the wrong time at the wrong place. But this rift in the capitalist class over tactics is of importance to genuine opponents of the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and they should utilize it to the utmost in pursuing their own objective -- immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.
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MOSCOW'S BALANCING ACT BETWEEN PEKING AND WASHINGTON
By George Novack
World politics today is dominated by three major powers: the United States, the Soviet Union and China.
De Gaulle aspires to bring his government into that lofty company but France does not have the demographic, economic, military and strategic weight to do more than maneuver among the big three. As for Harold Wilson, he is following the’ policy long ago laid down by the British ruling class -- resignation to the role of a satellite to the American colossus.
The position and policies of the United States and China in respect to each other are well known and well defined. These regimes are open enemies; they entertain no friendship for each other; and in the colonial world they tend to clash at every point. Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist party newspaper, is wholly warranted in its charge February 2 that ‘American imperialism is seeking to tighten its military ‘encirclement of China. The containment of Chinese Communism is one of the reasons avowed by American imperialists. and militerists for expanding intervention in Southeast Asia.
“ihe, ‘ambiguous rolé is ‘that played by the Soviet Union. in the présent™ ‘international situation. Where does it’ stand, what are its aims, where is its diplomacy headed? This complex: ‘problem admits of no simple answer.
It is: Significant that Washington and Peking concur from opposing points: of view on their appraisal of the principal objective of Moscow's foreign policy. Both are aware that the Soviet © leaders would appreciate a deal with the United’ ‘States on the touchiest areas of conflict between the two superpowers. These range all the way from prohibiting West German access to nuclear weapons to a settlement of ‘the: Vretnam war.
Such a global agreement is implicit in the Kremlin's official doctrine of indefinite peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and the workers states which guides the calculations of its diplomats as well as the line of its followers in the Communist parties. If it were officially concluded and ratified, this would be tantamount to a de facto condominium of the two capitals over world affairs. -
“But there hag Seen and remains a winding and rocky road between the desired aim of the heads of the Soviet bureaucracy and its realization. Recurrent and irrepressible conflicts between the forces of revolution and the imperialist counterrevolution and the deepening antagonism between Washington and Peking keep upsetting the status quo and hindering Moscow from moving as fast or as far as it would like in coming to terms with - Washington.
This was dramatized by Johnson' $+ ‘decision to bomb ~orth Viet—-
nam while Kosygin was in Hanoi last February. It has been further emphasized by U.S. commitment of massive armed forces to the southeast ASian mainland. These developments have pushed off the possi-. bilities of any general agreement between Washington and Moscow at _ teast until that conflict is disposed of.
£t the same time Washington and Moscow are taking care not to blow up any more bridges that might lead later toward such an. agreement , whatever conflicts and tactical considerations may hold it up or even set it back for a period. More than that, both sides are projecting new points of support which can pave the way to it.
-: Johnson made a sizable concession to the Kremlin's demands last December when he quietly scuttled the proposed multilateral nuclear force under NATO which was to give Bonn a finger, and possibly a whole hand, on the nuclear trigger. In his State of the Union message the president suggested lowering the barriers: of trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
The Russian representatives have: reciprocated by indicating at Geneva their readiness to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty and sign an agreement not to resort to nuclear weapons first.
The latest charges and countercharges exchanged between - Peking and Moscow revolve around this question of Soviet relations with the United States. China has accused the Soviet leaders of collaborating with Washington in its encirclement policy. They are also indicted for following "a. policy of appeasement in. Europe" by refusing to open a second front in Berlin, thus allowing American troops to be released for duty ‘in Vietnam.
The Kremlin in turn has accused Peking of trying to push the Soviet Union into reckless military confrontations which would threaten world peace, of provoking more than 150. border incidents in.1965, and of holding up shipments of Russian military equipment to north Vietnam. The Chinese have officially denied the latter charge. )
The erucial point at issue in these mutual recriminations . is whether, and to what extent and.with what ends in view, Moscow is in collusion with Washington against China. Such an alignment of one workers state against another alongside the mightiest and most aggressive imperialist power would be a most reprehensible and perfidious breach of solidarity. : ‘The Chinese Communist leaders have ample grounds for suspecting and distrusting the direction of Soviet foreign policy. The withdrawal of.:Soviet technical aid and curtailment of trade after the 1960 split was followed by the supplying of Russian military equipment to India ‘during the India-~China border dispute. Then Moscow signed the nuclear test-ban treaty with Washington which was implicitly designed to slow down China's acquisition of nuclear arms.
- Washington and Moscow worked along parallel diplomatic lines to halt the India-Pakistan war and Premier Kosygin's efforts to settle that conflict at Tashkent met with U.S. approval. As The. Economist commented on January 15, 1966: "However embarrassing - it may be for Moscow to admit it, the new extent of Russian involvement Lin south Asia through the Tashkent agreement| also implies a greater degree of co-operation with the United States. Not that the Russians would not like to replace western influence with their own. But the subcontinent has not been summarily removed by Tashkent from what the Americans regard as their sphere of concern. The point is that the two super-powers both want peace there, they both want economic progress, they both want stability. And they both dislike China. Common interests like these do not exclude competition, but they do as & minimum imply that it will not be destructive compet ition. Ws
The Economist also points out that the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty would involve a joint Russian-American guarantee to protect India which would imply a joint foreign policy in Asia directed against China and its nuclear capability.
This series of moves gives. substance to Peking's claims that Moscow is seeking to create a cordon sanitaire of India, Pakistan and Japan around China.
This opinion is not limited to Peking. It is confirmed from the. opposite side of the three-power triangle. When U.S. Vice- President Humphrey returned from attending Shastri's funeral in New Delhi, where he talked with Premier Kosygin, he stated flatly in a television interview that the Soviet government was intent upon encircling China. Similar views have been voiced by such wellinformed U.S. statesmen as Ambassador Harriman.
Buffeted between Washington and Peking and-between the pressures of. imperialism and the world revolution, the Soviet leaders have beén compelled to steer a devious course on the international political arena. On the one hand, they must formally, and sometimes even truculently, oppose and try to block the most insolent and perilous of Washington's aggressions while maintaining lines of communication, conducting parallel actions, and taking small specific steps toward agreement with the U. S.
‘on the ‘other hand, they cannot too! ‘openly consort with Washington before they have secured the basic conditions for a general agreement satisfactory to themselves. That would risk damaging their prestige and: losing their influence in the world Communist movement and. among the unaligned colonial nations and handing over leadership of the international anti-imperialist struggle to Peking. These considerations oblige the Kremlin to tread cautiously between the contending forces and occasionally jut its chin to the left in an anti-American stance.
Thus, many months after a shameful lack of response to Johnson's bombings of north Vietnam, Premier Kosygin took a tough
tone toward Washington in his December 6 interview with New York Times correspondent James Reston, .as did Foreign Minister Gromyko . in a follow-up speech to the Supreme Soviet in connection with the five-per-cent increase in the military budget. Similar motives may well have induced the Soviet representatives to set aside -their..previous conciliatory policy and ‘formally accede to the ‘perspective of armed guerrilla struggle as the. main line for the Latin-American-revolution: voted by the Tricontinental Conference at Havana. :
From the time of his meeting at Camp David with Eisenhower in 1959, Khrushchev strove to arrive at an understanding with the U.S. even at the cost of a rupture with China. After his downfall, the Kosygin-Brezhnev team hoped for a time to-assume a more neutral stance and remain on good terms with both antagonists. Khrushchev's successors refrained from public polemics with Peking and sought to moderate and muffle. the points of conflict between ‘them.
Now the. sharpening of tensions generated. by the. ‘expansion of the war in Southeast Asia has made it increasingly difficult to find and hold a middle ground against both of the contending sides, -Vietnam has become the focal point and testing ground of world politics today. And the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of CHina are being strained to the breaking point by the year-long escalation of U.S. intervention there.
The two strongest noncapitalist governments had the elementary duty to have closed ranks instantly in reply to the. stepped-up imperialist aggression. Such coordination of aid and action was dictated by the need to back up the national liberation struggle in south Vietnam, defend the independence of north Vietnam brutally. assaulted by U. S. air raids, and to ward off. the. threat. of war against China and’a possible nuclear. -conflict.
Instead, just as Johnson proceeds to send in more U.S. troops, Moscow and Peking present the spectacle of open disunity and mutual recriminations. Let us. assume that ‘the worst is true and the Kremlin is in league with Washington against Moscow, as Peking charges. What more effective means could Peking have used to block that policy and expose the hidden aims of the Soviet leaders than to have grasped with both hands Shelepin's call for "all socialist countries. ‘to pool their efforts to aid Vietnam by all means."
However, Mao and his associates have assumed the attitude of refusing to accept Moscow's proposal for joint action on the factional pretext that it is impossible to work together with "renegades" and "revisionists."
‘For example, the February 10 Hung Chi, organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, declared: "We will never take any united action with the new leaders of the Soviet party so long as they do not abandon the Khrushchev revisionist line, do not change their line of Soviet-U.S.-Indian-Japanese alliance."
This sectarianism has not only weakened the anti-imperialist front to the benefit of the enemy but has laid Peking open to the
Soviet charges of interfering with military shipments to north Vietnam and contributing nothing "positive" to the struggle.
Meanwhile the Soviet and Chinese representatives are each seeking to attain predominant influence in Hanoi, which would prefer to remain equidistant from the quarreling powers. Washington is counting on the Soviet leaders to cast their weight into the balance at the proper juncture to bring the Vietnamese to the conference table. There are signs that Moscow would not be unwilling to perform the seme mediating role in Southeast Asia as it has on the Indian subcontinent.
This is hinted at by a February 7 New York Times editorial speculating on a "Sino-Soviet Showdown" when the twenty-third congress of the Soviet Communist party meets next month. It concludes: "Should such a formal schism take place, it might increase Moscow's freedom of action in exerting pressure for reason in Vietnam, assuming -- as appears probable -- that the Chinese are correct in charging that Moscow agrees with. Washington that the time has come for negotiations to end the savage struggle in Vietnam."
The added supplies pledged to Hanoi by Soviet leader Shelepin on his recent visit to Hanoi does not necessarily contradict this possibility; it can serve as a means for strengthening Moscow's. position for such a purpose.
However, great obstacles stand in the way of the would-be "peacemakers." The Pentagon's decision to crush the national liberation movements and contain the People's Republic of China, the firmness of Peking, and, not least; the determination of the Vietnamese, north and south, not to be again cheated by diplomacy of what they have won through years of costly struggle.
BELGIAN UNIONS BACK VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE
At a recent meeting of the national committee of the Confederation Generale des Services Publics, which is affiliated to the Federation Generale des Travailleurs de Belgique, a motion to support the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee and its political opposition to U.S. involvement in the civil war in Vietnam was adopted by a very large majority.
The chairman was instructed to place the same motion before the national congress of the FGTB, but failed to do so. Thus it has not been possible as yet to determine the extent of the support which the Vietnam Day Committee has received in the Belgian tradeunion movement.
However, the two erade-aiton oPgani sata one that have already
gone on record -- the Liege Region of the FGTB and the CGSP -represent almost 250,000 workers. |
‘DEMONSTRATIONS IN. SUPPORT OF BELGIAN MINERS
Brussels oo For the first time in many years, violence has flared in workers struggles in the-Flemish (northern) part of Belgium. Barricades were set up on roads, trees were cut down and police. cars burned. Wide-scale fighting occurred between strikers, and: state pplice.
~ This occurred in. Limburg, the most: backward of: Belgium! s “provinces, where the reactionary Catholic party usually obtains between sixty and seventy per cent of the votes in general elections and where even the reformist unions headed by the Social Democrats hardly have a foothold in the plants.
What triggered off this sudden outburst of the class struggle was the government's: decision to close down one of the: six coal mines in Limburg, a pit named Zwartberg (black mountain) near the . industrial center of the province, the town of Genck (where a big Ford truck assembly plant is’ located).
As in the rest of Western Europe, the Belgian coal industry has suffered a continual: crisis of overproduction since 1957 due to $33 the competition of oil and gas-as fuels for homes and industries; (2) the competition of cheap American coal which is delivered at the ports cheaper than most European. Mines can offer it at the pit head.
The Belgian coal barons, who had pocketed more than $1,000,- 000,000 in subsidies from the public treasury, were quite unprepared for the crisis in overproduction. The various governments tnat have been in office since 1957 have. similarly been unable to cope with the problem. Their sole response has been to close down one mine after another without undertaking any serious measures to reconvert the regions industrially. As a result, the industries of the Borinage, one of the first regions to be industrialized in the nineteenth century have been practically wiped out.
Up until the late thirties, the Borinage had one of the most ' militant labor movements in the country. In 1959, in a desperate effort to save their jobs, the Borinage miners went out on strike. The rest of the-labor movement failed to back them up and so. their struggle was defeated.
In recent years the Flemish part of the country has seen -more investment and building of new industries than the Walloon ., sector. The Flemish workers were told again and again by the. government: parties and the trade-union bureaucracy that. they had "“definitively won full employment." a ;
This is why the sudden announcement that the Zwartberg mine was to be shut down provoked such anger, particularly when nothing precise: was said about. new jobs for the workers laid off. When the first ‘ones got their notices , the whole pit went out on strike.
On January 31 the strikers spontaneously resorted to an old
tradition among. the Walloon workers -- they organized a flying squad to go to adjoining enterprises and persuade the workers to come out in solidarity with the strike. os A large contingent of gendarmes (state police under the command of the minister of the Interior) sought to prevent them from reaching the nearby pits of Winterslag and Waterschei. Scuffling broke out. When the gendarmes threw tear-gas grenades, the strikers pried stones loose from the road and threw these along with bricks, chunks of asphalt, branches and whatever else that. was handy. The gendarmes responded with gunfire, killing two young strikers -- one at Winterslag and-the other near Waterschei.
In hope of diverting the indignation of the workers” over these brutal murders, government spokesmen and the leaders of both “- government coalition parties (the right-wing Social Christians and the Social Democrats) claimed that the Limburg incidents were due to agitators who had "incited" the extreme right-wing Flemish nationalists. In this way they sought to divide the Belgian working class over the national question which has been much in the forefront in recent years. However, the attempt failed miserably.
_ The next morning, 10,000 Liege metal workers, alerted by working-class. members of the new left Socialist party, stopped work in solidarity with their martyred Flemish brothers. In Liege. where the federalist tendency of the Walloon Popular Movement is the strongest, the anger of the workers over the ‘killing gave rise to “the most militant demonstrations.
For three successive days one work stoppage after another was interspersed with action in the: streets. The official trade-union leadership identified itself‘with this solidarity movement and sent a big delegation of 300 metal workers to the funeral services for the two miners which were held February 4%. They arrived with a huge banner: "The Liege Workers in Solidarity with the Striking Miners of Limburg." This drew tremendous applause. More than 4,000 persons attended the funeral.
The crowd was addressed by Camille Huysmans. Notwithstanding his age of 95, he made the trip from Antwerp to Limburg to. condemn the government for its repressive action and to:express solidarity with the miners. The old socialist leader received a big ovation.
When the news was broadcast about the murder of the: two miners, the new left Socialist party, the Parti Wallon des Travailleurs (Walloon Workers party), issued a leaflet calling attention to the ‘fact that this was the.first time in the history of Belgium that strikers had been killed as a result of orders. issued by a Social- Democratic minister of the Interior.
The leaflet supported the strike, called upon the workers to support. the miners by extending strike action, and proposed the following slogans:' no layoffs; a 40-hour week ‘without reduction in weekly pay; nationalization, under workers control, of the coal
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mines and all other sources of energy.
A second leaflet was distributed at the funeral calling upon the workers to solidarize with forty-five mine workers of foreign nationality who had been threatened with deportation by the government for participating in the strike and in demonstrations. The Belgian mining industry is a real melting pot, including workers from Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Morocco, Holland, Poland and various other countries.
Work stoppages to express solidarity with the Limburg miners -have flared throughout the country. Students have staged street demonstrations in four different towns.
Under pressure of these actions, the government finally granted a concession to the strikers, promising not to close the Zwartberg mine until all the miners have been given jobs elsewhere.
IS. KREMLIN. SEEKING TO UNITE COMMUNISTS IN INDIAS
By Kailas Chandra
Bombay ; There Rave been. persistent reports in the Indian press about the possibility of. a rapprochement bétween the pro-Moscow right-wing Communist party. of India and the pro-Peking left-wing Communist party. of India. The initiative in this, it is claimed, was taken by Suslov.,. one. of. the secretaries of the Communist. party of the Soviet Union..Suslov is alleged to have held a series of meetings with P. Sundarayye., general secretary of the left CPI, who is convalescing in Moscow after an abdominal operation there. Sundarayya, one of those arrested and detained under the Defence of India Rules was ‘released by the Indian authorities on medical grounds and given special permission to go to Moscow last year.
The Times of India reported from New Delhi on February 5:
"While the prospects of a merger of the two split communist groups in India are considered remote by both factions, a serious attempt is being made to secure a measure of understending to enable them to forge a joint front in the general election in 1967 as _well as to make common cause. with other left parties for agitational purposes. :
"It is now fairly well known that ‘the Soviet top communist theoretician, Mr. Suslov, has been urging the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party (Marxist) to get together.
"The proposal was made to Mr.S.A.Dange when he visited Russia seon after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and to Mr. P. Sundarayya, who is in Moscow and is expected to return to India about the middle of this month.
"Even Mr. Suslov does not appear to have suggested a reunification of the two factions of communists in India and is further believed to have pleaded with the left communist leader not to make things embarrassing to the chairman of the CPI.
"The Russian. leader was presumably encouraged to moot the idea of. the two factions getting together by a change in the dogmatic -pro-Peking attitude of Mr. Sundarayya, particularly as a result of the India-Pakistan conflict in which China not only actively sided with Pakistan but also made every effort to fan the flames.
"The animus between the two factions seems to persist if the correspondence between Mr. Sundarayya and a colleague of his, said to have been deliberately leaked out, reflects the present thinking of the left Communists.
Although it has been officially denied in both Moscow and India that Suslov and Sundarayya held formal meetings, Rajeshwar Rao, generel secretary of the right CPI, speaking in New Delhi February © at a function to mark the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist party of India, formally "invited" the left CPI to join it in mass movements without raising "fissiparous ideological and political debates."
Rajeshwar Rao, who, like Sundarayya, is from Andhra, made it clear that his party is not thinking of merger now. He said that it. has been his experience that the "communist movement closed ranks whenever it took up mass action." This was a reference to the agitation conducted by the two CPI's jointly with other left parties in India on food and other questions in different states, including Kerala. He. is supposed to have said that "such unity in action" would be in accordance with the decision taken at the Bombay congress of the right CPI. .
Referring to newspaper reports about a Moscow directive, he said he was not aware of any "order" from the Soviet Communist leader, Suslov, to the "two Indian parties to come together." However, he referred to a letter allegedly written by Sundarayya from Moscow to his party members but said it was for Sundarayya to explain whether or not it was authentic. What is purported to be the full text of this letter from Sundarayya was published in the February 5 issue of Current ,. an anti-Communist Bombay weekly.
Rajeshwar Rao made some significant remarks about the relationship of the right CPI with Communist parties in other countries. He said that the international Communist movement had "passed the stage when it put its faith in any one individual or any single party." He added: "Nobody in the international movement after the death of Stalin has been able to do such a thing as ordering us.' This is the first time a CPI leader has publicly admitted that in Stalin's time the CPI took "orders" from Moscow.
Rao admitted that it was a matter of regret that the Communist movement is split in India like the international movement. He
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said: "If. both. the parties in India work unitedly other leftist par- ‘ties would also‘come-into the movement: then we can actually change “the events ‘and.mould them. Bitternéss between the two parties will ~.also be“overcome. -Comrades must’ think more in terms of going to the péople and:working among them in terms of debates. ‘Then we can unite the communist movement and united progressive force, and show a path to our country." (Eree Press Journal, February Ve )
Evidently Rajeshwar ‘Rao is “not: ‘prepared for "ea debate" on. the differences'‘that separate thé two :CP's:in India nor is he prepared.:to discuss the issués that Have brought about a split in the international Communist movement. He wants "unity in action without debates." Debates can be embarrassing to the right CPI. Rao has in view the coming general elections in India in: 1967. He really is more worried about winning a few seats for the party in the Indian parliament and state. legislatures than about building up a powerful mass movement to oust the present bourgeois Tegime~
The two CPI's have some things in common. ‘They reject the
perspective of a socialist revolution in India, both of them main- ‘taining that the immediate stage facing the Indian revolution is bourgeois-—democratic-in character. Both of them advocate a "fourclass” ‘bil6e" with the national bourgeoisie. :
Among ‘the differences, the right CPI stands for the creation of a "National Democratic Front" in which leadership would be handed to?the national“bourgeoisié, while the left CPI stands for setting up a "People' s Democratic Front," including the national bour- : geoisie but with leadership held by the proletariat. In addition, the: left CPI holds open ‘the "possibility" of the.proletarian leadership: of-thé "People's: Democratic Front" carrying. forward an "“antiimperialist. and’ antifeudal revolution" uninterruptedly to the next stage of a socialist: revolution. In actual practice the left CPI stands for the workers and poor peasants conducting a militant struggle against the Congress government. That is why it has been subjectéd'to severe repression by the Congress.government since 1962 when thé border conflict between India and China erupted. §-
Within both groups various tendencies are opposed to an opportunistic: unity move. But centrist elements on both sides are “much in favor of a merger of some kind. Bupesh Gupta in the right ‘CPI and Namboodiripad ain the left CPI are among these. They con- ceive of: a process of "elimination of. undesirables" in both groups.
Recent reports have also appeared in the bourgeois press that _ some leaders of the left CPI in jail, including B.I.Ranadive, have been disillusioned with the so-called "Chinese strategy of world revolution" and have become critical: of the Chinese leadership, : especially after: the debacle suffered by the: powerful pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist party.
The right CPI headquarters. in Delhi has admitted that the central committee of the CPSU sent a message wishing every success to the CPI "in achieving unity ‘of its ranks." A letter from the. CPSU
on this topic was, in fact read at the meeting held at New Delhi on February 6. Similar interest in achieving unity between the two CP's: in India is believed to have been taken by the Communist parties: of - Czechoslovakia, East. Germany and Rumania. The Rumanian party is’ supposed to be inclined toward taking a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict. : be,
On February 6 Pravda officially denied the report in Indian newspapers that Suslov had met with Sundarayya. The report was termed a "concoction" and one which "does not accord with reality." It may be noted, however, that the report first appeared in Janashakti, a Telugu daily newspaper published by the left CPI in Andhra. .—. Janashakti later repudiated the report as did the Eeopie. s Democracy , the party's English-language weekly. :
Sunderayya's letter from Moscow is said to have been cireu- « lated as early as January 11 by the Punjab leader of the left CPI: Harkishan Singh Surjeet. The following extracts are taken from the version published by Current:. be
"The stay in Moscow has been ‘useful in another respect. During the last few days, Suslov of the CPSU leadership visited me onthree occasions and had fairly long talks with me. He expressed oe, concern for my health and soon we were having thorough organsational and ideotogical discussions.
"He seemed. to be interested in improving ‘the relations between the CPSU and ‘ourselves.
"Such an attempt is “not without value to us in providing an. opportunity to neutralise or in any case reduce the support of the. CPSU to the Dange clique without giving in at.all on our positions on national or international issues, and, . I. feel that I have definitively gained in this. sobjectives
"Phe substance of these discussions ‘should be discussed by. the Politbureau and I am, therefore, summarising it-here to the extent possible.
"T want again to point out-that our talks were held at.the initiative of Com. Suslov, who: appeared keen to have an exchange of views. I welcomed the same by telling. him that I hoped that a clear: understanding of our position by the CPSU would contribute to a. greater harmony within the world Communist Movement , which you will no doubt . ‘agree is. now: sadly lacking.
"During our talks I clearly enunciated our ideological | stand and did not yield:on any issue. of ideology or tactics..So far the... discussion has centred around ‘the split in the CPI as Suslov, has avoided any discussion on international issues....
' “Suslov was thus very:keen for the. reunification of the Communist Movement in India-and gave me the impression that.the Dangeites make necessary'changes, expulsions and concessions to -facili-.
tate this, though itis clear that the CPSU had no intention of denouncing the Dangeites at any stage as they believe this to be tactically: inferior and | din ‘the. long. tun UNNECESSATY «9 ¢
“'Suslov assured me ‘that the -Cpsu had rather strongly’ asked. . the Dange group to desist from slanders against the CPI and that he > had. personally advised..Dange to.doithe-needful to forge a Left United -Front. with’ the: CPI. and: other progressive | parties for: the:, 14967 elections.... obs 2) ugusiov. suggested ‘that. ‘the most vulnerable: “aspect. of. ‘the Congress. regime was its inability to féed the people. ‘and this’ offered ~ a very valuable opportunity for joint action’on the agricultural front.
a "Joint: ‘campaigns. with | other’ ‘progressive | parties. must, be pre-_ pared. against . food shortages - and to expose among. the’ peasantry the . “Bogus ‘schemes’ of food procurement hatched by the Government.
The dependerice on American food could. 4 ‘Sa. be ‘utilised tos. show the close working relationship between. the’ Shastri regime, the .. comprador bourgéoisie of India and the imperialists. oS
"This is in summary the substance of my discussion with Con. Suslov so far. I shall write again if any other such discussions are held. I have a clear impression from thése ‘talks that the leaders.of the CPSU are shedding their illusions about the strength and poten- tial.of the Dange clique, and are willing to, Becept the viewpoint of the CPI” on. important national issues." ; eon a a es
Although the existence of the letter has not been. ” alert Bar By the left CPI, it cannot be ruled out that it is a CI£ forgery. The CIA propagandists would naturally like to frighten New Delhi with planted stories about "Soviet designs" | with regard to building up an antigovernment "popular" movement in-India’on the food question.
~ “But if Sundarayya's letter is authentic, it only indicates that the Kremlin bosses are. _trying to win over the left CPI ‘by agreeing to. ‘sacrifice Dange © and his discredited associates in-the right’ CPi. But, as Rajeshwar Rao has pointed out; Moscow can no longer “order": “the: CPI: to. bring about a ‘sudden: ‘change in line to suit the diplomatic needs of the Soviet Union. In this: case ‘in particular, the right CPI is too much committed to a line of class collaboration with the national bourgeoisie and’ ‘opportunistic parliamentarism to embark on a line of militant class struggle. The left. CPI has not yet formally responded to the una ty overtures of the right CPI.
INFLATION IN BRAZIL
‘In his 31° ‘months in “office, Goulart printed 700,000 ,000 , O00 cruzeiros.. Accused among, other things of fostering inflation. he. was: overthrown by Castelo Branco: In the 21 months ‘since then, 1, 5385, 000,000,000 cruzeiros have rolled off the printing presses.
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