STORMY INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN CHINA -- II
By Livio Maitan
[Continued from last week. ]
_.. Why This Campaign Now?
The principal themes of the present round of polemics and’ _ denunciations, as we have seen, go back into the past. Why then — was the campaign set in motion at this stage, beginning last November when a Shanghai newspaper opened fire on the unfortunate Wu Han? :
A number of factors of various kinds appear to have been involved. The ruling group probably felt that critical elements | and oppositionists Cox persons presumed to be such) were in | positions of too great importance and were waiting for an occasion to settle accounts. Specific events on which we as yet have no information may have pushed them into opening their offensive out . of fear of a turn less favorable to them or in reply to the moves of the others. (It is possible that a crisis was developing in the Political Bureau, two members of which ~~ Peng Chen and Iu Ting-yi -- had been eliminated.) (40)
No special emphasis is put on international questions in the official documents, but there is no doubt that the events of the second half of 1965 and the beginning of 1966 constituted a heavy liability for the Maoist leadership. Oppositionists might have taken advantage of it and there is every reason to believe that very sharp debates broke out over this question, including the highest levels. The imperialist escalation in Vietnam was 7 also very likely a subject of conflict, particularly in relation to the problem of China's attitude toward the Soviet Union. This is a factor that might well have determined the Mao group to take the initiative in order to avoid being taken by surprise and to keep the situation well in hand.
It is also possible that the leadership team wanted to take timely precautions, bearing in mind certain eventualities which they would strive to meet absolutely united and with completely firm positions. The most tragic eventuality might be a test of strength with the United States, including a military confrontation (hence the necessity for firm control over the army). Another might be problems arising in an acute way from economic developments. At present, the economic situation is not especially
(40) It was said in a long article in Red Flag June ll that the attack on the "monsters" had the aim of removing the "time-—bomb" in which these adversaries of the party had put their hopes. (See HNA, June 12, p. 10, and also HNA, July 21, p. 6.) .
tense and nothing indicates that it is at the bottom of the conflicts of recent months.(41) But 1966 marks the beginning of the third plan and tensions are bound to occur in carrying out the plan whether things go well or whether there are serious failures. Hence the possibility, in the not distant future, of some offensive mounted by critical elements who might resume themes currently on the order of the day in the USSR and in the peoples democracies; in particular, themes which the Maoists consider utterly pernicious. It is possible, therefore, that they wanted to strike down the potentially dangerous "revisionists" here and now.
The international press has strongly inclined to interpret the crisis as an episode in the struggle over the succession. Aside from the sensationalist element and the arbitrary hypotheses concerning Mao's health, the problem is actually posed in more general terms than the possible replacement of the chairman. For a whole series of well-known reasons, the Chinese leadership is . among the oldest in the workers states and Communist parties; and the need for alternative leaders will become more and more pressing. It is perhaps with this problem in mind that the old leadership wished to clean out any critical or doubtful elements and launch a thoroughgoing campaign reaffirming the universal validity of its concepts and methods, symbolized by Mao's thought. In other words they may have been preoccupied with the problem of assuring the continuity of the leadership in a period of difficulties for the country. It is possible that the events which occurred in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death is a subject of reflection for Mao.
Insofar as it is possible to judge from fragmentary reports, no promotion of new, younger elements has occurred on the highest level. But it appears that Lin Piao, the least aged of the old guard, now occupies the number two spot. Do they hope that he will be in the best position to play a role in solving the problem of continuity of leadership when the older ones are no longer able to maintain their positions? (42)
(41) According to the China Association of London -- which is . composed of British firms dealing with China -- industry in 1965 progressed by 20% (19.9% in 1964). Difficulties developed in agriculture, with a drop in the production of cereals (the production of. tractors is also running into difficulties); but agriculture as a whole is reported to have progressed by 5%.
(42) Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping were mentioned in the People's Daily (HNA July 1, p. 6) on the anniversary of the Chinese Communist party, which cited statements they had made. But Lin Piao alone was cited in many documents as the faithful interpreter of Mao's thought . 7
With regard to Lin Piao, it should be remembered that for reasons of health he was absent from the political scene for long stretches. He became Minister of Defense in 1959 after Peng Teh-huai was ousted.
Style and Specific Features of the Chinese Bureaucracy
During the recent crisis, as on previous occasions, a certain "style," characteristic of the Mao leadership could be noted. The immediate: aim of ‘an operation appears limited and incidental, and during the first phase they advance cautiously as if they were feeling ‘out the ground. Then they mount a feverish campaign with a rising tempo, bringing enormous propaganda means to bear. What remains to be seen is whether this time, too, a moderating rectification will later be brought in to restore the overall equilibriun.
The methods used in recent months are reminiscent of the . methods and formulas of other Chinese campaigns against critical elements and oppositionists as well as being in the old Stalinist tradition. The frenzied glorification of Mao, the use of amalgams, the absurdity of certain accusations, the denunciation of previously forgotten "misdeeds" of the past to discredit those under accusation(43), mobilizations from the top down and bureaucratically orchestrated demonstrations of support, multiple pressure on partisans abroad to lend uncritical support to the campaigns -- there are so many well-known elements present that. we need not characterize them again. (44)
At the same time, all this confirms the revolutionary Marx~
ist characterization of the Chinese leadership as bureaucratic in nature and brings. into sharp relief the persistence of the pernicious. effects of its Stalinist education. Still; this time too the. existence of specific’ methods and concepts cannot be ignored.
First of all, at least up to now, the campaign underway has — not been accompanied by police repression or the physical liquidation of those under fire. For the time being, not even the expul-_|
(43)The accusations brought against Wu Han were particularly absurd. "He was personally groomed by the reactionary politician Hu Shih and consistently worshipped the U.S. and was pro- Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Communist." (HNA, June 12, p. 11. ) .
(44) It is necessary to point out one aspect of the present campaign which is probably aimed at exploiting backward concepts and outlooks still surviving in some layers of the population. On the one hand, the oppositionists are depicted as demoniac beings and are commonly characterized as "monsters" and "evil spirits." On the other hand, a veritable power of exorcism is attributed to the name and thought of Mao: "When there is any mention of Mao Tse-tung's ideas, they Lthe oppositionists] get upset, start swearing and cursing, and even get quite hysterical, just like the imperialists and Khrushchov revisionists." (HNA, July 1, p. 6.) "Tsai Lien-hsing said that in the twenty years since his locomotive was named Mao Tse-tung, it had not a single accident, because 'we are equipped with Mao Tse-tung's thought." (HNA, July 4, p. 12.)
sion of the leaders and intellectuals, who are the targets of very serious accusations, has been announced. Furthermore, the climate of ideological terrorism has not eliminated the paternalistic tone and it must not be forgotten either that the recent culturalpolitical discussions developed rather freely with statements by those attacked as well as by those who spoke in their defense being published in the press. One should note, however, that the self- ‘criticisms made up to this point have been regarded as incomplete and unsatisfactory by the ruling group. (45)
As for the political content, I will not return to what we have already said a number of times, particularly with regard to the economic policy and line of the Chinese CP in agriculture, which does not seem to have been rectified in the present crisis. (46) Nonetheless attention should be called to a real leitmotiv that constantly turns up even in the documents of recent months and ~ which it would be a mistake to underestimate -+ the reaffirmation of equalitarian concepts. It is expressed in many forms, from the proclamation of certain norms to the denunciation of the dangers of degeneration inherent in differentiations in the level of the standard of living and social conditions, in the constant reference to the necessity of not separating oneself from the masses and of living with them, to the extolling of cadres ready to share all the difficulties facing the masses and impervious to the temptation of privileges. (47) So
(45)It is well-known that certain celebrated "deviationists" of the thirties, who are always cited as negative examples, far from having suffered the fate of their counterparts in the Soviet CP or the other CP's, are still in the party, and in some cases are members of the Central Committee. (This is the case, for example, with Li Li-san and Wang Ming.) This has not prevented them from using different criteria against other oppositionists, in particular the Trotskyists who have suffered and are still suffering repression.
It must also be noted that at the same time intellectuals are attacked as supporters of the bourgeoisie, the ruling group takes care to reassure its bourgeois fellow travelers as to its — intentions toward them. (See HNA, June 12, pp. 9-10.)
(46)0n this question, see the resolution on the Sino-Soviet conflict adopted at the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International. Section II, part "b." a
(47)Passages have already been cited from: recent documents dealing with this question, in particular some from the article on the direction of enterprises (see HNA, April 4) and the relevant article (HNA, April 2) cited in footnote 35. Again, it should be noted that the report of Hsiao Hua to the conference on political work in the army said, among other things: "While carrying out the mass line consistently in the three spheres, we should resolutely prevent cadres from becoming 'special' and help them to overcome any such tendency; the cadres should always be solicitous of the
-This does not mean that there are actually no social differentiations and bureaucratic privileges in Chinese.society. But the inequalities, according to all the serious observers, are. much more limited than they were in the Soviet Union in the time of Stalin (and than they are in the Soviet Union today). Im any case, the -choice of an ideological theme which is constantly advanced cannot - be considered as pure and simple deception -- all the more: so since propaganda along these lines is not without its repercussions on the outlook and activities of a whole series of cadres and, in the last analysis, on the attitude of the masses themselves. It will be remembered that Stalin, contrariwise, sought to give theoretical justification to inequality, denouncing any resistance to: the growing differentiations as "petty bourgeois"; and that Stalin praised, among other things, the displays of Stakhanovism, a phenomenon which has no real counterpart in the Chinese experience.
Political and Social Tensions and the Perspectives
: Beyond the crisis of the most recent months, in what fields .and what forms are tensions likely to develop in People's China?
= An answer is not easily found, since many of the elements necessary for a judgment are lacking; but nonetheless some hypotheses can be advanced on possible perspectives. : nS
I will not return to the international context, which has unquestionably influenced the Chinese developments. But it should be noted that it is precisely in this field, which represented a strong point for the Chinese bureaucracy in recent years(48), that
masses and be at one with them. Our cadres must behave like ordinary labourers and ordinary soldiers..." (HNA, January 25, p. 8.) See also the April 30 speech by Chou En-lai (HNA,; May 2). In an article on the work of the functionaries in Yenan, we read: "These functionaries receive pay according to the actual amount and quality of «.field work they do, as is the case with all the ordinary peasants, from whom they are indistinguishable." (HNA, May 23, p. 6.) The ' press also published extracts from the diary of a soldier famous for his heroic actions, where we read:the following for the date of December 31, 1964: "Labour, especially physical labour, is the best road for the revolutionization of our youth. It enables us to reject non-proletarian ideology and develop proletarian ideology." (HNA, June 9, p. 17.) On June 30, the press extolled a young peasant cadre with leadership responsibilities who lived among the peasants, on their level, and who arrived at the local headquarters of the sector under his direction in a bus, dressed modestly and with a small suitcase. (HNA, July 1, p. 11.)
- (48)The perspective of international successes to relieve the situation had a real basis in fact. At the same time, the measures taken by Khrushchev against China, along with the constant threats of
the most serious frictions could develop in the near future. The ‘truth is that after a period of successes in the diplomatic field ‘ag well as the international Communist movement, the Chinese suffered extremely serious setbacks which have already had repercussions within the party and leading bodies and which will have still more in the future. If no substantial change intervenes, the attitude toward the war in Vietnam will in particular induce differences - and conflicts because the entire world will have noted that solemn ‘declarations. are not followed up by concrete measures. The problem of the need for a united front agreement with the Soviet Union against American imperialism and for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution, cannot be eluded indefinitely with the help of more and more virulent denunciations of the misdeeds of the Moscow leaders.
The methods adopted in the conflict within the Communist movement and in relations with the revolutionary movements of the colonial countries also threatens to create disillusionment and crises. Attitudes which are sectarian in the extreme may lead to even greater isolation; and the support of opportunist leaderships and orientations can only lead to impasses or to new grave defeats. The total lack of critical analysis of some very important experiences like the one in Indonesia, contributes, in addition to sowing confusion and demoralization and even to facilitating the maneuvers of the Soviet leaders. Lastly, the efforts of the Chinese to have at their disposal absolutely loyal groups or "parties," ready to repeat everything they say, will only result in artificial creations and a kind of inverse selection among party cadres and members who turn toward China out of revulsion against the rightist opportunism of the pro-Soviet parties. (49)
To touch briefly on the internal problens, China will have to confront difficulties in the industrial sector similar to those experienced by the Soviet Union, particularly when it has achieved sustained growth rates and attained higher productive levels. When this comes, the problems and debates which the ruling group has been seeking to eliminate will inevitably arise again. With regard to agriculture, despite the excesses of the years of the "great leap forward," there are no dramatic tensions in the Chinese countryside comparable to the tensions that have existed in the Soviet. countryside for twenty years. Relations between the state and the peasants in particular are quite different; and acute problems over the prices of products which the peasants deliver to the state do not
imperialism, facilitated a certain rallying around the party and its ruling group. (49)In the long run, the lessons of the Indonesian experience cannot be ignored; and the balance sheet of groups like the one led by Grippa Lin Belgium] and those existing in the Latin-American countries must also be drawn. Furthermore, the Chinese will reflect on their break with the Cubans to which they contributed by their sectarianism and their inadmissible methods of pressure.
exist.(50) ©
However, difficulties and contradictions are developing and will continue to develop because of the relatively weak rate of growth and the lack. of the industrial products needed by the countryside. Hence. the possibility, despite everything, that the tendency of the peasants to become increasingly disinterested in collective labor -- the efficiency of which is reduced by the lack of certain material prerequisites -- and to become more and more exclusively interested in.their little plots and individual trade will become manifest and grow deeper in China, too. In this area, the leading group must move, and continue to move, with extreme — caution, if they want to avoid compromising their relationship with the peasant masses in spite of the, be it repeated, absence of the negative factors which have operated in the USSR or in the people's democracies-of Europe.
The so-called "self-reliance" line, which had its legitimate side as a defense against the practices of the Soviet bureaucracy and as-an exposure of certain Khrushchevist theses, will inevitably manifest its limitations. The Chinese economy will not be able to develop in a balanced and harmonious way and with the necessary high rates of growth if it is not integrated into the larger context of a community of collectivist states.
New tensions will undoubtedly arise in the cultural field. Past experience has demonstrated that conflicts and debates cannot be suppressed despite all the measures resorted to by the party and state bureaucracy. In science, a prolonged imposition of the present methods, symbolized by the polyvalence of Mao's thought, can only lead to increasing stagnation. In art and literature, rebellion is inevitable against the neo-Zhdanovists who in practice seek to reduce artists to being propagandists of the official line. It is above all among the new generations in China, too, that recruits will be made for the vanguard in future assaults on the seemingly triumphant bureaucratic concepts and practices. (51)
(50)0n this problem, which merits detailed study, see Charles Bettelheim's remarks in La Construction du Socialisme en Chine, Paris, Maspero, 1965, particularly pp. 87-88. An interesting article among the many published in the Chinese press was reproduced in HNA, February 19, :p. 12. Information along the lines of that provided by Bettelheim concerning deliveries to the state was given by. Joan Robinson in a private conversation after her return from China.
(51)Such a prognosis seems all the clearer since the glorification of Mao's thought concerns in reality only affirmations on completely general methodological criteria, directions on norms of work, and "moral" exhortations -- these are not sufficient for anyone. It must not be forgotten. either that concepts of the Zhdanov type at a given moment provoke reactions even in some of the layers of the bureaucracy which sense the danger to the system of paralysis and ossification.
It must be added that sooner or later, if it is not reversed by the intervention of other factors, the tendency toward social stratification and the crystallization of privileged conditions will become accentuated likewise in Chinese society, which is still characterized by an insufficient development of the productive forces and therefore an inability to effectively satisfy expanding needs. Propaganda favoring equalitarian concepts, measures like those requiring work among the worker and peasant masses, or abolition of ranks in the army can only prove utterly inadequate in the best of circumstances. The most positive aspect objectively could be to foster antibureaucratic feelings among the masses and to stimulate their resistance to possibly deeper social differentiations.
All these tensions existing within the frame of the internal dialectics of a society in transition and not within the frame of a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, will wind up sooner or later in conflicts and ruptures between the bureaucracy and the masses, between a leadership, which despite everything remains the expression of a privileged layer, and revolutionary tendencies struggling for a socialist democracy. How long it will take for this to happen is another question to which no answer can be given at present.
In fact, the ties between the bureaucratic Maoist leadership and the masses are still solid. This leadership is, in the eyes of the peasants and the workers, the same that led the revolutionary struggle against the regime of the landlords, the comprador bourgeoisie and the’ agents of imperialism. Furthermore, whatever the bureaucratic abuses, whatever the rigidity of a system where the party apparatus dominates by imposing its methods and its solutions, the comparison which counts, among the peasant masses in particular, is with their former status. And in comparison with the former regime, the progress made is gigantic. Not only has the standard of living for the masses undergone real improvement (and the Indian tragedy shows what this means. concretely for countries starting from an extremely low level), but the peasants can also discuss day-to-day problems of their work and make their opinion felt. They perceive the gap existing between the party and state cadres with whom they deal now, and with whom they often share their lives and their problems, and the representatives of the former regime whose — attitudes symbolized a regime of unutterable exploitation and oppres- Sion. It is easy to see that for masses coming from such a past what has been gained counts much more than the lack of genuine proletarian democracy and the fact that it is impossible for them to actually exercize decisive voice in the major problems posed in China.
The tensions which we have just indicated will develop clearly, therefore, first of all in relatively limited sectors and layers, both of intellectuals and vanguard workers, who through their own experiences, will grasp the concrete significance of a struggle for democratic management of the enterprises and against the bureaucratic grip.
~2l-
It is not by chance that the ruling old guard do not conceal their concern over possible conflicts with the representatives of the new generations. For a long: time, they have stressed this theme which was present in Mao's famous speech on contradictions among ‘the people and which has turned up more and more frequently in recent months. The old guard seem to understand quite clearly why the youth may hold some surprises in store. The youth learn the documents by rote; they did not experience the former regime; and they have not passed through the crucible of revolutionary war; they do not have the ideological education and training of the old cadres. They might be vulnerable to the seduction of "revisionism," to individualist aspirations, to the desire to become specialists setting themselves above others, to making money, etc. Imperialism itself might attract the rising generations. (52
Beyond all the vague moralizing and a certain nostalgia for the struggles of the past which seems to emerge at times, the basic ..fact is that the point of departure for the youth is a situation created by the revolution, which they take for granted; and thus they can put themselves immediately within the frame of.the dialec- '\ tics of the new society in which they were born and grew up. In other words, the comparison that interests them is not so much between the present situation and a dead past, as between the present regime with all its limitations, contradictions and absurdities, and the undeveloped potentialities of the collectivist structures that issued from the revolution. This holds all the truer since the youth now have the possibility of seeing other experiments on a world scale and thus of developing a more critical outlook than the _ preceding generations. These tendencies ‘cannot be stifled by compulsory teaching of Mao's works in the schools or by frenetic campaigns on the subject of the so-called cultural revolution.
July 24,-1966
. (52)0n the problem of the youth and the education of succeeding gen- ...erations, see in particular the report by Hu Ke-shi, member of the - Secretariat of the Young Communists at.a meeting of the Central Committee on May 5 (HNA, May 6); an article in the People's Dail of June 5 ("Proletarian Revolutionaries or Bourgeois Royalists?) where, among other things, it is said: "In the last analysis the struggle between the two lines and the two roads of socialism and capitalism in the field-of education is a question of whether the -younger generation will grow up to become successors to the proletarian cause or successors to. the bourgeois cause." (HNA, June 6, -p. 7.) See also the article already cited several times, published in HNA, June 12, which accuses the oppositionists of seeking to win the youth (p. 6); and the article in the People's Daily of June .18 on the cultural revolution, which includes the following key passage: "The transformation of the educational system in the final analysis -affects:the question of what sort of successors we shall produce, the question of whether we shall pass on Mao Tse-tung's thought from generation to generation, the question of whether our party and
-2o~
country will change colour." (See HINA, June 19, p. 3, also HNA June 20, p. 4.)
Another manifestation of the. official attitude toward the youth is that in all the edifying anecdotes published in the press, the exemplary young cadres constantly consult with their elders. (See, for example, HNA, June 20, p. 18 and July 1, p. 11.)
| HUGO BLANCO --