AFFAIR
ee ; By Michel Lequenne . Lo
. Paris
On October 29, 1965, Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled leader of the Moroccan National Union of Popular Forces [UNFP -- Union nationale des forces populaires] and organizer of the Havana Tricontinental Conference, was picked up for questioning by two French policemen in Paris, while he was on the way.to a meeting with motion picture producer Franju, which-had been arranged to discuss plans for a projected anticolonial filn,. Basta. ,
Mehdi Ben Barka was supposed.to come to the meeting alone but had brought ‘along a Moroccan -history-student, M. Azemmouri, whom he wanted to propose as a consultant for the film.. ‘The. encounter with the police therefore had a witness .and consequently did not remain .a.secret. Even ‘though the,.student became frightened and went into hiding, . the French police bureau was..alerted through Antermediaries ,- partiguiartly. by the victim's brother, . Abdelkader Ben Barka. _
At the ‘same time, Philippe Bernier, ‘leftist journalist, friend of Ben Barka, and the link between Ben Barka and Franju in production of the film, became worried about the absence of the Moroccan revolutionist, and he, too, sought to find out the reason for “his disappearance. and alerted the French authorities. |
‘The. fifth man of, the meeting that was never ‘held, ‘Georges Figon, | a shady ‘figure. who had. made his way into leftist intellectual circles’ and was pretending to finance the film, was little concerned about Ben Barka's disappearance -- he had been the’ prime mover in bringing it about. . At first. the police claimed to have. no. connection whatever, with the disappearance of Ben Barka, and the secret. services [SDECE -= Service de documentation et de counter-espionage], when questioned by the police, also stated that they were not . involved -- all this through its chief Le Roy, known as Finville, the very man who had followed the operation through ali its stages. .
The campaign for the presidential elections in France had just begun. The kidnapping of Ben Barka came at a bad time. It was not until November 11 that the judge assigned.to follow the affair learned what the palice had already known since November 3 -- that it was in fact two of their agents, Souchon and Voitot, who had picked up Ben Barka, acting on orders of a member of the SDECE, Antoine Lopez, principal inspector’ for Air France at the Orly Airport. The two claim to have obeyed him after receiving a telephonic confirmation from the head of the police prefecture -~ but the voice -they describe was not the latter's. Lopez was the first to be arrested but despite the claim that he gave -himself up voluntarily he dragged out his limited revelations over many days. ot : :
Finally the French presidential elections were over. De Gaulle was re-elected. He promised Mehdi Ben Barka's mother that. the whole truth about her son's disappearance would be uncovered. He became a bit. angry, shouted that he was-being taken "for a sucker" and that he stood at the head of "anything but a government." However, all of this was quickly dropped and in February he declared at a press conference that the "French officials" involved in the affair were only "vulgar and secondary.” .
According to the official scenario, these were references only to the policemen Souchon and Voitot, members of the vice squad trained by Lopez, who collaborated with them on behalf of the. narcotics division. But who is Lopez? An “honorable associate" (unpaid).of the SDECE. He delivered his information to a "contact officer," Le Roy- Finville, whose job was. to transmit it through regular channels. And Lopez claims to have passed along all the information he obtained, and to have acted only on orders. The kidnapping of Mehdi Ben Barka was alleged to be a favor extended by the SDECE to | the Moroccan monarchy, which was desirous of "restoring" Ben Barka to the national community..-
The political information reaching the SDECE allegedly indicated that following the ferocious repression in the spring of 1965 (500 dead), King Hassan II was liberalizing his regime and seeking a reconciliation with the left. Even though Ben Barka was not involved in the amnesty proclaimed in Morocco, King Hassan II allegedly wanted to get his "former mathematics teacher" back and allegedly was seeking an interview with him on neutral ground. It was such an interview which the SDECE wanted to facilitate by "unorthodox" methods.
This thesis, consistently defended by the French authorities, does not, however,
correspond with the truth. In fact, it was known at the SDECE by October 22 at the: latest (a week before the kidnapping) that the Mordccan leaders were’ preparing a criminal attack against Ben Barka. Even the names of the agents charged: with the task were known. Moreover, Figon had let it be known that the Moroccans wanted to "gun down" Ben Barka, as Le Roy-Finville admitted in the course of the trial, although he pretended that he paid no attention to this piece of information because it came from’a “hoodlun."
The SDECE also knew that the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Oufkir, was a sadistic killer and that he hated Ben Barka. Even if the reconciliation project between Hassan II and Ben Barka had not been a trap, an interview with Ben Barka arranged by Oufkir could only inspire the deepest apprehensions. But it was precisely to such a meeting that Lopez conducted Ben Barka without any forewarning and then telephoned from Paris to Morocco, to Oufkir, to advise him that the "package" had arrived. This bit of news Oufkir passed on. to "the boss" (the ‘king, obviously).
Isn't Lopez a double agent who - acted on behalf of the Moroccans on this éecasion? There. can be no doubt about his being a double agent ‘und even a triple one, “since he was also an agent of the CIA, but he was not the only one. During the course'of the trial it was brought out that Le Roy-Finville (another agent_of both the CIA and: the. SDECE) had been forewarned of all phases of the affair, at least to the degree | that he did not cut off information by staying away from his office. The reports in which Le Roy- Finville,..transmitted the information supplied by Lopez to his superiors became skimpier in the period preceding thé kidnapping, then ended (or disappeared ).-It was impossible to learn during the course of the trial whether le Roy-Finville was deceiving his superiors or whether he himself was only one link in a chain of officials aware of what: they were doing. Nevertheless, the latter hypothesis seems the more probable, for: Le Roy-Finville, after several blackmail threats, was released provisionally, and is being prosecuted only for minor misdemeanors on the level. of professional misconduct. Such indulgence toward a man so deeply involved in the crime _is hard to conceive unless he possesses some very compromising secrets.
It was quickly ascertained that. Ben Barka had been brought | to “Fontenay-le- Vicomte, to a villa owned by the gangster-procurer Georges Boucheseiche, and- that Oufkir and Dlimi, in turn,”°arrived there on October 30...
It was ‘some two months later that the press made the crucial exposés, providing all we know today about the fate of Ben Barka. It became apparent almost immediately that a necessary cog in the kidnapping was Figon, ex-hoodlum turned producer. Moreover, everybody accused him, from Bernier -- who had been arrested even though there was no serious charge against him -- up to Lopez, who pictured him as the organizer of the operation.
Figon was sought but the police could not find him. Nevertheless, as early as November 2, he had met with Police Superintendent Caille of "General Information" at the -home of his lawyer and friend, deputy Pierre Lemarchand, and had told the superin-' tendent everything he knew about the. affair. However, Caille had already heard the main elements of the story the previous evening from a police spy whom he stubbornly refused to identify, even to the tribunal, a refusal which ‘was accepted and Justified by the presiding judge Perez.
In exchange for his revelations, Superintendent Caille promised Figon that he would not be bothered. Fortified by this immunity, Figon saw many people, did not hide, and according to his acquaintances, tranquilly waited for a passport. and money which’ would allow him to leave France. But when all this became delayed, he became frightened, surmised that his’ friends and accomplices were bent on destroying him rather than in helping him get out of France,. and he began to talk in an effort to convert his | secrets into money. Without’ success. They were published without his getting a penny . But they were to give new life and vigor to the affair.
The plan for the attack went back no further than the end of the summer. The film project was the bait and Bernier "the lure in the lion hunt." An initial attempt was made on September 2, 1965, in Cairo, where Figon had gone with Bernier. It failed, possibly because Figon wanted to enjoy himself longer and was in no hurry to kill Ben Barka and the goose with the golden eggs at the same time.
. On October 29, it was Figon who fingered Ben Barka.to the policemen ‘Souchon and Voitot. Figon followed Ben Barka to Boucheseiche's villa, where the leader of the UNFP was guarded by the gangsters Le Ny, Dubail, Palisse, normally in the service of Morocco, but occasionally also in that of various French police divisions. Figon was present when Oufkir. and Dlimi arrived. It was not until he saw Oufkir that Ben Barka understood the kind of trap he had fallen into. He tried to escape but was overpowered by the gangsters. Oufkir began to torture him (perhaps for questioning, perhaps solely out of -
sadism) by cutting into his throat with a dagger. Figon pretended not to know the sequel but stated that Ben Barka while still ‘alive “was probably taken from Boucheseiche's villa to Lopez' at .Ormoy, a neighboring spot, where he was probably tied to the“central heating furnace in the cellar. No doubt | it was there that he was murdered. os
- Figon told this complete story as early as November 2 (four days after the: attack) ‘to Superintendent Caille in the presence of Pierre Lemarchand. These two obstinately denied it but a number of witnesses, cross-checks and contradictions overwhelmed them. The reasons for their silence are unclear. Was it "loyalty to the organization" on the policeman's part? Professional secrecy on the lawyer's side? The two men were linked by friendship.
The lawyer-deputy (ot the Union pour la. ‘Nouvelle Républigue, the Gaullist party in power) is more than a suspicious character. Pierre Lemarchand is a former fascist who went over to Gaullism after May 13, 1958. Organizer of © "actions" against the terror- -ist Organization de 1'Armée.Secréte [OAS] in Algeria at the end of the War 9, he was accused. by a secret. agent. of having. liquidated’. his own agents by blowing them ‘up after -he had used .them. (and of having appropriated their*salaries and bonuses). ‘After Alger—- ‘ian- independence, it seems that Pierre Lemarchand preserved a. "network," ‘composed mainly. of gangsters who owe innumerable “cases” dismissed" ‘to his talents, as a lawyer. Figon was. notoriously one of. his " men. '
' What ‘role can his’ "network" have played in the Ben Barka affair? ae ‘French press of. the extreme right first accused him of béing - the principai organizer: of the kidnapping and, thus of the murder. But this press is trying to cover up* “thé King of Morocco and. his minister, and. is. . violently anti-Gaullist (it. has not ‘pardoned him for the anti-OAs struggle). - _ oes
“wares
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_ Lopez, £00, tried to compromise’ Lemarchand. He declared that Lemarchand aécom-~ panied Figon to Geneva on September 203 1965, when the latter went there to0° get: Giose to Ben Barka (Lemarchand was actually in the same plane); also‘that Lemarchand told =~ him, "You are the one who should. have done it," after Figon introduced the lawyer to Lopez as his "cover." But Lopez. recanted later. Lopez also pretended that Lemarchand was present at the kidnapping spot, which was. untrue. Lopez, defended by Tixier="“ Vignancour, a well-known fascist lawyer, madé a turnabout and abandoned his attacks against. lemarchand. a so . .
A last minute piece of written testimony, of doubtful: value, published by the Nouvel Observateur claims that the Lemarchand "network" followed the affair in order to stop it at the last minute and thus compromise the anti-Gaullist fascists entrenched” in the SDECE. Operation “interception” allegedly failed through a "betrayal" by Figon. ‘
However murky Lemarchand may be, it does not appear that he and his "network" . were the. moving forces in the operation; and in all probability. Figon was playing a __, personal. game with money. as the objective. _ _ . on
~ . The. latter' s revelations to the’ press had to bring’ ‘About his death. Although the official experts have called his death a suicide, the’ depositions. of his friends in the course of the trial leave no doubt that he was assassinated just before ‘the police arrived to arrest him at his last address, which had become "hot." , ~ bn With Figon gone, ‘a weil’ ‘of silence again settled over ail the unktiowns | in the Ben Barka, affair. ; ; hat became. of the body: of the leader: of the UNFP? Dlimi allegedly asked “Lopez to find a spot to bury. it. Since this was not easy in that: ‘part, of France, the ‘body was presumably -brought to the Moroccan embassy, then cut, into pieces and the parts sent. to Morocco in diplomatic pouches.
By November 3, 1965, the police and the highest authorities of the French state, among them Minister of the Interior Roger Frey, knew éverything about the crime (but not the investigating: magistrate). Nevertheless, on that day Oufkir and Dlimi returned to France, attended official ceremonies and gave a reception at the embassy. Not only were they left undisturbed but on the contrary, high functionaries everywhere worked to hasten their departure. The powers that be did not want them arrested. On the same day, Lopez'. confessions were held up in the police department. The official report of his deposition was signed’ only after the Moroccan dignitaries were on @ plane taking them out of France and far away.
The day after they left, de Gaulle ‘again cut loose. The Moroccan authorities responded insolently and refused his request to extradite the French gangsters, the hired kidnappers, who had taken refuge. in. their land.
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The French opposition made only meager use of the Ben Barka affair against the government, both at the time it broke into the open, when the presidential election was in full swing, and afterward. This is probably due to the fact that despite the obvious and well-established Moroccan responsibility, it is easy to discern the fine American hand of the CIA in the plot. To the heads of the CIA, Ben Barka was perhaps an even more frightening adversary than he was to the head of the "Moroccan reaction. And the French opposition is more "“Atlantic-minded" than-the de Gaulle regime.
In September and October of this year, the trial dragged through more than forty confusing sessions, under the direction of a presiding judge whose leitmotif was: "the question cannot be asked," and who refused to give the affair its proper political dimensions.
Finally, at the very moment when the verdict was to be rendered and the accused in the dock sentenced -- probably to ridiculous penalties -- a sensational development stopped everything. Commander Dlimi, chief of Moroccan Security, and assistant assassin, came to France to "give himself up," after having written Hassan II a letter stating that he was doing so voluntarily in order to "clear his name."
But no sooner was he in Paris than instead of "clearing his name" by replying to the accusation hanging over him, he appealed for a reversal of judgment, invoking the Franco-Moroccan juridical agreement, under which refugees from one country arrested on the territory of the other, must be returned to their own national authorities for judgment by their own courts (an agreement already twice violated by Morocco, one of the occasions being its refusal to extradite the gangsters).
- In effect Dlimi's move meant that the French court could not find him, as well as Oufkir, guilty on the grounds of being fugitives from justice, a judgment which would have resulted in platonic, even though heavy sentences, entailing as a result great diplomatic difficulties between France and Morocco.
Hassan II wants to settle the affair in the secret channels of high diplomacy between himself and de Gaulle and to use blackmail, since the Moroccan culprits are ~ fully conversant with the extreme degree of French culpability, even if it only involved taking a neutral position regarding the crime. De Gaulle, who sought throughout the trial to liquidate the affair before the French legislative elections next spring, is the one who is mainly hurt by "Operation Dlimi." The future will show whether he. answers -- whether he can answer -- the challenge hurled at him.
. In any event, at this point the Ben Barka affair, like the Dallas affair in the United States, testifies more than adequately to the proliferation of the police and the police character of these presidential regimes, whose No. 1 tool is also their major point of weakness.
MALCOLM X