VULTURES WATCH POWER STRUGGLE IN PEKING WITH INTEREST
How carefully the U.S. State Department is following the development of the political crisis in Peking is indicated by the way it continually sends. out feelers to the warring factions. Thus Washington officials revealed December 1 that U.S. ambas-— sador to Poland, John A. Gronouski, who holds regular meetings with the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw, Wang Kue-chan, had offered to exchange seed samples. It was not indicated whether the offer, made last September 7, had been officially rebuffed or simply ignored. Similarly, the State Department has been widening the categories of U.S. citizens who would be granted official permission to visit China if Peking would grant them visas. Peking, however, has refused to grant any visas to visitors who have been screened by the State Department. ;
In a dispatch from Washington, reporting these developments, the New York Times of December 2 also indicates how the State Department assesses the struggle going on in Peking. This is not without interest.
"Washington analysts," says the Times, “see no signs whatever of any break in Peking's rigid and militant attitudes. They have, however, revised earlier assessments on the course of the power struggle now under way in Peking -- to which they attach the utmost importance. ~ :
"About two months ago Washington thought the power struggle had been won by the militant hard-liners led by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his heir-apparent, Defense Minister Lin Piao, and backed by the Red Guards.
"Recent evidence, Washington believes, indicates that the struggle has not yet been resolved and that the hard-liners have encountered difficulties in breaking the influence of the group of party officials led by Liu Shao-chi, the chief of state, and Teng Hsiao-ping, the Communist party's Secretary-General.
“Analysts note that although Mr. Kiu and Mr. Teng have been publicly denounced by the Red Guard movement, they continue to appear at official occasions with Chairman Mao and Mr. Lin, suggesting that they have strong backing within the party hierarchy.
"American experts believe there is little the United States can do, or should do, to try to affect the course of the power struggle. Indeed, top Administration officials are extremely cautious in their comments in order to avoid any appearance of implied interference.
"Nor does official Washington believe that the outcome, even if the less militant wing emerges on top, would bring significant changes in Peking's foreign policy or over-all strategy.
"The interpretation of officials here is that this group might modify Peking's tactics slightly to improve its reputation in the world at large by appearing less rigid and less determinedly isolated.
"There is some expectation that this group might also move toward a slightly more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to China's domestic economic problems."
The propaganda that the Johnson administration is not interested in intervening in this struggle is, of course, pure poppycock. Up to now, the China experts in the State Department have simply been unable to find a point at which they could insert a wedge. Likewise, the State Department view that the opposition to Mao may be "less
militant" is not to be taken as a. faithful reflection of the reality. The opposition is in actuality divided into at least three sectors -- a bourgeois tendency, which, however, is very weak and not a genuinely serious element in the struggle, a Khrushchevist tendency, which may indeed be less militant, and a revolutionary Marxist current, the strength of which cannot be determined in view of the absence of workers democracy in China. .
‘WHY THE VIETNAMESE COUNT ON EVENTUAL VICTORY _
Why do the people of Vietnam continue such heroic resistance against the most colossal military power in all history? It seems beyond the comprehension of the Pentagon which keeps escalating the amount of explosives dumped on the inhabitants of the tiny country and employing the most fiendish weapons in the arsenal of the U.S. armed forces in an unremitting effort to crush their will.
Joseph Kraft, a correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, sought an answer from representatives of the National Liberation Front at their delegation in Prague. His account of what they told him in- long conversations appeared in the November 25 issue of the Chicago paper. Kraft condensed the NLF view as follows:
"On why they keep up the war: We- have fought for independence for more than a quarter of a century. After we have shed so much blood and lost so. many lives, it is not easy to accept the kind of capitulation the Americans are now offering.
"We know. that America is a great. country and a rich country. But its power is not unlimited. We know what it has already taken to fight against 14,000,000 people in a tiny piece of land. It has taken one-third of the American combat divisions, one-half of the American air strength, one-third of the American fleet.
"Despite that effort, the Americans have not yet destroyed a single one of our companies, not one company totally destroyed. We know that the Americans have responsibilities here in Europe and in Latin America. We think that if it has already taken them-so much to accomplish so little, in the end our struggle will not be in vain.
"On escalation: If it has taken so much American power to fight a tiny country with such small results, it does not make sense to fight 17,000,000 more people from North Viet Nam in a still larger area.
"On why the Liberation Front has not formed a provisional government: We were a front representing many segments of the population of South Viet Nam. But there remain some elements outside the Front. If we formed a government, we might exclude those people. We think that, if we keep our ranks open, we can still win over whole cities and even units of the South Vietnamese army.
"On reunification with the North: By reason of language, culture and the economy, Viet Nam is one. But we recognize as a reality the Geneva partition and the fact of 12 years of separate history.
"We are fighting for an independent South Viet Nam, with its own constitution, its own elections and its own government. Later, that government might, step by step and stage by stage, work toward unification with North Viet Nam.
"On prospects for negotiations: We do not think the time is right for negotiations for two reasons. One is that the Americans keep intensifying the war by sending more troops, by raising the military budget and by increasing draft calls. The other is that the Americans have not recognized the National Liberation Front.
"On the possibility of negotiations between the United States and North Viet Nam: The North cannot negotiate for the South. Hanoi is not the voice of the South. The Front is that voice."
Kraft was struck by two qualities in the statements of the Front. "For one thing, there is immense confidence -- even pride -- in the capacity to absorb punishment and win out in the end." The other was that the confidence of the Vietnamese fighters is not based on comfort drawn from critics of Johnson's policies. The confidence is based "on a a detailed analysis of benefits and costs."
"The conclusion of the Front is that, given the small American stake in Viet Nam and the huge American stake in the rest of the world, the commitment made to Viet Nam by the President and the secretary of state is too lopsided to be sustained indefinitely."
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