TERRIFIC IMPACT" ON AMERICAN PEOPLE
By George Novack
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee ended its public hearings on the Vietnam war in two sessions February 17 and 18 by taking testimony from two authoritative advocates of President Johnson's foreign policy, General Maxwell D. Taylor, former army chief of staff and. a presidential military adviser, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
The hearings, which lasted for two weeks, became the center of.what one commentator called "the great battle for the minds and... hearts of men" between Johnson and his congressional critics. The _. sessions, broadcast in full by the major. television networks, were oa viewed by an estimated 30,000,000 people,. including the president — himself. On Friday the Senate could not assemblé a quorum since al= most every member had deft the chamber ‘to Listen’ to. the. confronta~ tion. .
Johnson's opponents on the: ‘committee | aimed. to "go over the head of the President ‘to the people," smoke out the real intentions of the White House and Pentagon in Southeast ‘Asia, and set limits on the expansion of the conflict. Bristling at Defense Secretary Mt= Namara's refusal to testify in public before the committee, Senator Morse of Oregon denounced "government by secrecy" and ‘demanded that the administration give an open accounting of: its actions. and pur- oo poses to the American. people. wee - oo
The administration pokéamen! appeared « ‘on the defensive as they tried to justify escalation of the war and their refusal to initiate Serious negotiations with the Vietnamese.
Democratic’ Senator Gore .of Tennessee noted that ‘the gap between the Executive and Congress: and the” people had widened as the war had widened. A majority. of the Democratic senators are reportedly eritical of Johnson's course and apprehensive: about its implications. Republican Senator Scott gleefully quipped in a speech on Lincoln' s birthday that President Johnson’ may Soon. have to sue his own party for nonsupport.
Although Taylor and Rusk claimed that the U.S. military position in Vietnam has been improving, there.is little doubt that the administration's retations to- ‘public opinion have been deteriorating. This is admitted by Time magazine, which supports all-out military force in Vietnam, in its lead:article.on February 18: "Though the polisters tell: -[Lyndon Johnson] - that 'a substantial majority of. Amer-. icans approve of his policies, he knows he -can rely only on a-‘thin ~ crust of active support; and a vocal opposition is: constantly gnaw- ~ ing away at that crust." so oy co Se ae NED
The most relentless member of that vocal opposition on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Morse, struck back hard during the hearings at administration efforts to smear its congressional
critics.as "appeasers".who are giving aid and comfort to Hanoi and stiffening-its will to resist. When’ he was.in Honolulu, Johnson gave. the cue for this campaign by characterizing his opponents as "special pleaders" who counsel "retreat." His attacks were extended by General Taylor: who-said that-Hanoi.and the. National Liberation Front hoped to win in: Washington: the victory they could not gain in Vietnan.
- ‘Paylor. said: that. ‘the leaders of north Vietnam had not forgotten that they had "won.more in Paris than in [the battle of] Dienbienphu: fin. 1954] and believed that the Vietcong might be as fortunate in- Washington,"
‘Senator. Morse’ corrected ‘the general’ s faulty memory , - reminding him that in the spring of 1954 Pierre Mendes-France ran for premier on a pledge to bring the Vietnam war to an end, and that he regarded his election as a mandate to carry out the pledge end that he did so at the Geneva conference. —
"Now," the Senator asked the general, “when the people of a country demonstrate. an-opposition to a foreign-policy of that country and make clear:that they wented the Indochina war stopped, do you interpret that as’ a weakness on.the home front?"
The general ‘pesponded: by saying that he “would. regard it as weakness "if one. attaches importance to success in Southeast Asia, but he acknowledged the right of a » People. to- change a Policy. of their government. .
Morse continued, offering the opinion that the American people, before too long, "will repuciate eur war in Southeast Asia."
"That , of course , is good 1 news to Henoi, Senator," the general replied,
Morse glared. at. the Pentagon! s spokesman. "I know that is the smear artist that you militarists give to those of us who have honest differences of opinion, put I don't intend to get down in the gutter with. you and. engage: in that kind of debate.. ot "ALL Iam, asking is. af the people decided that this war should be stopped in. Southeast Asia, are: you- going to take the position that is weakness on the home. front in a. democracy?"
The general looked visibly engry. "I would feel thet our people were badly misguided and did not understand. the consequences” of such a disaster ," he said. my
“Well, we agree on one ‘thing, that they can be badly niogusa-
ed," Morse replied, "and you and the President in my judgment have been misguiding them for a long time in this war."
At this point a burst of applause came from the spectators in the hearing room who included not only a number of notables. but many participants in the teach-ins and demonstrations, at the capital.
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The exchanges during the committée's "teach-in" disclosed Sharp disagreements between the dissidents and the administration one a broad Tange of issues arising. from the war. —
‘Fulbright and. Morse contested the legality of the war and - ‘the scope of the president's powers to wage it. The government had previously justified its measures on the basis of a letter from Eisenhowér'to President: Diem in 1954 and the Tonkin Gulf resolution of _ Congress in August 1964. Since Eisenhower has stated that his offer did not promise military aid and many senators have denied that “ their 1964 vote authorized the current and contemplated escalation, Rusk was forced to shift ground and place primary reliance on the SEATO treaty for the United States commitment. This, too, roused strenuous objections’ ‘from committee members. . oo oo
Of greater significance were the aifferences expressed on the nature of the war and the objectives of U.S. intervention.
Rusk said that the American presence in Vietnam was part of “the continuing’ "process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker. nations on the perimeter of Communist power" which the United States had begun in Greece and Turkey as early as 1945. Both Rusk and Taylor stressed that the war of liberation in Vietnam had to be suppressed to teach Peking (and Moscow): that such subversion could not succeed and would not pay. Just as the Soviet Union had adjusted to. the balance of power in Europe after NATO, so China must now be _ brought to do the same in Asia.
Rusk insisted. that the war had been instigated and extended by aggression from the north. Taylor stated that it had been prcevoked and carried on by "the militant wing of the world Communist movement ," embracing the National Liberation Front, Hanoi and — Peking. Brazenly standing matters on their head, he asserted that, not the United States, but north Vietnam had replacéa France as "the dominant - imperialist power” in that situation.. .
Fulbright reminded his witnesses that the Vietnémese nad been fighting for their independence for over twenty years and that the conflict had originated as a war for national liberation from imperialist domination. It was essentially a civil war in the south com plicated by the interventions of the United States and. north Vietnan.
Rusk maintained ‘that the strugele ‘in Vietnam was vital to the "world security interests" of the United States. To illustrate this point, Taylor argued that "Indonesia would never have crushed the- Communists if the United States hadn! t held the line in southeast Asia." -.
On the other hand, Fulbright and others sereed with “Ambassador Kennan and Genéral Gavin, “who ‘had previously testified, that Vietnam is not a> region of major or decisive industrial or military importance to U.S. global strategy and that the basic interests of» the American rulers would best be served by restricting involvement
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and working: toward disengegement . ~
The. aanatorsy,. “who: frequently. confessed they, were "confused": and - "in: the dark," sought: to: extract more definite information on the®* administration’ s aims and perspectives.:Was Johnson trying BO ee get a negotiated settlement. -~ Or was. he bent on” all-out wart” -
Rusk told the committee that the enemy's will to. fight must be broken. "I get the. impression," Fulbright answered, "not.only from your statement as much as General Taylor' s, that we are in-an unlim-: ited war,-and the only kind’ of settlement is unconditional ‘surrender, Therefore, “there is nothing to. negotiate about. u
When Rusk expostulated that Hanoi was. unwilling to enter dis cussions,, Fulbright retorted that "there must be something wrong with our diplomacy" if the other side, which was not "mad," could not be brought to the conference table. He seeks a compromise settlement with the Vietnamese, not a war’ of total destruction at the risk- of a global | war . - - o oo
Fulbright pointed: out that Johnson's “eredibility was impaired: because "our actions are not consistent with our words" and this creates suspicion: of U.S. motives. The U.S. scuttled the Geneva agreements, blocked the scheduled 1956 elections, keeps escalating the. ... war, and builds big bases in Thailand and south Vietnam, he said. Promises to withdraw are distrusted because the U.S. has still to pull. ‘out its _Jroops from Korea and ‘the Dominican Republic. ls
why, hie: asked , if this was a plain and simp le- case of exter— nal aggression, as Rusk contended, have the allies and friends of--the United States given so little support? Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Britain and France have supplied no forces for the war and even Australia and New Zealand only token contributions. The only reasonable contlusion is that these countries:do not believe their security is at stake and think that the conflict. is in great measure a civil War .
Fulbright and Gore said that this government had never ‘made. ‘it clear that it would accept the results of free elections in south Vietnam; this left the National Liberation Front no ‘alternative but to continue fighting. When pressed, Rusk answered. that the United .. States would agree to elections put would not staté the specific conditions under which it would leave the country.
It had been reported on the highest authority ‘that 600; O00 . American soldiers were ‘to be assigned to.south Vietnam -under the. re-~ quested military ‘appropriation. The senators probed in vain to find , out -whether: this’ was true. Both.Taylor and Rusk evaded -an answer .and refused to put any ceiling ‘on the extent of Washington's- commitments or area-of intervention in Southeast Asia, stating that this depended, not on themselves, but on the actions of the adversaries.
-. Asked if it was correct that ‘there. are tno limits" in Vietnan, Rusk replied: "I am not going to*say that the United: States has. accepted a point beyond which it will not go to meet its commitments."
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This remark went to the heart of the dispute between the sen-. ators and the president. They fear above all that a widening war will push China into the conflict and lead to a nuclear holocaust. Their anxieties: were not diminished by the assertion of the clownish and bellicose Senator Long, Johnson's chief defender, that he some-times wished "the Red Chinese would come. in" because it would be better to lose to a large netion than to a second-class power! : “We are . stumbling along to World War III," warned Senator Morse. Gore of Tennessee asked Rusk why he didn't mention "the grave. danger":.of Chinese entry into’ the conflict in his opening presentation. Rusk replied that’ "the possibility of a larger war had always. been present in all postwar crises," as in Berlin and Cuba. But both sides had’ "learned the importance of restraint" and China as well as the United ‘States: “had the problem of reckoning ‘consequences."
Rusk gave no categorical guarantee that China would not come. . in. Still remembered in’ Washington is his prediction in 1950,.when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, that the Chinese Communists would not move into Korea to defend their borders. Instead he speculated that perhaps Peking and Hanoi have already been surprised at: what the United States is prepared to do, - and when they discover that. this country will not veer ‘from its course, "they may agree to: peace.” a we
General: Taylor was more: positive. that China. would not move .. into Korea or north Vietnam unless troops came close to its borders. "Military involvement with the United States is extremely unlikely," he stated, "because of the problems of- feeding a shuge. population, bitter competition | with the. Soviet Unton ‘and ibs: vulnerability to U.S. attack. Wo oo. c: 7 see 5 The still unconvinced Senator Gore stated that very high officials express the opinion that.a war with China would be a. nuclear war.". Rusk denied that. anyone in the administration was contemplating nuclear bombings "as a rational act of policy." But he refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war with China.
Taylor told the chairman that China‘ S entry "into ‘a war with | us would be a catastrophe for then." Replied Fulbright: "It would -also be a great disaster for us." .
The official witnesses offered interesting testimony on the Sino-Soviet ‘differences in respect to the war. Taylor stated that Russia, unlike China, had no°-vital national. objectives in Southeast. Asia and that Peking alone stood to gain from a victory there. However, Moscow was in a-dilemma. Although it didn't enjoy doing so, .. it had ‘to contend with Peking as "flag-bearer of world Communism" and this imposed on the Kremlin "a dual motivation" in the situation.
Rusk told Senator Hickenlooper of Lowa that a leading Soviet spokesman had informed him that "the biggest problem in the world today is turning Peking toward peaceful: coexistence." Rusk said he was not aware that the Soviet governmént-was "in collusion" with .
the United States;-as Peking has charged. However, when further pressed on what steps Russia was taking to promote peace in Vietnan, he said he preferred to. deal with that question in closed session.
In. answer. to a query, Rusk said that ‘Hanoi coulda not be re-* garded as a “puppet of Peking but had a measure of independence which he hoped it would exercise even if China would object. Hé divulged that.Moscow and.Hanoi had agreed to a.conference with the United States- last year. on Cambodia’ and Laos which. China. had blocked.
Johnson' Ss main committee supporters were the Southern ‘senators Long: of. Louisiana and Sparkman of Alabama along with Senator Dodd of Connecticut, the prime witch-hunter in Congress. Long tried several times.to. whip. up cheuvinist feelings by. referring to atrocities by the. "Vietcong terrorists." Chairman Fulbright reminded his flag- . waving colleagues that war was inseparable from atrocities and cited U.S. fire-bombings of German cities and atom-bombings of Hiroshima: and Nagasaki in World War II as well as the napalm bombings in the present War ».
No: one on either. gide of the policy debate wants to take American troops. out of. Vietnam now; none of them even questioned. the justness of the air attacks on, north Vietnam. Senator Morse, the most forthright administration critic, who.intends to seek a vote. rescinding the. 1964. resolution, favors a:multination "military “protectorate" under the United Nations. to solve. the Vietnamese problem.
The dramatic clash of views’ on U. 8. involvement in Vietnam was a highly educational experience for the millions who ‘listened to it. As the New York Times put it in its February 20 "News of the’ Week". review, "It. was.a drama whose intensity and stakes had seldom been equalled in the nation's history. With the country deeply embroiled in an undeclared war whose toll in blood and treasure was steadily rising,. leading members of the Sénate challenged ‘before - an audience of millions’ the aims and justification of that war." A New York World-Telegram dispatch from Washington the day after the hearings stated that the televised testimony has made a "terrific impact" on the country and the Senate dissidents feel it may restrain Johnson from plunging forward so recklessly in Southeast Asia.
_ Fulbright 's s “teach-in" will not prevent Congress fron passing the additional $12,300,000,000 military appropriation that occasioned the debate. But it has considerably deepened distrust of the administration's course and given a “Powerful. boost to the antiwar feelings among the American } people.
“FIRST BIG"