documents, foreign policy problems do not lie at the heart of the conflict. It is particularly symptomatic that there is not the least allusion to differences on the war in Vietnam or on the October 1965 events in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is certain that on international questions, the polemics developed with particular sharpness and intensity and the increasingly dramatic course of the crisis was determined to a large degree by the course of the situation in the Indochina peninsula, particularly following the intensification of the escalation and the increasing danger of imperialist aggression against the Chinese republic.
(3) In accordance with long-standing bureaucratic tradition, the ideas advanced by critical elements and opponents are not directly expressed by those involved, but indicated by the group that wins out. The very enormity of certain accusations, the repetition of stereotyped clichés used many times in other contexts, the positions taken in recent years by some of the main figures under fire, suffice to place in doubt the accuracy of the version offered by the Mao group. According to them the entire opposition advocated out-and-out Khrushchevist orientations and made common cause with forces seeking the restoration of capitalism. The real question at issue is most certainly not the restoration of capitalism. What is involved essentially is an intrabureaucratic conflict, affecting various layers, over what line to adopt in relation to crucial issues of the present stage and to the long-range problems of perspective confronting the bureaucratic leadership at this stage. The specific social weight of bourgeois and restorationist forces in the dynamics of Chinese society is after all negligible and any explanation of the current crisis based on the hypothesis of a dangerous upsurge on their part can be dismissed as false and tendentious. Moreover, if the ruling group had wished to strike harder at these forces, in particular, by ending their still existing privileges, they could have done so rather easily without touching off a crisis in the party.
The Mao group, however, was up against really critical elements and opponents of different orientations. There is no doubt that for years tendencies have existed in China that could be legitimately characterized as Khrushchevist, in the sense that they have criticized the concepts and attitudes. of the present leadership on the basis of a stand analogous to that of the leaders of the Soviet CP and most of the Communist parties. But there are also some who especially denounce the bureaucratic methods of the ruling group (referring at times to the battles of ten years ago), its extreme sectarianism; and therefore probably also certain opportunist orientations on key questions of the international workers movement. The official documents themselves have alluded on a number of occasions to the existence of critical left elements ("left opportunists," according to the well-known terminology). There is no doubt either that commencing at given moments centrist tendencies developed either in relation to "intermediate" positions adopted on several political or tactical problems or in relation to a conciliatory attitude aimed at blocking a complete rupture between the opposing groups and at avoiding a fait accompli.
Under the present conditions it is impossible to evaluate with certainty the relative strength of the different opposition tendencies. But it is clear that the "Khrushchevist" tendency can be considered the most dangerous for the Mao group in the immediate period ahead, particularly because of the powerful international support it might have and which a leftist tendency, moving toward a revolutionary Marxist orientation, clearly would not have.
(4) The struggle has turned out to be probably much sharper and much longer than the ruling group counted on when it took the initiative. That is why it has raised the tenor of its harangues and conducted campaigns at a frenetic pace, culminating in the demonstrations of August-September and the actions of the Red Guards. The plenum of the Central Committee, following a battle lasting some months, was held after the elimination of Lo Jui Ching, Peng Chen and a whole series of other leading figures, and was
the scene of dramatic conflicts. The Mao group won by a very close margin after ceding some concessions, at least on paper, particularly to the centrist elements. :
The explanation for this new outbreak of the struggle is to be found in two facts: on the one hand, the first wave of the "cultural revolution" ran into vigorous resistance; and on the other the isolation of the Chinese CP in the international Communist movement became greater following the estrangement of the North Koreans, the breakaway of the Japanese, and the difficulties encountered with the North Vietnamese. But once again it was the course of the war in Vietnam, with its new phases of escalation and the growing threat of an attack on China that provoked a new confrontation at the level of the top leading bodies themselves.
(5) The second wave of the "cultural revolution" and the formation of the Red Guards were the products of a situation of this nature within the party. In face of resistance and hesitation of all kinds, the group assembled around Mao and Lin Piao decided to mobilize the masses partially and to gain a new instrument of pressure, capable of being used against a part of the apparatus of the party and the state. The decision was to take a distinctly limited sector -- the student masses ~- with which the Mao group wanted to establish close relations and which it also considered it could control and channelize more easily. It is nevertheless significant that masses were called on to intervene in intrabureaucratic conflicts and that Mao and Lin Piao, in order to mobilize the students, were obliged to use ideological themes that could have a favorable echo among more radicalized and politically conscious layers (see, for example, in the 16-point document the affirmation of the democratic rights of minorities and the reminder of the democratic revolutionary tradition of the Commune).
The Red Guard movement thus had a factional origin, and its aim as outlined in innumerable texts, was essentially to help the Mao group fight its adversaries, including those within the political sector, which was profoundly split during the course of the struggle. But the weapon of the Red Guards proved to be very dangerous and threat~ ened to become transformed into a boomerang. As a matter of fact at least some sectors of the movement did not limit themselves to singing the praises of Mao, spreading his works and destroying foreign symbols. They sought to translate into practice certain current ideological slogans. In other words they began to act not only under the inspiration of anticapitalist and vaguely anticonservative sentiments but went so far as to attack privileges of the bureaucracy and to build a fire under some of the bureaucrats, including those who succeeded the Peng Chen group in the Peking leadership. It was difficult for the ruling group to denounce the infiltration of the enemy into the party and state at every level, and at the same time to demagogically exploit the real equalitarian aspirations of the masses, without having the movement inspired in this way hitting also at the symbols of bureaucratic power and taking on the settling of accounts with certain officials and ruling bodies of the party itself. It is of course difficult to distinguish between the spontaneous moves undertaken by the Red Guards and actions undertaken on decisions from above. But a whole series of facts emanating from various sources as well as a series of warnings and official appeals for order aimed, from all the evidence, at slowing down and channelizing the movement, testify to the fact that the students, to some extent at least, struck blows against some representatives of the bureaucracy, too, and were ready to unleash actions which the bureaucracy as a whole had good reasons to halt as quickly as possible.
(6) The issue remains wide open after the new wave of the "cultural revolution" and the ruling group does not seem to have been able to reestablish a relatively stable equilibrium within its midst. The opposition to its policies and the resistance to the actions it sponsors continue on a vast scale, even though they emanate from various sectors and from different and even opposed points of view. Dramatic changes and abrupt turns could still occur in a relatively short time.
A factor that accelerated the settling of accounts, making the crisis so dramatic is, as we have seen, the perspective of the Chinese leaders, that an imperialist aggression will probably be launched in the short run. It is precisely with this in mind that the Mao group sought to reinforce its positions, to eliminate all resistance, organizing even a psychological mobilization (this operated particularly in the formation of the Red Guards and in the choice of criteria for their organization and of the ideological themes). On their side, the adversaries of Mao and Lin Piao were drawn into a fight in order, before it was too late, to change an orientation which they considered false. If an aggression actually does take place, all the hypotheses and positions will rapidly be tested.
It is possible nevertheless that the Mao group likewise believes that the perspective of war can be avoided. Certain aspects of its polemics in recent months (particularly in the fields of industry and economic development) acquire meaning in the light of this hypothesis. If this turned out to be the case, the problems would be posed
in less dramatic and urgent terms, the tensions would not be of an explosive nature in the immediate future. But the ruling group is preoccupied with preparing a long struggle against tendencies that today are still relatively weak and with eliminating at once any incipient evolution like that in the USSR in the time of Khrushchev and his successors.
In any case, the Chinese leadership will emerge much weakened from this test. Up to now the masses saw it as homogeneous and strong, standing in the tradition of the victorious revolution. Now divisions have appeared openly and the wear and tear has proved to be serious. From now on the leadership will be judged by the cadres and activists and also by the broad masses in a much more critical and questioning spirit. This could facilitate the formation of a new vanguard.
(7) In the course of the recent