DEFEND PEACE BY DEFENDING VIETNAM AND CHINA!
By Ernest Mandel
The courteous tone and good faith of the article by Jean-Marie Chauvier confirm the fact that debate is possible today between Communists and left socialists in Belgium. This debate can bring about political clarification. We are far from the insults and sarcasm which 1'Humanité has seen fit to pour on those seeking only to engage the French Communist party in a dialogue, and who are its sole potential allies within the French left.
Before proceeding to the heart of the subject, permit us to add that no one, either at La Gauche or among the left socialists in this country, is waiting with folded arms for "the USSR to do something."
Surely Chauvier is not addressing his reproaches about resignation and cowardice to those who, from the first day of the American aggression, called on the Belgian workers to proclaim their disgust and opposition to this dirty war; to the UGS [Union de la Gauche Socialiste], which initiated and, in fraternal unity with the Communist party, carried out the largest street demonstration in Belgium against the Vietnam war; to our comrade, Pierre le Gréve, the only deputy to call publicly, in Parliament, for a victory of the NLF (National Liberation Front]; to our young comrades of the JGS [Jeunes Gardes Socialistes], who are organizing their national demonstration at Liége on October 15 under the main slogan of "Solidarity with the NLF of South Vietnam!"
- With this out of the way, we come to the arguments of J.M.Chauvier. And if in this connection we are led to raise our voice somewhat, it is not out of some "anti- Soviet" sentiment or other; on the contrary, it springs from our growing anxiety over the fate of humanity, over the fate of the workers of all countries and of our own in particular, over the fate of all that remains from former and present revolutions, over the fate not only of the Vietnamese revolution, but of China and of the USSR itself.
We are convinced that J.M.Chauvier is wrong in his general evaluation and that many Communist leaders are similarly in error. Here are the principal grounds for our disagreement with his arguments:
(1) Chauvier states that the working class and popular masses of the capitalist countries can be a determining factor in ending the impasse. Agreed. But it is still necessary for this factor to make itself felt. It must be obvious, however, that apart from such platonic activities as collecting signatures and making routine speeches, most of the Communist parties in the capitalist world have done nothing to bring about an effective and productive mobilization of the working class and popular masses against the war in Vietnam.
Marshal Malinovsky recently compared the war in Vietnam to the Spanish civil war. The comparison seems to us to be a pertinent one; we have even advanced it independently. Despite a completely different world context (at that time, reaction and fascism were on the ascendency on a world-wide scale; today, on the contrary, the relationship of forces in the world is favorable to the anticapitalist side), the parallel is a strik-
ing one: on the result of this civil war may depend the world's course of development for many years to come.
But what did the working-class movement do during the period of the Spanish war? Did it cry "Peace in Spain!" or was its cry "Death to fascism! "? Did it devote its efforts toward negotiations, or did it devote them toward the victory of the antifascist camp (it is something else again whether the policy of rebuilding the bourgeois army inside the antifascist camp, the policy of "win the war first, then make the revolution," did not demobilize the masses in Spain itself)? How does it happen that the majority of Communist parties today continue to act as proponents of "peace" and "negotiations" for Vietnam, instead of mobilizing the masses in favor of victory for the National Liberation Front? - .
In Belgium, the Socialist Confederation of Workers as well as the Communist party are vanguard formations. The difference in slogans is consequently only a difference on the propaganda level. But in France, Italy, India, Japan, Chile, to cite only five such countries, the Communist parties have a great and even predominant influence over the mass of workers. Where are the protest strikes against the Vietnam war? Where are the refusals by longshoremen, railroad workers, truck drivers to transport arms or supplies for the U.S. troops engaged in the Vietnam war?
(2) In fact, the last paragraph of Chauvier's article is in contradiction with the one preceding it. Moreover, he reveals the secret of the political strategy of the Soviet leaders, of the leaders of most of the Communist parties. "The moral and diplomatic isolation of the government of the United States" is their objective. They believe it possible to “end the impasse" by virtue of this isolation. Their policy is one of
In our opinion they are wrong. We hold that American imperialism is already largely "isolated" in Europe (even "Free Belgium" gives only the weakest kind of support to the Vietnam war). And we maintain that American imperialism is none the worse for it.
For in the last analysis, there is a glaring contradiction in a position in which it is claimed, on the one hand, that the American leaders have become insane enough to be capable of launching a nuclear world war, thereby rushing to certain suicide, and on the other hand, that these same madmen are at the very same time especially sensitive to “moral and diplomatic isolation," to the homilies of General de Gaulle and the crocodile tears of the West European bourgeoisie.
(4) J.M.Chauvier appears to seriously underestimate, even to minimize, the immediate stakes in the Vietnam war. These stakes do not consist solely of the survival of the Vietnamese revolution, of the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determination, to set up an economic and social regime of their own choice (which the foul dictatorships of the Ngo Dinh Diems and the Kys prevented them from achieving through any other means than armed insurrection).
It is also the right of all peoples (above all those of the Third World, but not theirs alone!) to choose the regime they want. Johnson(whom the American CP indicated to the voters as the "lesser evil" -- is a reminder necessary?) has proclaimed that American force will stop liberation movements, which -he baptizes as "Communist," everywhere-in the world. And as a matter of fact, the United States government has, since 1964, stopped popular movements or revolutions in Brazil, the Congo, Santo Domingo, Ghana, Bolivia, Algeria, Indonesia, and so on and on, either by direct intervention or through plots in which it manipulated the strings.
Against this global counterevolutionary strategy, only a global revolutionary strategy can constitute an effective reply. Fidel Castro understood this and proclaimed it at the Tricontinental Conference. Obviously the United States would have to reexamine the situation if it were compelled to conduct three or four "Vietnam wars" at the same time and at three or four different points on the globe. Such objective possibilities are hardly lacking.
But the USSR and most of the Communist parties refuse to admit the soundness of this strategy. They prefer to grant credits of a hundred million dollars to the military dictatorship in Brazil, which is detested by the whole Brazilian population. They continue to play the game of an "alliance with the national bourgeoisie," despite the terrible setbacks of recent years. And the masses are in danger of paying the price for this incorrect policy.
(4) J.M.Chauvier also underestimates the mounting danger to the entire socialist camp, beginning with China, as a result of the Vietnam war. American imperialism, far from acting in a fit of madness, is advancing prudently and with caution, calculating
and observing the reactions of the enemy camp with each step it takes.
First there was the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin during August, 1964; no reaction from Moscow, save some verbal protests. Then came the first bombing of North Vietnan, under pretext of reprisals for an anti-American episode in South Vietnam: again Moscow did not budge. Subsequently, the bombings were repeated on a daily basis, and there was still no Soviet response. Finally, Hanoi and Haiphong are bombed and no counterblow has yet been dealt to the United States.
For our part we are convinced that far from being ' ‘irresponsible madmen," the American leaders are accurately calculating the risks. They are increasing the scale of escalation because they are convinced that neither the USSR nor China will intervene directly in the war in Vietnam. Retreat is possible if they are confronted with the dilemma: retreat or perish; for the balance of terror is such that a nuclear war would destroy the United States just as surely as it would the rest of the world.
The danger lies in the fact that the United States, in the belief that the USSR will remain passive, will soon commit an aggression against China. As for us, we are convinced that the USSR cannot remain a passive spectator of such aggression, if for no other reason than that of military self-defense. But the silence of the Soviet government runs the risk of being badly interpreted in Washington and it could windup by dragging the whole world into war.
We therefore ask the Soviet government to declare, immediately and publicly, that any attack against China would be considered an attack against the Soviet Union. We call upon all Communist leaders and militants to support this request. It is not a declaration of this kind which contains the risk of provoking nuclear war: on the contrary, it is the ABSENCE of such a declaration which can hurl humanity into the nuclear holocaust, by_ encouraging aggression upto the point where there would be no other way of opposing it save by the use of extreme means.
Like Chauvier, we deplore the refusal of the Chinese leaders to form a socialist united front against the American aggression in Vietnam. Contrary to Chauvier, however, we attribute the principal reason for this refusal to the incomprehensible silence of Moscow at a time when everyone is already openly posing the question: will the Pentagon attack China?.
(5) By asserting that a strategy of this kind "would provoke" the imperialists and runs the risk of precipitating nuclear war, Chauvier really puts himself in an impossible position: the only way to beat aggression is to retreat before it! As a matter of fact, haven't we already heard this same tune previously about resistance to aggression being the equivalent of “warmongering"? Where has it brought us?
But more to the point: if all those who are asking the Soviet government for an energetic response to imperialist aggression are "warmongers" then the Soviet leaders themselves have been guilty of similar "warmongering." For didn't they reply in thé most energetic terms -- going so far as to threaten to launch rockets against Paris and London, something we do not at all ask of them! -- at the time of the aggression against Egypt and the American landing in Lebanon?
Why is it that what was valid in 1956 and in 1958 is no longer valid in 1966? Why is it that what was valid for nonsocialist countries is no longer valid for socialist countries? In what way has the situation "changed" since 1958?
That is why we are so anxious. That is why we are so fearful about peace. Failing an energetic response, nothing has a chance of stopping imperialism on the road of aggression, for it will believe itself invulnerable and all powerful.
IN REBUTTAL
By Ernest Mandel
The discussion between La_ Gauche and the editors of Le Drapeau Rouge on the subject of the most effective way to defend Vietnam is continued by Rosine Lewin in the October 1 issue of the weekly Drapeau Rouge in the form of an answer to the article which appeared in La_Gauche on September 24, 1966. The editor of Le Drapeau Rouge presents three arguments against us.
"Ernest Mandel," she says, "blames the Communists for attaching too much impor-
tance to action by the popular and democratic masses in the capitalist countries as a method of ending the Vietnamese impasse."
Posed in this way, the question obviously does not coincide with what we wrote. Action by the laboring masses of the imperialist countries would be genuinely useful in forcing American imperialism to withdraw from Vietnam....provided it was genuinely effective action. ;
If longshoremen and railroad workers in all the capitalist countries refused to transport American arms, munitions and soldiers to Vietnam; if there were strikes and continuous demonstrations in all the big capitalist countries in support of the Vietnamese revolutionists; if there were tens of thousands of volunteers coming to Vietnam from Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy, to support the struggle of the NLF; if this swelling movement threatened to overthrow the capitalist regime in let us say two or three key countries in the world...then, obviously, the Pentagon, which coldly evaluates the developing situation in terms of power and of social forces in motion, would say to itself that taking everything into. consideration, a retreat from the Vietnam wasps' nest would be less costly than continuation of its war of aggression.
But to pose the question in these terms is equivalent to answering it. For it is impossible realistically to foresee any struggles of such scope taking place in the coming months. However, it is precisely in the coming months that imperialism will cross new thresholds in escalating its aggression. It is against this extension of its aggression -- which includes the danger of direct aggression against China -- that the most effective response must be found.
Certainly the struggle to mobilize the laboring masses of Western Europe in behalf of the Vietnamese revolution must be pursued and amplified. We will do it in Belgium, too. But we most seriously doubt that the "pressure" of a de Gaulle, or a petition campaign "for peace," or one kind of diplomatic initiative or another, can possibly be adequate to halt imperialism on its road of aggression.
"How can it [the USSR] fulfill its promise, practically, if Americans and Chinese become militarily engaged tomorrow...? How will the USSR be able to bring aid to China? Not by sending it conventional arms, planes, tanks, soldiers, since Peking refuses all collaboration with the USSR." This is Rosine Lewin's argument against our invitation to the CP to add its voice to ours in appealing to the USSR to solemnly warn the United States that any attack against China would be considered an attack against the Soviet Union itself.
The arguments seem very weak to us. In the first place, it would be ridiculous on our part to try to advise the General Staff of the Soviet army. But no one can convince us that the latter sees no way of responding, in Asia and in the Pacific, to an aggression against China, other than on Chinese territory alone. After all, there are submarines and long-range bombers. There are American troops in a great number of places in Asia. Is a diagram necessary?
Furthermore, why isn't it obvious to Rosine Lewin that such a declaration by the Soviet government would remove the main argument of the Chinese leaders, who are talking about a secret Soviet-American alliance against China? When this commitment will have been honored, the Chinese leaders will not keep on talking this way, for obvious reasons of self- defense. Faced with a materializing American attack, the Chinese leaders would very quickly propose a way of bringing in Soviet aid to China...
But the real question lies elsewhere. The point which we stressed was that the escalation of aggression by imperialism is planned with the utmost care, step by step, and with careful testing at each stage of its adversary's response.
Aggression against China is no more inevitable than is the landing of American troops on the shores of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It will take place only if Washington believes it can make these moves with impunity.
It is highly probable that a solemn warning by Moscow, backed up by a demonstration in force to show that the Soviet government is serious in its commitment, would prevent an aggression against China and would prevent a new phase in the escalation of American aggression.
The great danger now confronting humanity is that Washington might believe that the USSR would not intervene in a war between the U.S. and China; that it might learn too late that such a hypothesis is without foundation; that this will occur at a time when it will be too deeply committed to be able to withdraw. Under these conditions we would be rushing directly into a world war. To speak up loudly and clearly now means, in
a large measure, to avoid this danger.
Rosine Lewin's final argument: our proposal would place the Soviet Union at the mercy of a provocation -- since it would be compelled to make its response by means of nuclear weapons.
Obviously we have never advanced such a monstrous proposal as to call on the USSR to take the initiative in a nuclear war. We have proposed -—- together with Fidel Castro, Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertrand Russell, and many more -- that the USSR should reply to the imperialist escalation with a counterescalation. That is all. The counterescalation must be cut to the measure of the escalation; there can be no question of taking the initiative in using nuclear weapons.
Quite the contrary. Our proposal is, in the last analysis, the sole way of avoiding nuclear war -- by launching a response at a time when aggression can be contained by conventional arms and methods. It is only if the response to aggression is delayed until the moment when imperialism resorts to its final weapons -- until the final phases of escalation -- that we keep on increasing the risks of nuclear war.
Our proposal was not made as a means of “ending the impasse in Vietnam." It was concerned with the defense, in the immediate period, of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China, threatened by a new American aggression. To guarantee the victory of the revolution in South Vietnam, it would be necessary to amplify the revolutionary struggle in other areas of the globe, so as to compel imperialism to spread its forces thinner and, in the end, to strip its Vietnam front. But this is another controversial subject to which we shall return shortly.