MEANING OF THE BOLIVIAN JUNTA'S CALL FOR ELECTIONS
(The following article has been translated by World Outlook from the January 31 issue of Lucha Obrera, official publication of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario ever ueagnary Workers party), Bolivian section of the. Fourth International . 7
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~The setting of elections for next July by. the Military. ‘Junta, is not due to any democratic desire to return to the constitution and to restore the freedoms and rights suppressed by the "gorillas" [reactionary military officials]; it is a maneuver aimed only at maintaining the military in power. To believe the contrary would signify falling from. ingenuity | into stupidity.
The preventive coup of November 4 -196M, organized “in the Escuela de Altos Estudios Militares [School of Advanced Military: Studies] with Yankee militarists as accessories, had as its main objective the destruction of the trade-union organizations and the left parties of the workers and the repression of the masses. These tasks were assigned the Military Junta by imperialism. This was also the reason why the: Bolivian reaction gave it unconditional support.
However, more than a year after’ seizing power, the results are very limited. Although the gorillas carried out a massacre, dissolved the unions, fired workers and conducted the most brutal repression, they were nevertheless: unable to defeat’ the masses, which launched struggles. again and again. For all practical purposes, the repressive policy of the Military Junta, falling short of its. (objectives, has ended in a resounding defeat.
In addition, in applying their policies, the military. lost the support..and sympathy which they were initially granted by some sectors of the petty. bourgeoisie. Despite all their efforts, they were unable to gain the massive support of the peasantry -- only the doubtful adherence of the peasant bureaucracy. Thus the bourgeois and oligarchical sectors who assisted in the military-coup and “who placed hopes in the possibility of ruling jointly with the military, were unable to unite; the divisions among them remained, together with different political positions on what road to: off er _the country.
By the end of 1965 the bourgeoisie and the imperialists began to see that the military dictatorship was a failure, that the stabil- . ity they sought, the desired-for social peace that would attract capital, remained ‘distant, the situation -- contrary to expectations -- grew worse and worse, the struggle reaching the level. of armed action and guerrilla warfare. Discouragement, doubt and ine the in some of’ the military circles as they observed day by day the». power of the masses despite the massacre, the repression and the...» political murders. Some of the bourgeois sectors, becoming desperate, sought to save themselves, indicating their disagreement: with the policies of the Military Junta, even threatening them with a possible
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coup d'état.
Among Latin-American bourgeois circles and among the imperialists, the fear grew that Bolivia would become converted into a revolutionary volcano fed by the brutality and incapacity of the Military Junta. Thus they began to look for a new way out, which, without abandoning the uniformed dictators, would enable them to widen the base of support for their government and give them greater stability. The way out must at the same time serve to extinguish the conflicts on the point of breaking out both from the side of the masses as well as the bourgeoisie itself.
It was in accordance with this line of thinking that the Military Junta suddenly found itself obliged to set elections and Barrientos was forced to resign and leave Bolivia. This step, a result of the pressure of various factors like those indicated above constitutes a striking expression of the defeat of the fascist gorillas and their repressive, antilabor policy.
Thus it is clear that the convocation of elections is a result of the defeat of the gallows policy of massacring the masses. The Military Junta, driven into a corner by the mass struggle, by the aggravated crisis of the bourgeoisie and by incipient internal struggles in the army, is trying to save itself by means of an electoral farce.
With the election call, issued at the same time as a cautious, calculated and cunning withdrawal of the army from the mines takes place, many prisoners are freed, and the "election" is permitted of certain mine leaders and rehabilitated members of the bureaucracy (who will serve the gorillas as they formerly served the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario]), they unquestionably hope to create illusions among the masses with regard to the elections and divert them into preponderantly electoral activity. In other words, with the mirage of elections and temporary observance of certain rights and freedoms, the Military Junta hopes to disarm the workers and absorb the conflicts that have been accumulating and that threaten to break out. In the camp of the workers, particularly the miners, this maneuver aims at destroying the Underground Committees and isolating the revolutionary partisans of armed action and guerrilla warfare.
Nevertheless, in view of the highly militant mood of the working class, particularly the miners, this objective is not easily achieved. Among the radicalized workers, who feel the effect of the criminal policies of the Junta, the electoral gambit has not caught on.
It is the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties that have responded to the setting of elections; but the crisis there, instead of being overcome, has grown even sharper.
The bourgeoisie have not been able to unite around the Military Junta. They have not been able to foster a broad movement around the official candidate. The weak Frente de la Revolucion
Boliviana (MPC-PIR-PRA* and the usurpers who claim to represent the.- Excombatientes) is the maximum gained up to now. But this Front, from which the FSB, PDC, Liberals, PURS** and other bourgeois outfits have been excluded, has not been able and will not be able to hold =: back the masses of workers and peasants and the middle class. From: ;. the electoral point of view, it is a fresh failure. Its:: components, -. particularly the military men of the Junta, already feel: defeated: cin. the elections, even . ‘before the electoral campaign has begun. | ;
Reality has thus crossed up the desires of the Military Junta and imperialism, placing them in a blind alley.
The coming elections, with a minimum of freedom, will end in a tremendous deféat for the military and its allies. To gain-at the ballot box, the’ Junta will’ have to order-out the entire army and. the police to control the mines, the villages and the countryside.. But... this will compel them to drop their mask of pseudo democracy. Under. present conditions, free and democratic elections are a luxury which the dictatorship cannot permit itself, hated as it is by the people.
- But to prepare elections and then hold them, rope in hand, and with a gun aimed: at the back of: the people, can only help ripen the conditions: for a popular insurrection. A confrontation between the. masses and the government will: again occur with the employment of arms as in May and September 1965.
But either of these roads leads to a defeat for the military murderers! a Bs a
‘Placed at the crossroads so quickly after calling elections, the Military Junta now faces mounting pressure to postpone them | indefinitely and maintain Ovando as president for a long time. Tendencies within the FSB and other rightist parties | are actively working for this” outcome. ae
. If the calling of elections whets appetites and sharpens ‘squabbling among the bourgeois and oligarchical circles hunting. for office, postponement of the elections will only deepen the crisis. The sectors who are fans of the mad Barrientos, as well as the..officeseekers, will feel cheated. To continue Ovando in power would frus-.. trate the aspirations of Barrientos.
The capitalist regime in Bolivia is doomed. The alternative party of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists has not been able.to. stabilize thé situation. In power it has ‘only accentuated the. “internal crisis and radicalized the antagonistic masses. Precisely the masses, with their mobilizations, their struggles, their inexnaustible energy, make it impossible for the Military Junta or any other version of the Amperialist dictatorship to stabilize the country with a capi- *Movimiento Popular Cristiano, Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, Partido Revolucionario Auténtico. **Falange Socialista Boliviana, Partido Dembcrato- Cristiano, Partido Unido Republicano Socialista.
talist program and capitalist policies that no longer Stand up, that. are pastonsoally, exhausted. ~ “Consequently | the workers and their vanguard: must start from the real fact that ‘the social peace: hypocritically advocated by the - Military Junta is no longer possible. It.is necessary to prepare and. to organize the working-class and popular forces with the perspective of approaching and repeated battles and armed confrontations.
The elections must be considered as a probable variant of the measures to which the Junta may have recourse to, ‘but not ‘as an. im- |: mediate reality and still less as a road capable of solving. the problems facing the natioh“and-the workers. Elections held under the. .;. presidency ‘of the military dictatorship, with the Law of State. Security in effect as well as antiunion decrees, can only serve to legal-. ize the government of the murderers. The people and the workers must turn their backs on them and not have’ any confidence in the elections.
-In face of serious éarly: confrontations, it is. ‘the duty of ‘the revolutionists and the:political groupings ‘that..claim to be for the. masses to come out for a powerful Left Front {Frente de Izquierdas] . that could unite the broad majority of the nation, prepare and‘ organize its armed contingents and launch the struggle for power.
It would be an:error to try to'limit the operation of this Front solely to electoral activities when the situation in realatye demands a unified command in order to direct the struggle to solve. all the national and working-class problems along the road to insurrection and the conquest of power. »
THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN ALGERIA
[When Colonel Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella in a military coup: ‘d'état last June 19, there was a sharp reaction particularly among the students and most advanced sectors of the: women in Algiers. The army was able to put this down, however., by a-show of force -in the major centers of Algeria that resulted in a number of casualties. The opposition sullenly withdrew from the streets for the time being. Boumedienne appeared to enjoy absolute authority. At the end. of January, however, signs of unrest were again visible among the stuents; and during. February they engaged in a series of demonstrations.
[The following factual account of the first days of this” action has been translated by World Outlook from a mimeographed publication, The Week in Algeria, which is circulated in the underground. The’ identity of the tendency that is producing and circulating this newsletter is not clear, but evidently it has good sources of ‘information. The’ particular issue from which this report has. been taken is dated "January 28 to February 5." The subheadings appear ‘in the . original. ]
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Chronology of the Facts ce ites
@ Friday, January 28, in the morning, 30 to 35 Moroccan students invaded the offices of the Moroccan embassy, distributing leaflets to the crowd that ‘gathered, demonstrating their hostility in this way against the regime of Hassan II-and protesting Oufkir's assassination of Ben Barka. Se, a
e ‘Saturday, at noon, a demonstration was ‘organized ‘by the Algiers Committee of the UNEA [Union Nationale des Etudiants Algériens ~- National Union of Algerian Students] on Didouche Mourad Street. The demonstrators (about 250 at the beginning) shouted against General Oufkir and the demonstration quickly took a turn hostile to the June 19 regime. The students demanded the release of their president, Houari Mouffok, and shouted in addition, "Free Ben Bella." .'a. i The crowd grew as it marched toward the Plaza of the Martyrs until it included about 4,000 persons. The police charged the crowd and made some arrests, but the:demonstrators dispersed peacefully. In the evening the demonstrators:.were released, but on the other hand the Executive Secretariat dissolved -the. Algiers Committee of the UNEA. The handling of the demonstrators by the regime was noticeably less severe than during the events of last summer.
@ Sunday , the UNEA Committee was-in continuous session all day. In: the evening it’ decided to stage ae three-day strike at the university.
® Monday , at dawn, the work began of pasting ‘leaflets and | handwritten posters on the school walls. Leaflets were distributed to the students asking them to go on strike to protest against "the barbarous methods" of the government. The appeal called for the release of all the students arrested since June 19 and the reestablishment of the UNEA's right to function freely.
The strike was actually complete -~ 95% to 98% of the students observed it everywhere, the. various Schools, Fine Arts, Polytechnical Studies, as weli as. the School of Agriculture. The police were active. to some extent everywhere. They compelled the teachers to hola class, with | a Single’ ‘student whom they forced to attend.
‘The same day, in “certain high schools (for example Ouride Meddad. in El. Harrach), the graduating classes. also went .on strike.” | But. ‘here: police calls to the parents stopped the movement. Moreover . the student organization is very weak in the high schools. ,
Tuesday, the strike continued in the same way.
/@ Despite - the ‘most varied threats ‘and pressure, the strike was “still 80% effective. Wednesday evening, a leaflet issued by the Algiers Committee of the UNEA asked the students to resume classes: "the strike is ended, the struggle | continues. " The Reactions of the Regime
Sherif Belkacem took charge of operations beginning Friday
evening by personally. writing a-letter from a reader which was published Saturday morning in.Révolution Africaine. The letter condemned the demonstration of the Moroccan students.
® Saturday evening, the RTA [Radio-Television Algiers] maintained a chaste silence on the UNEA demonstration. (The radio is under thé responsibility of Boumaza and not Belkacem. ) “
@e Sunday. Nothing in the press but frenzy begins on the radio. Each news bulletin -- 7:30, 1:00, 8:00 -- attacks the students for 20 to ee minutes with wild statements, all sounding: the same theme. This was not difficult .sinee the national commissars of the FLN {Front de | Libération: Nationale] happened to.be meeting in Algiers and "“editori- ’ als" in the press were filled with an extraordinary verbiage: "abject cosmopolitans"; "fishers in troubled water"; "so-called students, foreign agents"; "methods contrary to our national and moral values"; — "fascists'; "reactionaries"; "diabolical agents of obscure forces."-~"
The Algerian press (Le Moudjahid) kept up the chorus, natur-. ally, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.
At the same time, Sherif Belkacem tried to get messages of support from the national organizations. the UNFA [Union Nationale des Femmes Algériens -~ National Union of Algerian Women] published nothing because it ceased to exist six months ago. The UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens -- General Union of Algerian Workers] refused to intervene in any way, replying to Belkacem: "Considér yourself lucky that we don't denounce you." For the JFLN [Jeunesse du Front de Libération Nationale -~ Youth of the National ~_ Liberation Front] it was easy. Under pressure from, the Executive — Secretariat, they wrote up a relatively mild statement. Belkacen found it insufficient and composed another one which he distributed.
The representatives of the UNEM [Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc -- National Students Union of Morocco] were called to the party headquarters Tuesday evening and told to make a declaration supporting the Boumedienne government. They wrote a document, presenting the facts: objectively, including a few polite diplomatic — phrases but assuring the Algerian students of their support.’ The docu ment of the Moroccans was fixed up with a censor's pencil and otherwise modified and then presented as a message disavowing the UNEL and supporting the Boumedienne regime.
All this is serious, but everybody in Algiers knows about it, so that the aim sought for was not achieved. Through word of mouth) and leaflets, the Moroccans explained their real position.
Belkacem became the. butt of nridicule for publishing communiqués signed: "the students in literature, sciences, medicine, law, etc... who denounce the strike." These messages were written by a phony student, one Ben Aissa, ordinarily a teacher at the El Mokrani high school, who is generally known as an ultrareactionary, belonging to the "Muslim Brotherhood" tendency, an intimate of Tedjini, the ultrareactionary Secretary General of the Ministry of National. Education.
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_.. It was also this Ben Aissa who wrote the long article in the Saturday , February 5, Révolution Africaine where frenzy against the students reached a high point. mid
The’ Ministry of National Education took several actions:
@ On the one hand, the scholarships of troublemakers. were cancelled and they. were expelled from the university.
e On the other hand, Tedjini issued a circular asking the teachers to spy on their pupils and students and to inform on oppon-. ents of the regime. Already numerous reactions have occurred against this -- the unions representing foreigners refusing to have anything to do with such an obnoxious procedure. Lessons of the Strike
Algerian public opinion has shaken off its torpor and the Secretariat of the party has lost the little prestige it still had.
Belkacem's reaction was one of panic, revealed in the expedients he. resorted to. Everyone knew during this period that the strike was a complete success. The masses gave a favorable reception to the strike. The lack of publicity and the relative isolation of the students prevented the movement from becoming broader. As for the students more directly, it should be noted in particular that they were the first to be caught by surprise at the extent of their movement. The success is explained by the favorable conditions (Boumedienne's regime is highly unpopular), by the breadth of the strike program that brought the students together, and finally the brutal, stupid reactions of the regime which strengthened the cohesion of the students which was not too good at the beginning of the strike movement. However ,. we should note that at bottom the student demands were on a union rather than political’ level.
In addition one should remember here the very serious organizational work which the UNEA has carried out since the time of the -ORP [Organisation de la Résistance Populaire -~ People's Resistance Organization, the underground anti-Boumedienne, pro-Ben Bella movement], a work that has placed on a solid footing an efficient and. solid parallel structure, on the organizational as well as material | level (leaflets for example). It should be noted that a different legal organization. now existing is far from having attained the same organizational.level; it should be. observed that the students were able to go into action on 24-hours notice.
The publication of leaflets and halting the strike at the end of three days. again shows the seriousness and the maturity of the students.
All this therefore proves:
e On the one hand, the organizational capacities of a considerable part of the most politically conscious sectors of Algeria.
® On the other hand, the possibility of striking echoes among the masses (the Sunday demonstration, the most important since June 19).
@ The weakness of the regime and the state apparatus, hence the possibility of really toppling.it in the future.
© Finally, the hysterical campaign unleashed by Belkacem shows in particular his desire to attract the attention of the ANP [Armée Nationale Populaire -- People's National Army] through the following language: "Now is not the time for you to get agitated; the Communists will take the offensive." It remains to be seen whether this argument will carry any real weight.
® In addition the impression is given that the power of the regime has been overestimated. It has been forgotten, or not noticed, that the various organs of power represent only the members of the leading bodies and a narrow following. The fragility of the regime -lacking a popular base and a program, able in eight months of rule to assemble nothing -- is thus apparent. The men of June 19 only have their hands on the machinery of power, but the divisions among them lead. one to ask -- for how long?