DEEPENS THE SPLIT WITH MOSCOW
The refusal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party: to.send.a delegation to the twenty-third congress of the Soviet Communist::party, consummates the split between .Peking.and Moscow on. the party level. It remains to be seen how much this rupture. will affect their-governmental relations. oe,
‘re. 3. In view.of the deepening differences since 1959 and the bitterness. of their. ‘public disputes since 196% this event. is neither sudden ‘nor surprising. But the final bill of divorcement which dis- — poses of the.last hopes of reconciliation.is bound.to have great repercussions among the Communist parties everywhere and condition the éntire development of the international revolutionary movement for years, if not decades, to come.
The showdown has been. precipitated by the immense pressures exerted upon both Moscow and Peking by the escalation of U.S. mili-_ tary intervention in Southeast Asia. .The bombing of : the Democratic. Republic of Vietnam in: February 1965 was the first armed imperialist. assault on a workers state since the Korean war. These attacks con-— fronted the two leading Communist regimes with a direct threat to their own security as well as to the independence and integrity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Neither Moscow nor Peking responded to the military aggression of U.S. imperialism in a manner commensurate with the obligations imposed by the situation. Moscow protested but did not take any serious countermeasures to deter Johnson's escalation of the conflict. It did not even encourage the Communist parties under its influence in the West to conduct sustained mass protest campaigns against U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
For its part Peking has persistently rejected common action with the Soviet Union in defense of Vietnam on the fallacious ground that it was. impossible or impermissible to engage in a united front with "revisionists" and."renegades" who were conspiring with Washington to. encircle China.
~The March 22 open letter of the Chinese Communist Central Committee turning down the invitation to attend the twenty-third congress refers to the "anti-Chinese" letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU, circulated among the leaders of the East European Communist parties, which accuses the Chinese CP of accentuating the split in. "the socialist community as well as the world communist movement." The full text of this document,. which is generally accepted as authentic, was published in the West German paper, Die Welt of Hamburg. The English translation of its main points appeared in the March O4 New York Times.
The CCP Central Committee said that the Soviet letter was aimed at instigating other Communist parties to join Moscow in opposing China. It "wantonly vilified the Chinese Communist party" as being "bellicose" and "pseudorevolutionary," as. "refusing to oppose -
imperialism" and "encouraging United States imperialist aggression," and as being guilty of "adventurism," "splitism," "Trotskyism," "nationalism," "great power chauvinism," “dogmatism, " and so on.
The Peking statement charged the Kremlin with spreading rumors. that China "is obstructing aid to Vietnam" and that "China has been encroaching on Soviet territory." "You have even gone so far as to State," the letter said, that "China is not a Socialist country."
‘The Maoists castigated the Soviet leaders for exposing Stalin's crimes at their twentieth congress. "You suddenly lashed out at - Stalin. Stalin was a' great Marxist-Leninist. In attacking Stalin, you. were attacking: Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union, Communist parties, - China, the people and all the Marxist-Leninists of the world." Peking sees a grievous fault in one of the few meritorious acts of Stalin’ Ss. successors.
.. There is somewhat more validity'to their charge that the Kremlin leaders “have all along been acting. in coordination with the. United States in its plot for peace talks, vainly attempting to sell out the struggle of the Vietnamese people against United States aggression and for national salvation and to drag the Vietnamese | question into the orbit of Soviet-United States collaboration. "
"You have worked hand in glove with the United States in a whole series of dirty deals inside and outside the United Nations," the letter added. "In close cooperation with the counterrevolutionary ‘global strategy'. of United States imperialism you are now aoa trying to build a ring of encirclement around. Socialist China.’
~The letter ended with a pledge to the Soviet people that "once the Soviet Union meets with imperialist aggression and puts up resolute resistance, China will definitely stand side by side with the Soviet. Union and fight against the common enemy. "
‘The first half of the private” Soviet letter reviews the efforts made by the Soviet leaders over the past year and a half to arrive at an understanding with Peking on joint aid to Vietnam. Khrushchev's successors contend that they have sought to refrain from open polemics against the positions and attacks of Peking and accuse the Chinese leaders of rejecting their overtures and positive steps for resuming cooperation in various spheres.
“The second part of the letter deals with China’ s relations with the world Communist movement. The gravest charges are that China is ‘provoking border conflicts with the Soviet Union and trying to embroil ‘the Soviet Union in a war with the United States.
The document alleges that the Chinese leadership is replacing the course toward socialist revolution "with a course toward a world war."
This | accusation is especially perfidious ‘and. poisonous since © it is the aggressive actions of the U.S. imperialists directed
against China through Vietnam which are threatening to engulf Asia and the world in armed conflict.
‘The Kremlin' s attempt to shift responsibility for the danger of world war ‘from Washington, where it really rests, to the People's Republic of China serves to substantiate Peking's contention that the Soviet heads are aligning themselves with the imperialists "to establish a holy alliance against China."
The second part of the letter assails the concepts ‘of world revolution presented in the celebrated article by Lin: Piao, deputy chairman of the CCP, published in September 1965. It interprets these to mean that the whole arsenal of revolutionary struggle is reduced to the single form of armed revolt arid war. This is more than an. apology for the multiple roads to socialism, including the gradual, peaceful parliamentary path, advocated by Moscow and practiced by its followers from Paris to New York.
Under the guise of attacking the Chinese leaders for an ultraleft and adventurist policy, it is a thinly veiled. polemic against | the Cuban line of -armed guerrilla struggle in the Latin-American revolution adopted at the recent Tricontinental Conference in Havana.
The Soviet letter alludes to a speech by Kao Kolin, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, on November 11, 1965, which categorically rejects the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union while recognizing the possibility of cooperation with "representatives of the upper strata.of many nationalist .countries" and — with part:of the "monopoly bourgeoisie." At the same time the letter complains that the CCP leadership “ignore the fact that. in a number: of former colonies and sSemicolonial countries, patriotic and revolutionary-democratic forces are in power. It is natural that the Chinese appeals for armed actions against these. governments spark protests by the democratic: forces. "
Here again, under the guise of criticizing the extremism of - Peking, Moscow is trying to justify its policy of supporting the bourgeois-bureaucratic heads of friendly neocolonialist regimes against the forces and movements striving to lift the: national Liberation struggle to a higher stage and clear the way for the rule of. the popular masses on genuinely socialist foundations.
The letter concludes by pointing out that the Chinese leaders, who are so free in criticizing other Communist parties and countries for their lack of revolutionary spirit, "show an extraordinary caution in their own political deeds, as well as extreme patience toward imperialist powers and their policy, including the policy that is aimed against China itself."
This is a well-aimed shot at the most vulnerable opening in the Chinese armor. It is becoming widely recognized, not only in -capitalist circles but among their opponents, that Peking's revolutionism in words has by no means been matched in the field of action, as the caution of its conduct in the Vietnam conflict indicates.:
. At the same time, this accusation, coming from the Kremlin, .... is utterly cynical. The Soviet Union is the only power in the world . with a nuclear stockpile sufficient to really deter U.S. imperialism. When Khrushchev scrapped the. nuclear pact between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in hope of: thereby winning a. "peaceful coexistence" deal: with Washington, China's military defense was greatly weakened. It was precisely this weakening of China's defenses that encouraged the Pentagon to plunge into its military. adventure in Vietnam and to begin actively considering a military attack against: China with the possible use of nuclear weapons.: In view of Washington's threat to attack China and the absence of guar-. .. anteed military support from the Soviet Union, particularly nuclear: . support, the caution of the Chinese government is not without: dustification whatever its exaggeration.
‘While Peking and Moscow pointed accusing: fingers.at each other | for responsibility in a situation that is seriously weakening both | of them in the world relation of forces, Washington has busied itself in scheming how to take further advantage of the deepening division. The latest exchange of missives between Mao and Brezhnev-Kosygin. has led to a new stir of activity among the strategic planners ‘in the. Pentagon. my os
The New York Times, which has very good connections. in. U.S. government circles, indicated this in its March 27 issue:
"For if Russia can indeed be counted out as Communist China! ‘s military ally, the question arises: Can American military pressures . against North Vietnam and even China be. escalated with relative impunity since China alone has neither the air power nor the nuclear . resources to take on the United States?"
When the Sino-Soviet dispute. first came into the open several years ago, the Mao regime took the offensive against Moscow and for a while made considerable headway in gaining sympathy and support for its views both among the leaderships and the ranks. of the Communist parties and the colonial revolutionists. Today, as the split reaches its climax, Peking finds itself on the defensive. and more isolated than ever within the Communist world. What accounts for. this weakening of its position since neither of ‘the antagonists have changed their fundamental ideas?
FPirst, the serious setbacks tothe colonial revolution on three continents, initiated by the military take-over in Brazil in 1964, extending into Africa. from Algeria through the Congo to Ghana,,. and culminating in the anti-Communist blood: bath in Indonesia have dealt heavy blows to the prestige and influence of Feking: - There are explicit references to this in the Soviet letter.
More directly detrimental has been the factional policy Peking has pursued in stubbornly opposing united action in defense of Vietnam. Chairman Mao and his. associates propose to persist in this ruinous course. They try to justify it in a March.24 editorial in the official newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao with the specious argument. that the world's peoples are already supporting one another in "the
broadest united front."
This flies in the.face of the facts and no amount of bluster and bravado from Peking can. canceal them. In reality, the peoples of ‘the world, and-especially among the workers states, are sorely divided at a time. when. the expansion of the war in Vietnam demands the greatest unity. Peking cannot escape its share of the blame for this state of affairs which issues from its sectarian rejection of joint action with Moscow's leadership. ;
The united. front of workers states and parties is rendered necessary in the first place by the existence of deep and unbridgeable political. and organizational. differences among the forces and movements facing a common enemy. It is designed to achieve unity in action against a mutual danger despite existing differences.
If Moscow is as revisionist and conciliatory toward the imperialists as Peking insists, this should come out and be manifested in the further course of the struggle. The task of exposure will thereby be facilitated, not hindered, by the creation of a united front. As it now stands, the other Communist governments and parties are being called upon to trust in Peking's words rather than to make up their own minds. on the, basis of Moscow's actions.
The Soviet. leaders boast in their letter that they have sent over half a billion dollars in military,. aid’ to north Vietnam and’ the’ National Liberation Front this past year. This is not much compared with the $14 billion additional military. appropriation for Vietnam just voted by the U.S.Congress. It has proved, far from adequate to protect the Democratic..Republic of Vietnam from ‘bombér raids. Peking is less able to provide military matériel than Moscow while its opposition to united action lays it open to accusations of obstructing the transport of Soviet supplies to Vietnam.
The wrongness of the Chinese attitude on this crucial matter is emphasized by the alienation of its closest allies. The Japanese Communist leaders have been vainly pleading with Peking to abandon its intransigence and promote unity in face of the U.S. military operations in Vietnam. Last week they joined with the North Korean Communist leaders in declaring that it was "the first and:-foremost task" of all Communist parties "to unite broad anti-imperialist forces and concentrate all strength on the struggle against U.S. imperialism" despite "difficulties in realizing this." Instead Peking , has increased: the difficulties from its.side.
Now the governments of North Vietnam and’ North Korea, which’ have been Peking's two foremost allies in Asia and in its dispute ue with Moscow, are sending top-level delegations to the Soviet Communist party's Congress, despite China's denunciation and. boycott of it. The South Vietnamese Communists will also attend.
These steps must be regarded as sharp. rebukes to Peking for its divisive stand which intensifies its isolation. At the moment, apart from sympathizers in the ranks of the Communist parties and pro-Moscow groups, Mao is left with no unquestioning supporters but
the Albanian government and the New Zealand Communists.
The Kremlin has been exploiting the untenable position of the Mao leadership in respect to Vietnam to the hilt and with much: suc-:: cess. The third major point on the agenda of the twenty-third congress will be a report on the situation within the international Communist movement. we.
The discussion around this question should indicate what steps the Soviet leaders propose to take in the light of the consummation of the.split. The March 23 Le Monde reports that Soviet CP Secretary Brezhnev has sent personal messages to the first secretaries of the. Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian parties again insisting on the need for an international conference to discuss coordina-— tion of aid for Vietnam but really designed to condemn and: further. isolate Peking.
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