Vol. 5, No. 10 March 10, 1967
JOHNSON AGAIN ESCALATES HIS WAR
In his February 13 message to Pope Paul VI, President Ho Chi Minh stated the terms for a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam as follows: "The U.S. imperialists must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and let the Vietnamese people themselves settle their own affairs."
Hanoi's representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo, explained February 22 that Ho Chi Minh had merely repeated the four conditions required to bring peace and that the opening of peace talks was another matter. On this, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had made an important concession, Mai Van Bo declared. He again called attention to the declaration made by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to the Australian correspondent Wilfred Burchett in late January that talks would be possible if the bombing were to stop.
Previously Hanoi's position had been that if the Johnson administration stopped the bombing unconditionally, then this new fact would be studied. If Washington next took the step of proposing to negotiate, this too would be studied.
New York, N. Y. 10010. Pix
The concession made by Hanoi was evidently at the bottom of the recent flurry of speculation about the possibility of "negotiations." It was this concession, apparently, which Kasygin brought to Prime Minister Wilson in the hope that the British government
would utilize its "special re-
lations" with Johnson to per-
suade him to Seize the opening.
Johnson's reply was
given February 27 when U.S.
planes began sowing mines in
the rivers of north Vietnam.
And at a press conference the
same day, Johnson said he had
ordered three new kinds of mil-
itary action. These included
mining the rivers, naval shell-
ing of Vietnamese positions and
long-range artillery fire into
north Vietnam.
This "far-reaching" (the
term used by Johnson) intensifi-
cation of the war set off a
storm of protest in the U.S. and
throughout the world. The denun-
ciations hinged, in general, on
the obvious hypocrisy of the
Johnson administration in clain-
ing to be seeking peace talks in
which all that was required from
Hanoi was the "slightest signal"
in this direction to bring a
halt to the bombing. More than a
slight signal had been given --
with the result that now Johnson
was praising the bombing because
it tied down as many as 500,000
persons in north Vietnam to re-
pair the continual damage in-
flicted on the country!
Premier Pham Van Dong
told a French reporter March 1
that Johnson had torpedoed the
hope for talks by again escala-
ting the war. The U.S. aggres-
sors, he said, "are continuing
their escalations, thus defying
public opinion and the universal
PHAM VAN -DONG conscience of the peoples." He
added that life had again confirmed the validity of the four-point position of his government. Nguyen Van Tien, speaking for the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front, said that no choice was left but to "struggle until final victory." "We appeal to all our friends to help us even more."
As to why Johnson had decided to expand the war once more, when it appeared that Hanoi was prepared to go along with the recommendations of people like Kosygin and Wilson, the mystery appeared most impenetrable to those who place the highest hopes in the line of "peaceful coexistence"; i.e., collaborating with the imperialists and appealing to them to listen to reason.
From the very beginning, Washington has moved ahead in Vietnam cautiously testing the ground for resistance. If either Moscow or Peking or the two of them together should engage in a serious countermove, then the Washington strategists were prepared to call a halt and even back down. But no countermove has been forthcoming up to now.
Instead, the conflict between Moscow and Peking has grown sharper. Washington reads this as a success. Mao's rejection of a united front with the Soviet Union is taken as a signal that it is safe to proceed. Finally, the "cultural revolution" in China is obviously not considered by Washington to represent a new upsurge of the world revolution. Instead it is judged to be evidence of unexpected weakness and disarray. The Johnson gang
PHAM VAN DONG
PHAM VAN DONG
no doubt view the disruptive factionalism in China as a victory for the policy of escalating the war -- a victory for the line of the war hawks. In any case it is taken as confirmation of the view that Peking is for the present incapable of mounting a serious countermove. Hence the conclusion that Johnson can get away with a still bigger war.
The biggest single..unknown is the American people. Their impatience with Johnson's war.on the Asian mainland is mounting. A great historic responsibility now lies with the antiwar movement in converting this feeling into the form of effective action.
IN RESPONSE TO BARBARA BEIDLER
A poem by 12-year-old