This theme , a usual one with de Gaulle, ‘that it's the Fifth Republic or nothing, is attractive in this period of economic prosperity to the least politically developed sectors of the population. All that was most backward. in the country -~ and in France in 1967 there is no lack of "rotten boroughs" -- responded to a personal appeal like this from de Gaulle and voted for candidates, who, if they have no talents in particular, . compensate for this by a hearty appetite and know-how in backing "gaullism" to the hilt.
The gaullists, that is de Gaulle, achieved the following results with this policy:
(a) They reaped almost the entire rightist vote. Thus Poujade appealed to the voters to support de Gaulle. The extreme right, those like Tixier-Vignancour, who hold nostalgic memories either of Petain or "French Algeria," were virtually wiped off the map politically.
(b) The center, or‘rather the center-right, was flattened. This included some of the most typical figures of the big.and middle French bourgeoisie. Most: of: then, like Giscard d'Estaing, preferred to fight in the gaullist ranks. It is true that in the past year, the regime granted many financial and tax advantages to these social categories. Lecanuet, who claimed that he would be able to influence de Gaulle from "outside," who gave up the labél of the MRP [de Gaulle's Mouvement républicain populaire] in exchange for the "Democratic Center" [Centre démocrate], and who at the beginning of the electoral campaign asked the electors to support a hundred candidates of his in order to wield real blackmail power over de Gaulle, saw in the final week that he was close to disaster and he sought in vain to redress the situation by asking de Gaulle to say a few words that would permit him to save face as he offered his services.
De Gaulle's moves for several months in behalf of his retainers certainly succeeded in holding the votes for the gaullist candidates. But to jump to the conclusion that this is a sign of the stability of the regime is something else again. To bisect the country and suppress the center will not be without consequences later on when, for one reason or another it will be impossible to appeal to de Gaulle. The theme -- me or chaos -- carries because it is launched by de Gaulle. Let a Pompidou or Debré or anyone else try it in turn and it will have no success.
Let us now turn to the anti-gaullists. The Fédération de la Gauche Socialiste et Démocrate [FGDS -- Federation of the Socialist and Democratic Left], combining the Socialist party and Radical party (of which little remains) and the "clubs" of technocrats claiming to lean toward socialisn, hoped that by presenting themselves as a bloc they would carry sufficient weight to gain a higher percentage of votes than the Communist party and thus be in position to haggle with it in reaching an electoral deal in the
second round. The FGDS candidates did not succeed in gaining this objective even if one adds to their vote, the votes cast for the candidates of the Parti socialiste unifié [United Socialist party], the percentage won by’ the Communist party was higher. The fact is that while they gained votes, the candidates of the FGDS and the PSU failed to attain the percentage they won in 1962. The difference is small, certainly, but it is sufficient to affect the future. of the FGDS when, after the elections, Mollet, Mitterrand, etc. get around to working out the statutes of the FGDS.
The PSU made a big effort to achieve national status in the elections, running around eighty candidates. In-a formation of this kind, there is nothing astonishing in an electoral period about a rightist tendency predominating. In this election, things went very far. The most characteristic feature of the situation was that.the official leadership, the one elected by a party congress and which, for good or ill, directs the party's activities from one year to the next, turned this function over to Mendés-—France. The PSU has appeared before the public as the "party of Mendés-France." The latter, it should be noted, is a great. champion of democracy for the French nation but couldn't care. less about democracy when it comes to “his" party. He attends none of its congresses, he never defends his point of view, he uses the label of the PSU only as its candidate and as its spokesman on radio and television.
The candidates of the French Communist party gained around a million votes in comparison with November 1962 and the percentage cast for them rose from 21.84% to- 22.46%. The-considerable satisfaction shown by the leadership (and this is not a mere show) over these results provides a measure of its real ambitions.-All the leaders want is sufficient cards to negotiate an alliance with the "left" with the aim of going back to bourgeois democracy and, in case this is realized, of participating in it adequately, including posts in the government. Not even something resembling the Labour party in Great Britain, but. something more like what the Social Democratic party in Germany just did, with certain provisos with regard to the possible French Kissingers. If. things depended only on the leadership of the French Communist party and the "lefts" with whom it. seeks an alliance, the gaullists could remain tranquil, even after de Gaulle has gone.
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