Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

The Spring Campaign of the Japanese Labor Movement

· World Outlook Vol. 5, No. 15, 14 April 1967 · pp 402-406 · 2,748 words

Japan and Korea

Japanese labor movement to begin its sharpest struggles for the improvement of working conditions during March, April and May in what is called "the spring campaign." This year's campaign has already begun: the first nationwide united trade-union action took place on March 2 in accordance with the schedule of Sohyo, the country's biggest left-wing national federation of unions. Domeikaigi (the General Union, in the right wing), the second largest union in Japan, is also involved. In previous campaigns they have followed a policy of abstention.

The "spring campaign" takes on a special significance this year when seen within the context of an upturn in the economy and coming on the heels of a general election in which the electoral support of the Socialist party remained static in contrast to the increased support for the Democratic Socialist party which heads the more conservative General Union.

(1) The Schedule of the Campaign

Last November, after establishing the Committee for a United Struggle in the Spring Campaign, Sohyo made public a timetable for action that called for a preliminary phase in February and March, reaching a high point of concentrated industrial action by April. On February 27-28 they held a special national congress to initiate the campaign. On March 2 each union organized on-the-job meetings, plus district membership meetings and meetings in Tokyo, to deal with the particular problems around such as the struggle for increased wages, against rising prices, a better system for determining the minimum wage, and a shorter workweek with the same take-home pay. A national delegated meeting on March 8-10 discussed campaign tactics. On March 30 a second, stepped-up nationwide united industrial action was scheduled to begin.

This will be followed by further actions in April. Unions which have not reached satisfactory agreements with employers by May 1 are expected to continue to struggle. Municipal government and transport workers, seen as the main force of the campaign, will seek to achieve their demands by the middle of May. They will set up strike commnittees. :

Concurrently, national struggles will be conducted for a minimum wage level, for a revision of the law on old-age pensions and other laws in the labor code, the struggle to reach peak intensity by May when the Diet reconvenes.

(2) The Campaign Comes During an Upswing in the Japanese Economy

Most Japanese companies publish their budgets twice a year, in September and March. They should be examined if one wishes to understand current trends in the economy. Last September they showed that profits had increased by 28.2% (between April and September) over the previous year. Those in March are expected to show greater increases. Bonuses last December (workers receive them twice a year) were 78,000 yen [362.5 yen equal $1], an average of 15% over the 67,000 yen of the previous year.

The Spring Campaign Committee has explained that workers need to win large increases this year because inflation usually occurs when there is an economic upturn. In a White Paper on wages, in a section entitled "The Present Situation of the Working Class," the committee tells how average nominal wages increased by 10%, considerably behind the rise in prices of consumer goods which rose 7.6% higher. This would mean that real wages only increased by 2.2% in 1965 and by 4.2% during the first half of

Big company managers who are fully aware of the economic upturn are very reluctant to discuss it in relation to wages. Mr. Maeda, for example, the director of Nikkerren (Japan Industrial Federation), recently stated that while the economy owes much to the Vietnam war, nobody knows where the war is going; so therefore everyone should fear for the future of the economy. With a program for the complete liberalization of capital transfer by 1969 and with an increase in economic aid for the "developing" countries to 1% of the national economy by 1970, the bourgeoisie are especially keen to place their companies on a more competitive footing, insisting that the increase of nominal wages should be less than the real growth in per capita productivity.

On the other hand, Mr. Heigo Fujii, president of the Yahata Iron and Steel Company, has stated that the iron- and steel~making companies may be eventually forced to accept wage increases of 4,000 yen a month. .

Other managers have expressed the same sentiment. They see the inevitability of having to grant wage increases so now they are concentrating their energies on bringing about a change in Japan's peculiar system of wages payment, and they hope that in the process they will be able to win concessions making it easier to overcome resistance to automation.

At present there does not seem to exist any major disagreement between the unions and the companies on the necessity of the reform. It is posed by industrial modernization and automation in combination with the problem of the shortage in the number of workers in the lower age bracket. They all agree that the reform cannot be carried out without at the same time granting some increase in wages. The problem for them is how to make the change and what form it should take.

Commenting on the need to raise wages, Sohyo in its White Paper* states:

"The number of employees in the country has now reached more than 60% of the working population. The time should now be past when living conditions or low wage levels are determined by the low incomes of the peasants. We are in a period when wages of the employees, especially organized employees, should determine the national level. The struggle for higher wages is thus a struggle for a higher living standard for the Japanese people as a whole. ;

"This perspective means that the time is fast approaching when the Japanese economy will depend on high individual consumption. The priority of an export economy based on low wages is disappearing. The economy will be dependent on the increase in individual consumption in the internal market.

"Our perspective is to bring the time of low wages to a close and open that of higher wages. The extension of this demand makes clear the beginning of a new age."

With this view Sohyo is insisting on rapid improvement in the conditions of workers in the low-wage category. The White Paper points to their miserable existence: there are 4,520,000 families whose incomes are less than 220,000 yen [#607] a year.

It might seem that Sohyo is being inconsistent when it stresses the campaign for a better national minimum wage system and a basic revision of the pension law, rather than the struggle for wages on the industrial front. This is in line with and is actually a logical outcome of Sohyo's orientation and concentration on the conditions of life among the workers in the lowest income category, the sector of the working class from which Sohyo has been most successfully adding to its ranks.

The debate in the labor movement on the need for this reform is a new element in the political life of the country.

Managers of the big companies, too, are paying attention to the problem, for their own ends of course, because where rationalization and automation have been implemented, a changed system of calculating wages payment is most urgent inasmuch as the old method stands in the way of the system functioning smoothly. They wish to drop the old system based on seniority and experience in favor of a new system based on job classification. Recently Sanyo Electric Machinery Company, one of the biggest electrical goods manufacturers in the country, succeeded in introducing the new system.

(4) Sohyo Versus the General Union

Regarding the reform of the system for calculating wages in the big companies, Sohyo's attitude is not very clear. They repeat that they stand in opposition to a change in the system that amounts to nothing more than one of the methods to more effectively introduce rationalization.

Toshikatsu Horii, chairman of Sohyo, who said he realized that "younger workers

* It should be noted that the White Paper uses a Keynesian terminology that is not very familiar to Japanese trade unionists traditionally under Marxist leaderships, be they Social Democratic or Communist.

are interested in a new system of wages and the existing one is not perfect," also stated: "We must reject the idea of an increase in wages that is tied to rationalization measures which are against the workers. A new system is being proposed that calculates wages from the lower part of the existing system. The idea is to change the system completely by destroying the order and system of work." He said Sohyo must "oppose changing the system of wages if it is proposed by the companies during the spring campaign."

Why is Sohyo highlighting the problem of low-wage workers? Why does it not have a much sharper position on the question of altering the system of wage calculation, the need for which even Horii understands, and which has a special attraction to younger workers? The answer will be seen in an examination of those factors that in themselves make for militancy in the organization.

In recent years Sohyo's membership and the number of unions under its influence have increased because of the unionization of small factories. This has an objective basis which can be shown by figures on the growth of trade-union membership.

Number of Trade Union Units*

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964

5,000 workers and more 190 206 228 238 239

1,000 to 4,999 workers 848 946 985 1,048 1,111

500 to 999 992 1,051 1,130 1,172 1,173

200 to 499 2,769 3,063 3,221 1,509 1,614

100 to 199 5,457 3,809 3,988 54965 6,226

30 to 99 8,054 9,025 9,241 9,746 10,291

Less than 29 workers 5647 6,137 6,106 6,170 6 487

Totals 21,957 24,237 24,899 25,848 27,141

Trade Union Membership**

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 5,000 workers and more 3,358,036 3,607 ,421 3,927,496 4,117,599 4,236,823 1,000 to 4,999 workers 1,743,305 1,912,382 3069 ,449 2,169,653 2,354,710 500 to 999 B4 575 727,126 779 ,827 812,426 819,962 200 to 499 836,866 949 ,007 988 ,550 570,439 615,198 100 to 199 485,632 539,677 556,638 1,018,166 1,065,990 30 to 99 458,181 520,294 545 569 562 ,672 97,057 Less than 29 workers 94,973 103,969 103,627 106 , 224 109 ,913

Totals 7,661 , 568 8,359 »876 8,971,156 9,357,179 9,799,653

It is important to keep in mind that a trade union in Japan is an autonomous entity, comparable in size to a local or lodge in Western countries, comprised of workers in a particular company, not involving the workers of any other company, even if it is the same industry. The number of unit unions, in the National Railway Workers Union, for instance, will reveal the number of branches of the National Railway Corporation (about 2,000). Thus tables on the number of trade unions and their membership can indicate not only the changing strength of the unions, but also the growth of the companies and corporations and the pattern of monopoly.

The remarkable thing which has to be underlined here is the rapid increase in the number of trade unions with less than 199 members. This increase is due to a struggle for wages and conditions (usually in the smaller, inferior plants), along with a scarcity of younger workers and rising prices. Sohyo's militancy has been based on this sector. It is also the source of its expansion.

In contrast to Sohyo, the Domeikaigi has concentrated its attention on the bigger modernized plants, but as yet it has failed in either organizing more workers or in making explicit its program for a new system of wages payment. Its proposals to date amount to nothing more than recognizing the right of the bosses to rationalize, in re-

* Source: Ministry of Labor, Labor Year Book.

** Source: Ministry of Labor, Labor Year Book. The breakdown indicates the number of workers in trade-union units of various sizes. Thus in 1964 there were 4,236,823 workers in units of 5,000 or more. The figures include members who are not in units but are directly affiliated with national trade unions.

turn for a share of any increase in productivity. They have dropped their most characteristic positions. Whereas in the past they would criticize Sohyo from the right on the question of long-term contracts, opting for two- and three-year agreements, saying it was rather silly for workers to struggle every year for wages, now they are partic-— ipating in the Spring Campaign. Haruo Wade, the deputy chairman of Domeikaigi, has explained why:

"In the past we asked for wage increases every two or three years because we thought it more intelligent to have a stable contract and wages which did not need revising so frequently. But because of the rise in prices, we have decided to participate in the Spring Campaign."

This is a piece of sophistry. Rising prices are nothing new. In fact, the inflation now is probably not as great as when they first sought long-term contracts. But they are not bothered by the contradiction between the facts and their explanation: for them, the main thing is the Spring Campaign.

It is expected that the Seamen's Union, which is an affiliate of Domeikaigi, will play a leading role.

The competition between Domeikaigi and Sohyo will tend to stimulate the struggle.

(5) The Influence of the General Election

The leadership of Domeikaigi has been feeling extremely confident ever since the last general election when the Democratic Socialist party increased the number of its seats in the Diet. The returns are provided in the following table:

Results of General Elections*

Liberal Democratic Komei Other

Democrat Socialist Socialist Party re Groups Independent Number 1963 22,423,915 11,906,766 3,023, 302 646,477 51,765 1,956,313 of votes 1967 22,447,834 12,826,099 3,404,462 2 5472, 371 3 *190, 563 101,244 2,553,988

Percent 1963 54.7 29.0 7.4 - 4.0 0.1 4.8 of votes 1967 48.8 27.9 74 5.4 4.8 0.2 5.5

Percent 1963 60.0 30.8 4.9 - 1.2 0 2.8 of seats 1967 57.0 28.8 6.2 5.1 1.0 0 1.9

Apart from whether the DSP confidence is misplaced or not, the stagnation in the vote for the Socialist party has brought about sharp debates on the policies and programs of the party, not only among party leaders but especially among rank-and-file activists in Sohyo. Uppermost in their minds is the inescapable fact that the vote has remained virtually the same since 1960.

Votes of the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists*

1958 1960 1963 1967

Liberal Democrat % 57.8 57.6 54.7 48.8

Socialist % 32.9 27.6 29.0 27.9

The increase in votes for the Communist party candidates from 4.0% to 4.8% in contrast to the decrease of the Socialist party vote from 29% to 27.9% indicates that the more militant workers in the smaller plants who have joined Sohyo, did not vote for the SP but instead voted largely for the Communist party.

The following set of statistics reveal clearly that there is an urgent need both for Sohyo and the Socialist party to work out a concrete program for these sectors of the class.

* Source: Keiichi Matsushita, Kozohendo to Sengominshushugi, Sekai, April 1967.

Composition of Workers by Age Groups*

(Manufacturing Industries)

Less than More than

25 years 25 to 29 30 to 40 -40 years Scale of plants % % %

1960 72.9 16.3 8.7 2.2 More than 5,000 persons 1962 79.3 9.6 6.2 4.9

1964 972.7 15.0 9.9 2.1

1960 80.8 11.0. 5.6 2.6 1,000 to 4,999 1962 78.1 10.5 7.0 4.4

1964 66.4 11.5 14.6 7.5

1960 68.9 13.8 11.2 6.1 100 to. 999 1962 60.2 15.6 15.7 8.5

1964 54.7 12.2 5 21.4 11.6

1960 64.4 11.6 11.6 12.5 30 to 99 1962 47.6 16.2 19.9 16.4

1964 48.4 12.3 24.4 14.8

In the smaller plants, the composition of the younger workers is a decreasing factor. In the big plants, where the bulk of the trade-union membership is to be: found, as shown in a previous table, workers who are very young have yet to be shown a program dealing with the problem of their wages system. It is urgent to discuss immediately the program and strategy necessary to involve the young militant workers. If a correct program can be provided, this sector can assume the leadership of the Japanese working class as a whole. The time to discuss such a program is now during the Spring Campaign.

* Source: Economic Planning Association, Survey of Fluidity of Labor Force and the Determination of Wages, 1966.

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