PROBLEMS OF THEIR REVOLUTION
By Antonio Valdés
As repressions continue in the Dominican Republic so do the ideological discussions on the left in an effort to evaluate the experience of the Dominican revolution and find a new path forward.
While ultraleft Maoism is strong, reflected especially in its influence in the Revolutionary Movement of the 14th of June [1-J-4], there is also increased interest in Trotskyism. The widely read magazine Ahora, for example, found it expedient to print an article by the anti- Marxist Social Democrat Victor Alba which under guise of a historical review, twists and distorts the record of Trotsky and Trotskyism. Even in the pro-Moscow current, in the Dominican Communist party [PCD -- Partido Comunista Dominicana], there has been a symptomatic leftward shift of position.
The shift in the PCD is worth looking at because some of the recent PCD statements raise questions of importance, although their answers are inadequate.
Last October the party issued a manifesto stating their position on the Dominican political crisis. In it they declared that the present struggle of the Dominican people is geared toward the "restoration of the constitutionalist government of the April Revolution headed by Colonel Caamafio, based on the 1963 constitution, the democratic program of our people which constitutes their immediate task."
Such a government, said the manifesto, would unify "all the democratic and political sectors and all the classes interested in the defense of the national interest and the establishment of a revolutionary democracy." According to the PCD, such "unity" is the required premise for achieving "the ultimate socialist objectives," at which it is impossible to arrive without going through certain "transitional stages of struggle."
In January of this year, the PCD repeated the same position in a new manifesto. Among other things, they declared: "For the proletariat and its political party, the replacement of the Balaguer government by a nationalist and revolutionary government, such as that headed by Caamano in April 1965, constitutes a tactical objective closely related to the strategic objectives (socialist) of the Dominican revolution. Such a change corresponds to the necessary carrying out of the democratic and anti-imperialist tasks, which because of the characteris-—
tics of our historical development, pre-
cede the achievement of the supreme ob-
jectives of the proletariat: socialism
and communism."
What is this but a subtle restate-
ment of the two-stage theory of Menshe-
vism, refuted not only in theory but by
history in the Bolshevik revolution fifty
years ago?
The January statement of the PCD
was subjected to serious criticism in the
Dominican left. For example, the 1-J-4
pointed out that the true tactical ob-
jective of the Dominican revolution is to
"struggle for a revolutionary government
led politically by the working class."
But rather than a separate stage,
said the 1-J-4, the "achievement of this
objective is closely linked with the so-
cialist revolution, for a government of
that type, achieved through .an armed
struggle that would defeat the oligarchy
and the Yankees, would be nothing less
than a form of the dictatorship of the
proletariat."
The 1-J-4 criticized the PCD for
implying that the achievement of this ob-
jective would be easy. The 1-J-4 held
that, on the contrary, it would require
"a long process of armed struggle which
would organize the forces and establish a
United Front led politically by the work-
ing class and its party, which would take
power by violently overthrowing the
Yankee-led oligarchic power."
In response to this and similar
criticism, the PCD in mid-March published
a statement of clarification of its views.
Most significantly, the party for the
first time accepted, at least verbally,
the notion of armed struggle.
"It is time to speak of a true
revolution, to admit the new and superior
forms of struggle, armed struggle, as in-
evitable." The statement went on to say
that "the revolution has not failed; on
the contrary, the central task of the
proletariat is to carry through the anti-
imperialist revolution."
But here, the previous line was
restated. "The struggle for a revolution-
ary government like that of April" is a
tactical phase of the anti-imperialist
revolution.
Among the tactics which the PCD ,
says are necessary are (1) the need to
incorporate the liberal sectors of the
bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie
into the revolution; and (2) the need for
a national liberation government unifying all classes opposed to imperialism, which would "inevitably" lead to socialism.
Class collaboration and compromise it can ‘be seen, are still at the heart of their program. ‘This can be seen more clearly in their discussion of the role of “commando” groups in the April revolution.
The PCD's main assurance that a "national unity" government like that of Caamafio would lead to socialism is based on their analysis of the role of the commando groups, the fighting squads, of the constitutionalist uprising of April. Their stress on these armed groups also makes them sound militant and in favor of armed struggle.
They say that the establishment of workers and peasants "commandos" must be the "fundamental base" of a national liberation government, and they explain that the establishment of such organs would give the proletariat political hegemony in a national liberation government.
Looking back at the commandos of the April revolution, they claim that "in general they were not controlled by the bourgeoisie, and the changes in them were progressively in favor of the political position of the proletariat." This, claims the PCD, "limited the power of the bourgeoisie" and gave the Caamafio government its character as a "national liberation" government. The proletariat in arms would have been decisive, they say, in ultimately transforming the Caamano regime into a dictatorship of the proletariat "once the democratic and antiimperialist tasks had been realized and once the bourgeoisie had been defeated."
This sounds like an echo of "Defeat Franco first, then the revolution."
The role of the commando groups in the April revolution is indeed important; such formations could be decisive in any new advance of the Dominican revolution. But the PCD assertion that the: commandos were not controlled by the bourgeoisie and increasingly favored the political positions of the proletariat completely overlooks the political role of Caamafio as the virtually unchallenged head of the revolutionary forces. Was there any clear-cut alternative put forward politically by the commandos to oppose Caamaflio's; i.e., Bosch's and the PRD's policy of compromise with imperialism?
It is true that the armed masses wanted to continue struggling to the end, that they wanted to defeat imperialisn. But they had no organized leadership that could counter that of Caamafio. There was a failure of revolutionary leadership. The commandos were indeed a strong social force in the revolution, but a strong
back without a will has-been put to many
an alien use in the long history of class
warfare.
The power of the commandos was
limited and disoriented. by the lack of a
political program and a ‘political leader-
ship voicing proletarian demands and
needs. Allowing for the weaknesses of
historical analogy, one might say that
the incipient Soviets were there but the
Bolshevik party was missing.
Likewise in Germany and Austria in
1918, the armed groups of the proletariat
predominated socially, but Social Democ-
racy with its strategy of sellout re-
tained the helm politically.
Thus the determining factor ina
future uprising will not be the estab-
lishment of commandos alone. The decisive
question will be: Who will lead the com-
mandos, the revolutionary Marxists or the
liberal bourgeoisie?
The PCD is correct to call for or-
ganization of workers and peasants com-
mandos. But with its call for unity of
classes in a national liberation govern-
ment it is denying the political hegemony
to the proletariat in advance. The call
for unity of classes whose fundamental
social interests are diametrically op-
posed is sheer utopia. The lessons of
modern times, from the massacre of work-
ers in China in 1927 to the blood bath
in Indonesia today, should have shown
once and for all what disaster the "al-
liance" with the liberal bourgeoisie
brings to the proletariat.
In short, the PCD still adheres to
the classic Stalinist "mistake": an alli+
ance with the liberal sectors of the
class enemy to confront imperialism.
As Che Guevara says, in his mes-
sage made public April 17, 1967:
"The indigenous bourgeoisies have
lost all capacity to oppose imperialism,
if they ever had any -- and constitute
only a last trump. No other alternative
exists -- it's either a socialist revolu-
tion or a caricature of a revolution."
The PCD reassures us, "The partic-—
ipation of the liberal bourgeoisie in the
patriotic struggle is not under any cir-
cumstances decisive. Constantly it will
swim in two waters....But it maintains
democratic and nationalist positions
which permit in certain circumstances
concrete alliances."
Well, then, if they aren't deci-
sive, and they're not always in our water,
let us not change our program to accom-—
modate them. Struggle for a workers and
peasants government and a socialist revo-
lution -- let them come swim in that
water if they are willing.