GAMAL ABDEL NASSER
"In its great-power aspect the Middle Eastern crisis shapes up as a confrontation of the Soviet Union versus the United States. As the British and French were gradually forced out of the area following World War II, the United States took their place. The region is now of paramount strategic importance to this country, whereas until escalation of the Vietnam war, Southeast Asia was only a marginal power factor for the United States."
Last -- but not least -- a lot of dollars are at stake:
"The Persian Gulf area produces 27 per cent of the world's petroleum and has proved global reserves of 60 per cent. American firms have a gross investment in the region of more than $2.5 billion. There is nothing comparable in American interests that can be said of the Southeast Asian peninsula,"
The Times concludes: "If Washington now argues that it cannot afford to take on two crucial commitments at the same time, this would be another good reason to say it is time to descalate the war in Vietnam."
The concomitant conciusion, which this influential voice of the powerful Eastern sector of the American ruling class leaves unsaid, is that Washington should escalate the crisis in the Middle East.
Here we come to another reason for Johnson's hesitation. The very extent of U.S. involvement in exploiting the oil of the Middle East dictates caution. Both Washington and London had a sobering experience on this in 1956.
When Secretary of State Dulles sought to blackmail the Egyptian government by withdrawing aid in building the Aswan dam, Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal. And when France, Britain and Israel answered this with their version of a Pearl Harbor attack on Cairo, the Soviet Union intervened very vigorously on the side of Egypt.
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