[The following is the text of a resolution on the Middle-East conflict adopted June 28 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the world party of socialist revolution founded by Leon Trotsky.]
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(1) The crisis in the Middle East has served to demonstrate once again the explosive nature of the world situation. While imperialism pursued its criminal war in Vietnam, a limited war broke out in another epicenter where international contradictions converge, bearing with it the danger of becoming transformed into a major conflict. At the same time, other epicenters in other parts of the world are rumbling, particularly in Latin America where the potential for an explosion is building up day by day.
For the past twenty years the Middle East has been kept in turmoil by an almost uninterrupted succession of domestic and international crises. At bottom this is due, whether directly or indirectly, to the presence of imperialism, which is exploiting the enormous resources of this region and seeking to maintain its position at any price. The Arab masses, in return, bled by the foreign exploiters and the indigenous ruling classes and layers, linking up with the historic wave of the colonial revolution, have mobilized in impetuous movements that have already brought about important changes in the traditional structures despite the limitations and contradictions featuring the leaderships in the forefront at various stages.
It is in this context that the existence and the role of the State of Israel must be considered. Set up by Zionism and imperialism at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs, this creation exploited the sentiments and aspirations of broad layers of Jews, the victims of the barbarous anti-Semitic persecution which raged repeatedly in the so-called civilized countries of Europe.
In view of its social and political structure, the origin and ideology of its ruling groups, its international ties, the State of Israel inevitably introduced an element of permanent antagonism in the Middle East. Imperialism has profited from this, exploiting the resulting weakening of the Arab movement and the possibility of propagandizing ideological themes that might have an impact on wide sectors of world opinion. At the same time, the question of Israel provided a channel for the reactionary Arab ruling classes in diverting the hate of the masses who were beginning to rebel against the exploitation of which they were victim.
In the glaring light cast by the events of 1956, all possibility of doubt was removed as to the actual role of the State of Israel, the ally of French and British imperialism in their adventure to regain the Suez Canal after it was nationalized by the progressive Egyptian government.
A correct appreciation of the recent events and the attitude which the revolutionary movement ought to adopt cannot be gained without understanding the essential facts about the class nature of the countries involved in the crisis and the international meaning of their respective actions. The fundamental feature of the June 1967 conflict was the confrontation between a capitalist state with very specific sociological and ideological traits, integrated in the imperialist system on a regional and world scale, and an ensemble of countries of colonial and semicolonial structure, in which the most dynamic element was represented by states that had at different stages adopted spectacular anti-imperialist measures.
The imperialist forces, welded into an international united front that included even the dregs of traditional anti-Semitism, utilized the occasion to deliver a blow to the Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, in order to force back the freedom movement and postpone the settling of accounts in certain crucial instances. The camouflage for this was propaganda designed to obscure the primary significance of the conflict.
Washington in particular also found it useful in diverting attention from the war in Vietnam, the most recent phases of which had profoundly moved world opinion and touched off unprecedented demonstrations in the European capitalist countries and the United States. A certain success in this was registered -- not only did divisions occur in the pro-Vietnam movement, but new attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam failed to provoke the countering response that would normally have followed; and in a whole series of countries a very dangerous hysteria was to be noted in which fear over the fate of Israel merged with the revengeful mood of former colonialists against the peoples engaged in the colonial revolution.
In this context it is the duty of the Fourth International to state its attitude with complete frankness -- we stand on the side of the Arab masses and the Arab countries against the Zionist state of Israel and its imperialist partners and masters.
(2) Analysis of the events shows unquestionably that the Tel Aviv government took the initiative in opening fire, thereby assuring itself probably a decisive advantage on the military level. But even before the outbreak of hostilities, several episodes indicated that Israel was getting ready to strike at her neighbors. Various factors contributed in this direction -- growing economic difficulties, the gradual consolidation in Syria of a government in the vanguard of the progressive Arab movement, the pressure and concern of the oil companies who became more and more worried about maintaining their positions.
It is likewise probable that the ruling circles in Tel Aviv felt that the international context was definitely more favorable than in 1956 and they could count on the Soviet Union not intervening directly in the conflict in any way.
The problem arises, however, of explaining why Nasser, for his part, accepted the perspective of a test of force under the given conditions and consequently undertook measures, including those dealing with the Strait of Tiran which on the face of it involved the risk of a military confrontation.
The hypothesis that at bottom it was due to pressure exercised by the Soviet Union with the aim of engaging the United States on a new front in order to establish a basis for overall negotiations has not been confirmed by the events. In the diplomatic phase following the cease-fire, the USSR did seek to place all the problems on the table; but it is clear that the outcome of the conflict in the Middle East weakened the position of the USSR, and, in addition, in view of the fact that they had no intention of becoming directly engaged, the Soviet leaders could have had no doubts about this even if they did not foresee such a quick conclusion. Nasser himself in announcing his resignation revealed that Moscow, while sounding the alarm at the beginning over the threat to Syria, intervened later in the direction of "moderation."
In addition, it can be gathered from the official Nasserite explanations, aside from their apologetic character, that the Arab leaders, particularly the Egyptians, were under no delusion, essentially, in their estimate of the Israeli reaction (no one could seriously envisage the possibility of Tel Aviv swallowing the blow struck at Aqaba without replying) or in their interpretation of the attitude of the USSR (it was difficult to believe that Moscow, which had not become directly engaged in Vietnam, would do so in the Middle East under less favorable conditions).
It was particularly in their estimate of the relationship of forces on the military level that the Nasserite group made a very grave error. In counting on the way the army and the air force had been strengthened and in underestimating the forces of the enemy (and likewise, no doubt, the negative consequences of the engagement in Yemen), the Nasserites thought they could reverse the situations of 1948 and 1956, or at least sustain a prolonged war which, accompanied by guerrilla struggle and a people's war in certain zones, would effectively constitute a major danger for Israel. A test of a few days duration was sufficient to show how mistaken these calculations were.
(3) The immediate causes of the Arab defeat were thus rooted in a false estimate of the relationship of forces and, fundamentally, in a military inferiority that was expressed, among other things, by the technical errors indicated by Nasser himself. No one can point to any crisis in the relations between the regime and the masses that might have flared during the conflict and provoked the disintegration of the army. No source has adduced the least evidence of this kind; and the masses, in addition, displayed their support to Nasser at the most crucial moment.
But the military weakness, in the final analysis, has political roots. At bottom what was involved were the intrinsic limitations and contradictions of a regime which is still based much more on the passive and controlled support of the masses than on their active, democratic mobilization, and which above all has maintained to a large degree the political and administrative structures of the past, featured by extreme bureaucratization and immense corruption. It is these factors, more precisely, which are at the bottom of the ineffectiveness of a military apparatus that despite the efforts of a decade and considerable foreign aid once again proved inadequate when the test came in the field.
The political causes on an international scale are not less important. The Arab countries are deeply divided and this division, behind the facade of a "sacred union," once again operated in favor of the Israelis and the imperialists. Certain countries did not budge, limiting themselves to verbal demonstrations of solidarity, while the united front which Nasser established with Jordan, severely criticized by the Syrians and Algerians, proved completely sterile in practice since it did not serve to distract the concentration of enemy efforts against Egypt or to avoid the immediate collapse of the Jordanian forces.
(Only King Hussein seems, for the time being, to have profited from this pact, succeeding in retaining his throne, which would probably have been impossible without the cover of the alliance with Nasser.)
The refusal of certain countries to prolong the oil blockade after the cease-fire provided further confirmation of the precarious nature of the Arab bloc and signified an additional weakening of the positions of the most progressive governments.
The Arab countries found out, in addition, that the bureaucratic leadership of the USSR, whose acts are determined essentially by its conservative interests and the ramifications of its concept of "peaceful coexistence," is not at all inclined to run risks. In the current situation in the Middle East, the bureaucracy is anxious above all to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. This anxiety, which led to panic at the crucial moment, induced the Kremlin to associate itself shamefully with the June 7 UN decision which in reality sanctioned the Israeli victory, showing the solemn declarations of the top Moscow figures to be nothing but propaganda.
No matter how the political and diplomatic situation evolves -- and for obvious reasons the progressive Arab states cannot envisage a rupture with Moscow -- the prestige of the USSR has suffered a very grave blow. Class-conscious militants and vanguard layers will be more and more inclined to question the fundamental line of the Soviet leadership and its willingness to reply effectively to imperialism.
Tendencies oriented toward Peking can gain despite the fact that China is in no condition to intervene in a decisive way and the fact that its capacity to act is seriously limited by its policy of rejecting a united front against imperialism a priori.
(4) The war in the Middle East undoubtedly strengthened the State of Israel and enabled imperialism to score some gains. The Arab states emerged from the test with greatly weakened or disorganized armies and with very grave losses. They face the perspective of a long period of difficult military and economic reconstruction.
But in recognizing this fact, it must not be forgotten that in the near and even immediate future, Israel must face some acute problems arising from her expansion and some difficult political situations -- both abroad and at home -- without mentioning the fact that its inhabitants have not ended the nightmare of another clash with the crushing superiority of forces held by the Arab countries.
As for American imperialism, it will have to pay a high price for the limited success that was gained. Even leaving aside the economic repercussions of the blocking of the Suez Canal and the supply of oil, the imperialists must post against their account the increasingly bitter hate of the Arab masses, who have gained still clearer understanding of the imperialist role and the need for a struggle to the end against it. This factor will have extensive influence on developments in the Middle East.
This is all the more so inasmuch as the military defeat did not involve demoralization and demobilization of the masses up to now. On the contrary, in a series of countries, and Egypt in the first place, the masses responded with a new wave of radicalization which was symbolized by the demonstrations in Cairo in support of Nasser against the forces demanding his departure.
(5) The military defeat did not cut the links between the Nasserite regime and the masses. At the decisive moment, the resigning president was able to count on a mobilization of wide extent in contrast to what happened upon the downfall of other Bonapartist leaders brought down by their adversaries without the masses reacting or reacting very little. It would be an error, however, to underestimate the difficulties in store for the future, including those following a "cooler" appreciation of the consequences of the defeat.
In any case, the revolutionary Arab movement will not fail to seriously ponder the experiences it has undergone. In the phase now opening, the domestic problems of reconstruction in particular will be on the agenda, and in the progressive countries, especially in Egypt and Syria, there will be the danger of a counterattack by the partisans of the former regime.
The correct response will not be limited to defending the status quo, to supporting the existing regimes, but must be conducted by working out a political course aimed at surmounting the limitations and contradictions of the present leaderships and regimes and at assuring the complete elimination of the vestiges of imperialist domination and settling accounts with the national bourgeoisies as classes.
A prime necessity is to establish state structures qualitatively different from those of the former regime and capable of really guaranteeing all the democratic rights of the masses, who must be in position to directly control and manage the property confiscated from the imperialists and the indigenous ruling classes. In other words, objectively the problem is the consistent socialist development of the revolutionary movement in Egypt, in Syria, and also in the countries where the task still remains to sweep aside the most reactionary layers closely linked to imperialism in the defense of their monstrous privileges.
On an international level, the Arab revolutionists must pose the struggle against the State of Israel in correct terms, opposing any chauvinist distortions or manifestations along the line of a "holy war." The State of Israel must be combated because of its Zionist nature and its role as an instrument of imperialism, which is the enemy No. 1. It is necessary to reject any political or propagandistic orientation that reverses the order of things, seeking to justify the struggle against the imperialists essentially because of the aid they provide to Israel.
The perspective of the Arab revolution, in general, can only be that of a very hard and prolonged struggle which will probably take the most diverse forms, ranging from new military conflicts between states to guerrilla actions and a genuine people's war. That is why it is imperative to draw all the lessons of June 1967.
(7) Even if the euphoria of the victory still retards the political and ideological maturing of the Israeli masses, they will come to realize in the final analysis that maintenance of a Zionist state, integrated in the imperialist system, within the framework of an Arab world in full transformation, constitutes a blind alley for them. Even in the near future they will be able to observe that the war did not resolve the economic difficulties and that the consequences of this thrust to the right which the conflict accentuated injures them.
Sooner or later the Arab movement must admit that the problem exists of Jewish masses living in the Middle East and who cannot be denied the elementary rights belonging to every nationality. But a condition for such recognition is that the Jewish masses in Israel do not identify their fate with that of the Zionist state.
The Arab masses have struggled and will legitimately continue to struggle in the future against the Zionist state -- which from the very fact that it is based on the right of unlimited immigration necessarily operates in an expansionist direction at the expense of the Arab population in Palestine and the neighboring regions as has occurred in the past and as is the case at present.
But the terms of the problem will change radically the day the Jewish masses in Palestine free themselves from Zionism, rejecting it as the doctrine at the heart of their state organization, struggling against their own capitalism -- whatever its specific social and ideological nature -- and joining in the common struggle of the peoples of the Middle East against imperialism. This is the way in which the premises for solidarity and collaboration between the Israeli masses and the Arab peoples can be established.
Within this perspective, which also involves the right of self-determination for the Israeli masses, it is possible to find a solution which will permit coexistence and collaboration between the Arab states, including a Palestinian Arab state, if the interested populations wish to establish it, and the Jewish national community now in Palestine.
For us the present task is not to take up the question of the state structure such a national community would have. For our part we believe that a genuinely independent state would scarcely be viable and that it would thus be preferable to envisage particular forms of autonomy within the framework of a wider state formation which would obviously have an Arab majority. It is clear that this perspective can be realized only as imperialism is driven out of the Middle East, capitalism overturned in the Arab countries and the working-class and peasant masses of this area of the world move jointly toward the construction of socialism.
(8) In the conflict that has continued on the political and diplomatic level since the June 7 cease-fire, the Fourth International reaffirms its solidarity with the Arab countries against the State of Israel. The Fourth International is struggling in particular for the achievement of the following immediate or short-range objectives:
(a) The withdrawal of the Israeli armies to their bases of departure and the reestablishment of the lines of the armistice of 1949.
(b) The immediate return of the refugees to their homes, with full compensation for the damages inflicted on them as victims in the recent war.
(c) An effective solution of the problem of the former refugees, to whom the opportunity must be given of returning to their lands, with compensation for all damages they have suffered; or, if they choose not to return, full compensation for their holdings. The right of the Arabs of Palestine to self-determination must be recognized and translated into practice.
(d) Effective measures to boycott the imperialist powers. The measures should likewise be applied to governments who oppose them or hesitate to apply them.
(e) Complete solidarity of the workers states on the side of the Arab countries, including the application of boycotts on an economic level.