THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN CHINA
By Livio Maitan
{The following is the first part of the transcript of the report on the developments in China given by Livio Maitan to a recent plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International.
[It is intended as a contribution to the discussion opened in the ranks of the world Trotskyist movement on this momentous and controversial issue in world politics.
{For the opening statement by the IEC on this question, see World Outlook, May 19, 1967.]
*x* * *
The Origin of the Crisis and its Initial Stages up to August 1966
It is clear that the present crisis in China was preceded by a series of conflicts, open or undercover, which had developed over a period of years. This is confirmed, among other things by: (a) frequent and explicit allusions in Chinese documents to the internal difficulties and frictions of 1959-62, when all sorts of "monsters and demons" are supposed to have been let loose, by references to the launching of the so-called socialist education campaign in 1963, and by Mao's 1965 appeals on the necessity of learning from the army, etc.; (b) by the dissemination throughout this period of themes which came to the forefront in 1966-67 (in particular, on tendencies in the countryside, on radical transformations to be introduced in the cultural realm); (c) by the tension existing at the time of the September 1962 plenun, which culminated in changes at the summit of the hierarchy; (d) by the development of public polemics in special areas (e.g., on certain conceptions of economic theory, on philosophic principles).
While we must not lose sight of these previous conflicts, it would nonetheless be a mistake to overlook or to underestimate the new, more immediate factors which precipitated the crisis and caused its development to take ever more dramatic forms.
Let us remember that Mao began his offensive virtually at once on two fronts: The article which opened the literary debate was published in Shanghai on Novenber 10, 1965; and a week later -- on November 18 -- there was an intervention by Lin Piao in the army. This coincidence seems to demonstrate that Mao had already made the following choices: (a) to open up the battle before the opposition could
gain any more strength (this is shown by
the polemics referring to the time bomb
the opposition had planted in the party);
(b) to start with a rectification and a
struggle for his line in the army; (c) to
base himself on the Shanghai leadership
against the Peking group; (d) to attack
certain political-intellectual groups with
considerable influence and positions of
strength (primarily in Peking but also in
the government and the central apparatus)
much more harshly and openly than in the
past.
But why did he touch off the cri-
sis? We have already explained this in
the November 1966 document of the United
Secretariat of the Fourth International:
The policy which had been followed until
that time had run into more and more seri-
ous difficulties and contradictions, and
events of prime importance such as the
step up of the imperialist escalation in
Vietnam and the victory of the reactionary
generals in Indonesia inevitably put the
international line again in question.
In this context, a serious split
occurred in the leading group, which,
despite all the divergent tendencies and
differences arising on this or that occa-
sion, had maintained its essential unity
over all the preceding years. It is clear
that the conflicts arose over military
problems and international questions logi-
cally involving the attitude to be taken
toward Moscow. On more purely domestic
questions, it is possible that the prob-
lem was again posed of how to deal with
certain groups, including the Peking
group (in other words, the issues debated
in 1956-57, and the military problems de-
bated in 1958-59, came up again).
In these circumstances, the partic-
ular factor which probably led Mao to
touch off the crisis was fear that "new"
oppositions would link up with "old."
This could have led to the defeat of his
line bringing about a change in orienta-
tion which he considered catastrophic.
We do not believe, however, that
the Mao-Lin Piao group had a clear idea
from the outset of all their allies or
adversaries or of all the manifold impli-
cations of the conflict. In fact, the
breaks with the different personalities
and groups occurred in successive waves
and over different issues. According to
the information so far available to us,
it was the tendency in the military rep-
resented by the chief of staff, Lo Jui-
ching which was attacked in the first
round. Probably Peng Chen was the only
member of the leadership's inner circle
who defended Lo. (We know from the offi-
cial sources that Peng Chen made an intervention at the January 1966 military conference which turned out to be a success for Lin Piao. )
Other information and indications provided by the Chinese documents, however, support the interpretation that the former mayor of Peking [Peng Chen] -~- who continued to hold his position even after the military conference -- fell over the united front question or over Mao's antiunited front actions of the spring of 1966, which among other things led to the break with the Japanese Communist party. Peng Chen was also called to account for his relationships with figures like Wu Han, Teng To, Fan Chin, etc., who could scarcely have held the positions they did in Peking without his backing.(1) This would support a view that Peng Chen was relatively favorable to some "liberalization"; certain passages from his speech would also suggest this hypothesis.
Once the attack on Peng was decided upon, the whole Peking affair became the central question for two months. Mao wanted to destroy a group which he could not rely on and to sound the alarm on the existence of a "revisionist" danger even in the high echelons of the administration and in the party apparatus itself. The occasion was also utilized to settle old scores over past differences which had probably arisen over the way to confront signs of criticism and opposition such as the literary and journalistic work of Wu Han, Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, etc. In addition, Lu Ting-yi was probably dismissed in connection with this affair.
Throughout this phase -- before the beginning of the first wave of the "Cultural Revolution" -- Mao still hoped for a firm majority in the regular leading bodies and more particularly in the standing committee of the political bureau. The rupture with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping had not yet taken place. These two figures performed their functions as usual, receiving delegations and giving important speeches. During March and April, Liu went abroad on an official trip which the press kept playing up. Teng played a conspicuous role in the May meetings with the Albanians, which culminated in the adoption of a document which Peking considered very important. On May 6, in a speech in Shanghai, Teng attacked centrist attitudes in international policy, denouncing the supporters of joint action and compromise with the revisionists. This attack was probably primarily aimed at Peng Chen.
(1) The polemic over the play "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office" brought out clearly that this group operated as a tendency acting with definite ends.
We must not forget, moreover, that during this period the Mao group was still putting its emphasis on the primacy of the party. (We have stressed the concrete meaning of this leitmotiv enough and there is no need to go into it again in this report. )
The crisis in the state and party political apparatus deepened after June and in the weeks which preceded the central committee plenum. This was primarily the consequence of tensions which were developing in certain sectors where vigorous responses from elements and groups attacked went hand in hand with an emerging danger that the student strata, once set in motion, would go beyond the group which launched the "Cultural Revolution," and get out of control.(2) But the worsening of the conflict was also caused by international developments, especially the further U.S. escalation in Vietnam and the open break with the Japanese Communist party and North Korea.
It was probably in those weeks that Mao realized that the struggle would be a very difficult one and that he might be defeated. It is hard to know for certain in which body he found himself in a minority at any given time. The situation was confused in the political bureau and above all in the standing committee of that pody, which is the real leadership, and only a minority was ready to support Mao's line all the way.
We know still less about the relationship of forces in the central committee. But the essential fact was that Mao could no longer count on the steadfast support of the leadership cadres, who had passed through all the trials of the civil war and the revolution -- the 800 Edgar Snow speaks of -- in their entirety. He must have clearly seen that diverging tendencies and oppositional currents were shaping up more and more, even in the political apparatuses which he had relied on at the start; and he must have drawn the conclusion from this that he had to go outside the regular bodies and resort to mobilizations from below.
Following this decision, the crisis reached a new stage and its character began to change. It was no longer simply an interbureaucratic conflict; sections of the masses began to get caught up in the struggle and to move in accordance with a dynamic relatively independent of the bureaucratic systen.
The question is posed whether the
(2) Remember that it was just at this time that the polemics started against the cadres and leaders who were supposed to have feared the masses, hesitated to take a position, did not like "big posters," etc.
crisis was caused from the outset by tensions between the bureaucracy, or certain sections of it, and the masses. It goes without saying that in the last analysis a bureaucracy is conditioned by the tendencies arising in the various social strata; but in a stricter, more direct sense, there have not been sufficient factors at work in China to date, to justify interpretations that pressures from below were decisive. The crisis arose at the top in a clash between groups within the bureaucracy and it was only when a faction of the leadership decided to appeal to the rank and file that the masses, taking advantage of the breach, began to mobilize.
In other words, social tensions did exist -- I myself have already spoken of them elsewhere -- but, to begin with, they were not of an immediate and dramatic character and, moreover, the prestige which the leadership and the cadres still enjoyed acted as a buffer. Only after the crisis of the leadership and the leadership's fragmentation became clear to everyone did the masses intervene in all their social weight. Furthermore, this did not happen in one fell swoop; the mobilization reached its height in January 1967, four months after the plenum decisions.
The Red Guard Movement and the Period from August to November 1966
There are still several obscure points with regard to the period following the central committee plenum: The most common sources of information (the big posters) have a very doubtful value, both in and of themselves and because of the garbled translations picked up by the international press. According to some reports, another meeting of the central committee took place in October and many dismissed officials were imprisoned; but the official sources have given no word of this. There has been no mention of a second meeting of the central committee and only at a later stage do the documents mention arrests, without however mentioning any names.
This period is primarily characterized by the struggle against the group which was defeated at the plenum and by the many-sided and contradictory development of the Red Guard movement. In this regard, I will add nothing to what is said in the IEC statement.(3) [See World Outlook, May 19, 1967.]
We are witnessing, basically, very violent attacks on the apparatus, actions
(3) The statement adopted is significantly different from the draft submitted by this reporter, who expressed his reservations by his abstention.
often accompanied by grave excesses, oc-—
casional open clashes between the Red
Guards and sections of the masses(4), and,
last but not least, instances of the Red
Guards getting out of hand, which have
been confirmed by the most diverse sources;
and in the meantime, a considerable part
of the apparatus is resisting Mao's line
and organizing to defend its people and
positions which are being threatened.
In our November 1966 document, we
stressed that the Red Guard movement's
factional origin -- it was conceived as
an instrument of pressure and a tool of
the Mao tendency in its struggle against
its adversaries -- did not exhaust the
question of its full objective import.
The subsequent events and later
reports have demonstrated the following
points:
1. The Red Guards have often gone
beyond the objectives set for them and
have resisted attempts to impose strict
discipline on them or even to demobilize
them. Thus, their activity has acquired
an objectively antibureaucratic signifi-
cance.(5
2. The Red Guards were not tightly
organized and strictly controlled from
above by the Mao tendency but were divided
into many groups and reassembled into
groupings, sometimes in open rivalry with
each other (in which cases it is probable
that parallel organizations developed).
The official documents themselves mention
"false" Red Guards or "reactionary" Red
Guards, and sometimes give figures on
such groups existing in a given locality.
3. A rather well-defined tendency
claiming to base itself on the thought
and line of Mao developed its own line in
practice and even employed its own orga-
nizational forms. In July 1966, during
the first waves of the student movement,
"Cultural Revolution work groups" operat—
ing independent of the orders of the Mao-
ist leading center had already gone into
action; new difficulties arose immediately
after the close of the plenun.(6)
(4) See, among other things, the "Sixteen
Points," pp. 6-7, Hsinhua, English edi-
tion, September 6, 1966.
(5) Sometimes the Red Guard documents
have been drawn up in a style significant-
ly different from the style of the offi-
cial documents and expressed ideas which
the top Maoist leadership certainly did
not approve of (for example, the summary
condemnations of the entire period sub-~
sequent to 1949 contained in the documents
displayed at the University of Peking. )
(6) On this subject, see especially a
speech by Mao Tse-tung's wife, Pékin In-
formation, No. 50, 1966.
According to accusations by orthodox Maoists, this tendency was responsible for the use of coercive methods and the conflicts ensuing therefrom. It is possible these "work groups" wanted to come down harder on the oppositionists and especially those elements considered centrist. This diversity of views and activities was facilitated by a factor which would play an even greater role when the worker and peasant masses were mobilized, that is, the character of the Mao group's appeals, agitation, and ideological propaganda.
On the one hand, it could not both advance revolutionary democratic and equalitarian propaganda themes, and denounce widespread infiltration of the party and state apparatus by supporters of capitalism and, at the same time, prevent the movement which it had set in motion from striking out against the apparatus and undertaking directly antibureaucratic actions.
On the other hand, the vagueness of the Maoist propaganda and the lack of any precise information on the real objects of dispute at the top greatly facilitated all sorts of tactical maneuvers by the oppositionists as well as confusion within the Maoist front itself. Independent of the factional maneuvers, sections of the masses clarified their aims in action, undoubtedly striking at times where the Mao group did not want them to.
let us remember, finally, that Mao probably intended the Red Guards to conribute to the solution of the problem of educating the new generations, which were a cause of grave worry to the leading group. They sought to give these youth some sort of substitute revolutionary mobilization by mobilizing broad sections of them in a very arduous struggle. It is significant that the Red Guards were often given military training and, for a period, were mobilized in long marches which were represented in the propaganda as a repetition of the civil war epoch.
The Ferment in Shanghai and the Other Cities
The IEC draft document says:
"The immediate cause of the events of January 1967 lay in the rupture in the leadership of the Chinese CP and in the growing disintegration of the parvy and state apparatus at all levels. A vacuun, a relative absence of power, was thus created. In these conditions, in which the appeals to the masses helped, the various social forces were set in motion, each impelled by its own needs and objectives.
This is the essential feature of our interpretation: From a certain point on, the mass mobilization followed its own logic, independent of the moves at the top.(7) This does not exclude the possibility that the Mao group's propaganda and its appeals acted as a stimulus, or that oppositionists in turn strove to win the support of the masses.
In practice, all these factors were intertwined because the masses could not have had a very clear awareness of what was taking place, of the real import of their movement, since the oppositionists could not act openly but had to adopt manifold tactical expedients and the Mao group was forced to take contradictory postures. This explains, among other things, the fact that there were sections of the working class on both sides and that arguments, valid in and of themselves, were advanced both by those participating in the strikes and py tke members of the so-called revolutionary rebel organizations. This also explains why the movement continued to develop after the Maoist center intervened to repress it and why, moreover, the Maoist propaganda continued its chicanery around certain revolutionary democratic themes (new soviet structures, etc.), even in the most dangerous phases of the crisis.
Both the official sources and the international bourgeois (and pro-Soviet) sources, for obviously different reasons, have advanced interpretations which coincide on the essential points: the strikes, particularly the Shanghai strikes, were organized by Mao's opponents. This thesis is weakened, however, by the fact that the Shanghai leadership had been Mao's main support when the crisis was touched off and that the city committee of the party decided unanimously to publish the famous article against Wu Han (see Hsinhua, June 12, 1966, p. 12).
Later on, Shanghai was cited as the model city of the "Cultural Revolution" (see, for example, Pékin Information, No. 22, 1966) and its economic achievements were praised as exemplary. (8) In reality, Shanghai is the clearest example of how the Maoist group became gravely split in the course of the events and of the fact that one of the basic reasons for this split was the question of what attitude to take toward the mounting mass movement.
(7) For my interpretation of the January 1967 events, see my articles in World Outlook, February 3 and March 3, 1967.
(8) At the time, these economic successes were celebrated in virtually the same terms used (in March 1965) to exalt the happy consequences of the "taking of power" (Hsinhua, July 17, 1966).
When the late December-early January crisis broke out, the Shanghai leadership split: One part -- probably the majority -- opted for concessions; another (including Yao Wen Yuan, the author of the article against Wu Han) resisted the movement and began to organize the revolutionary rebels. Another proof of our interpretation is this: For four or five days -- a long period under the circumstances -- the central Maoist group took no clear position, creating concern among the orthodox Maoist group in Shanghai. (9)
I have nothing to add here to what is said in the document with regard to the workers' demands. I would only emphasize, however, that numerous organizations with the most diverse mandates were created throughout the entire period of the crisis following July 1966 and that there were also organizational developments during the mobilization of the working masses. In Shanghai, in particular, the workers formed organizations of a trade-union type which the Mao group attacked as corporative bodies; the aim of these organizations was probably to meet the needs left unsatisfied by the bureaucratized unions, which the Mao group also criticized.
As we said in the draft submitted to this plenum, the Shanghai events again enabled us to see the real nature of the Mao group's goals in practice. As soon as the movement went beyond the predetermined objectives and as soon as the masses went into motion in accordance with their own dynamic and thus introduced a factor dangerous to the bureaucratic system as a whole, Mao turned against it and appealed not just to the most loyal elements but to the army, whose role became decisive, to block the demonstrations and strikes. The facts on the significance of this intervention are clear from the official sources themselves and it is also clear that repressive measures were taken and announced in the press.
However, since it could not allow itself to be cut off from the masses or to contradict its own ideological slogans in too flagrant a way, the Mao tendency had to continue its appeals to the masses and to strive to present the "conquests of power" by its supporters as turns toward a revolutionary democratic renewal of the state apparatus.
(9) See Hsinhua, January 1, p. 25; January 13, p. 19; January 20, p. 11. The breadth of the mass mobilization and the extent of the disarray in the Maoist ranks is confirmed by the fact that there was ferment even among the Taching workers, usually cited as exemplary in official propaganda (see Hsinhua, January 20, p. 24).
To this end, it sought to link up with the most advanced sectors of the movement; but it could not keep the movement from getting out of hand again, or prevent the emergence of manifold new organizations, often jealous of their independence and their "seniority," or forestall new onslaughts on the party and state apparatus, which produced conflicts and new splits in the Maoist ranks themselves.
All these developments explain Mao's latest strategy. After the middle of January, while the battle was still in full swing, he began to advance, without much clarity at first, the theme of the "Great Alliance." He proceeded rather rapidly to define further his objective, which was to assure a balanced participation by the various elements in the new bodies being formed and to rehabilitate a majority of the cadres and leaders.
Thus, the "Triple Alliance" formula was born and became a truly central theme; it was further specified that the army was to be the "backbone," or the "keystone," of the alliance and that the cadres were indispensable because of their experience and abilities. At the same time, a canpaign was initiated to unify and centralize all the groups which had been formed and against the so-called ultrademocratic, anarchist, etc., tendencies, which did not seem disposed to accept supervision, radically criticized the past, and wanted to sweep away all the old cadres.
The Shanghai and Peking "Communes" proved to be ephemeral propaganda exercises and control was invested either in persons sent from the center (Shanghai)(10) or in police officials (Peking).
Later information shows the army, which remains the most solid apparatus after both the party and the state have been shaken by the succeeding waves of the crisis, to be tightening its grip, while the official propaganda is stressing the necessity of promoting production (especially in the countryside). It is clear that the Mao group is seeking a new equilibrium, though it is still torn by contradictory needs and pressures and cannot hope to stabilize the situation in the long run.
Before concluding on this point, I would like to note especially for the benefit of partisans of certain interpretations, that at the most critical moments the Mao group has tended to turn again to the highest party and state bodies and reinvest them with their former authority. The documents considered most important
(10) For information on the role of various individuals, see Hsinhua, February 25, February 28, 1967.
in the Shanghai crisis were circulated in the name of the central committee and the authority of the state council was invoked in recognizing the new governing bodies. Later, it was again the central committee which signed the appeals to the peasants and workers for the regular resumption of production. It is significant, moreover, that even the "Urgent Memorandum" of the Shanghai Maoist organizations addressed itself to the city committee of the party and the Bureau of Public Security for the application of the envisaged measures.
The Tendencies in the Countryside
Judging from information now available, the movement did not spread throughout the peasantry but was limited chiefly to certain regions near big cities like Shanghai and Peking.(11) The reason for this was probably that contacts with the city movements were more frequent in those regions and that this resulted in a greater politicalization; it was also easier for the peasants in those regions to see the differences between their standard of living and that of the urban population. Furthermore, elimination of this inequality was in fact one of the demands attributed to the peasant movement by the official sources and, indeed, it is explained quite clearly that tensions among the peasantry arose over this issue.
We have pointed out elsewhere that there were no sources of dramatic and inmediate tension in the Chinese countryside because conditions had greatly imnproved following the revolution, and the state had developed its relationships with the peasants on a completely different footing than the bureaucratic leadership in the USSR; this was also true because the prices paid for products delivered to the state were sufficiently profitable and the tax criteria, especially in recent years, markedly favored the peasants.(12) This situation could ex-
(11) Let us note, however, that conflicts were reported also in the Siyang region where the famous Tachai model brigade operated (see Hsinhua, March 5, 1967,
(12) It appears that the production teams distributed 60 percent (in money or in kind) of the value of what they produced among their members, after deducting production costs, taxes, the "common welfare" levy, and the contribution to the accumulation fund. The agricultural tax was set at 10 percent of 1961 production and has not changed with rising production. According to Bettelheim, private plots account for 5 percent of total land under cultivation and for 15 to 30 percent of the peasants' income. This figure of
plain why the movement in the countryside
stayed within the limits described above.
Nonetheless, experience has demon-
strated that as soon as a situation arose
favoring "free" development of the dynamic
of the different tendencies in society,
the peasants' demands developed along the
lines typical -- aside from specific fea-
tures in one or another country -- of the
transitional period (the objective basis,
in the last analysis, is found in the
still modest level of the development of
the productive forces). Thus, even in
China, despite all the special propitious
conditions, despite the rectifications of
the 1958-59 orientation, despite enormous
ideological efforts, the peasants tended
to demand greater and more direct partic-
ipation in the sharing of the product,
greater opportunities to operate on the
"free" market, and more freedom to devote
themselves to their private plots. (13)
According to rather frequent allu-
sions in the official documents, such
tendencies expressed themselves on several
occasions -- for example, between 1959 and
1962 -- when some are said to have demanded
that the family economy be given greater
opportunity for development. (14)
This means that whatever the Chi-
nese leadership may be when the crisis is
over, it will be faced with problems
which cannot be resolved by summary con-
demnations of "economism" or appeals
against egoisn.
As the element in the population
comprised by the new generations grows,
the peasants' relations with the regime
will no longer be so much conditioned by
the comparison between the prevailing con-
ditions and those prior to the revolution;
these relations will depend primarily on
the ability of the regime and the cadres
5 percent of land under cultivation also
appears in individual examples cited in
the official sources.
(13) Moreover, it must not be forgotten
that from the organizational standpoint
the communes put the property of the pro-
duction team and sometimes that of the
brigade (i.e., basically the property of
the agricultural producers' cooperative)
above the more purely collective property.
(14) See Hsinhua, August 30, 1966, p. 5.
Also for additional information, see Hsin-
hua, January 1, 1966, and Pékin Informa-
tion, No. 1, 1965, p. 13, for Chou En-lai's
report. See also Hsinhua, February 28,
1967, p. 4, on criticisms of the cadres.
There is an allusion in a recent document
to a deviation, left in form but right in
content, which Mao is said to have fought
against in 1964 (Hsinhua, March 6, 1967,
p. °
to resolve the basic problems of assuring the peasants a real part in decisionmaking in the allocation of the surplus and of creating living conditions in the countryside not too different from those in the cities (aside from purely eco-
nomic stimuli, the phenomenon of attrac-
tion to the cities, especially of the
youth, appears to be shaping up in China
also).
May 29, 1967