ANGRY PROTEST IN JAPAN OVER ESCALATION OF JAPANESE ROLE IN VIETNAM
The militant demonstration in Tokyo October 8 against Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's departure on a junket that included a visit to Saigon had big repercussions in Japan where it is considered to be the most important event of its kind since the massive student demonstrations in 1960 that successfully blocked the projected "goodwill" trip of President Eisenhower to Japan.
The demonstration itself did not involve large numbers -- some 2,400 Zengakuren students and 600 unionists on one side and 2,300 riot police on the other -- but it was highly dramatic and caught the attention of the entire country as well as winning headlines throughout the world.
For the number involved, casualties were unusually high. According to the Tokyo fire department, 250 were injured, including 151 police (10 seriously), 75 students (2 seriously), 8 bystanders (1 seriously) and 16 whose status was unknown.
One student, Hiroaki Yamazaki, a student of Kyoto University, was killed when, according to police, he was accidentally run over by an armored police car seized by the students. Demonstrators, however, reported seeing him being beaten by the police.
Sato's trip was the second within weeks. On the first trip, at the end of September, he visited Rangoon, Kuala Lunpur, Singapore, Bangkok and Ventiane. He did not land in South Vietnam, limiting himself merely to flying over it. The trip was obviously part of a plan to escalate Japanese participation in the Vietnamese conflict.
In mid-November Sato is planning a third trip, this time to Washington and no doubt he will do what he can there to give Johnson a badly needed political assist, probably making some gesture of solidarity with the American president's war aims in Vietnan.
That the Japanese government is moving step by step toward still more active participation in the war in Vietnam is very well understood among Washington's other satellite powers. Thus the London Times explained editorially October 10:
"In setting off on a tour in an area of understandable Japanese interest Mr Sato has made it plain that his purpose is a closer affiliation with the American position in Vietnam. He goes to Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines -- all countries closely associated with the Americans in Vietnam -- and ends with a stay in Saigon.
"All the pressures upon him will be for some closer form of alignment with the American Vietnam policy, at least in the form of aid for South Vietnam. That something of the kind was envisaged has been plain for some time in Government statements in Tokyo.
"On this point Japanese public opinion may not be so quiescent. Feeling about Vietnam has always been strongly against the American action, not least because circumstances could arise in which Japan was herself involved by a widening of the war."
During the trip itself, Sato's actions indicated the drift of things. For instance, in Canberra on October 12, he supported Johnson's policy of continuing to bomb North Vietnam. "At present," he told the press, "there are opinions in some circles that the U.S. should suspend its bombing of North Vietnam; but the U.S. refuses, on grounds that suspension of the North Vietnam bombing alone will not bring about peace. The U.S. probably cannot suspend its bombing unless the north guarantees to take steps equal to suspension of the bombing. We cannot onesidedly criticize only the U.S." [Asahi Evening News, October 13.]
An unnamed Japanese government spokesman announced October 18 that Sato planned to make a "peace proposal" during his visit to Saigon. His trip had to be cut short, however, due to the death of former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and so Sato said little in Saigon. He returned to Tokyo October 21.
Perhaps Sato decided, in light of the repercussions in Japan, that it was best not to say too much in Saigon and he found Yoshida's death a convenient excuse for cutting his trip short. The Asahi Evening News observed editorially October 23 that "In connection with the Vietnam problem, he apparently was unable to find a 'prescription' to take in his briefcase when he visits the United States."
The same paper added that a number of facts associated with his trip "are generally interpreted as meaning that Japan, although indirectly, is giving unilateral support to the Vietnam policy of the United States." And it asked, "Isn't Japan's diplomacy now at the crossroad of a major turning point?"
The American diplomats in Tokyo sought to make the most of Sato's landing in Saigon although he was there not
much longer than was required to refuel his plane. Robert Trumbull, in a special dispatch from Tokyo published in the October 29 New York Times, said: "Mr. Sato's four-hour stopover in Saigon...is thought to have given him a keener perception of the urgencies of the situation in Vietnan."
Trumbull reported that “analysts" in the Japanese government and in foreign embassies in Tokyo consider that "the most important immediate result" of Sato's trip "may prove to be the new projection of Japan into the affairs of the region."
"From the United States point of view, as stated by American officials here," Trumbull added, "an especially satisfying aspect of Mr. Sato's trips has been to align Japan more firmly on the side of Washington in Vietnam and against Communist designs generally in the developing states of Southeast Asia."
It is thus clear that the Japanese students who organized the October 8 demonstration had correctly deduced the political significance of Sato's projected trip to Saigon.
Their protest action was organized by the Sampa Rengo [Three Faction Alliance]. This is composed of the Kakukyodo [Japan Revolutionary Communist League], the Shagekudo [Japan Socialist Student League] and the Shaseido (Japan Socialist Youth League].
The Sampa Rengo is a minority in the Zengakuren [National Federation of Students Self-government Associations] opposed to the policies of the Japan Communist party and considered to be within the orbit of the Japan Socialist party. The Japan Communist party controls about seventy or eighty percent of the membership of the Zengakuren.
No doubt it was due to the opposition of the Japan Communist party that the majority of the Zengakuren did not support the protest action and only a small minority were involved.
Preparations for the demonstration appear to have been begun about a month before Sato's departure. These included buying crash helmets and sturdy staves (two by twos). About 1,000 of the participants came from other cities. Upon as-~ sembling, detachments scoured the area for stones and broke up paving blocks to add to the supply. The some 400 girls participating in the demonstration helped in this, doing their best to keep the male students supplied with missiles as they were thrown at the police.
The police barricaded the bridges leading to the island airport, utilizing
-889-
armored cars for this purpose.
The students moved forward, chant-
ing, "Sato don't go" and "We are opposed
to Sato's visit to South Vietnam."
Seeking to break through the police
cordons, some of them climbed on top of
the armored cars.
The police opened up with high-
pressure water tank trucks, blowing stu-
dents off the tops of the armored cars
and knocking a number into the muddy
river.
Throwing stones, the students
charged the water cannon, captured one
of them and turned its nozzles on the
police.
They also captured some of the
armored cars. They did this by smashing
the windshields with hammers and climbing
inside. Starting up the motors, they used
the cars as battering rams against the
police lines and many police had to jump
into the river to avoid being run down.
In other instances, students and
police fought in hand-to-hand conflict,
some of them ending up by being pushed
over the sides of the bridges.
Students punctured the gas tanks
of seven of the cars and set them on fire,
making spectacular columns of smoke.
Eventually the students ran out of
rocks and the police, using tear gas, were
able to push them back.
Sato, protected by a number of
police cars, managed to make it to his
plane but other passengers were held up
for many hours before the bridges were
finally cleared.
The one tragic incident was the
death of eighteen-year-old Hiroaki Yama-
zaki. He had gone to Tokyo without the
knowledge of his parents.
"I never thought my son was a rad-
ical," said his father, a sawmill worker.
Hiroaki had graduated from Osaka
Prefectural Otemae High School last March.
He was always at the top of his class.
Last year he participated with other
classmates in putting on an antiwar mas-
querade.
The police claimed that 647 police-
men had been injured. But this figure was
discounted by other sources. A total of
fifty-eight students and unionists were
arrested.
The press deplored the demonstra-
tion, particularly the violence. They, of
course, blamed it on the students, al-
though Tensei Jingo, writing in the Asahi Shimbun thought that the Prime Minister ought to "postpone" his trips abroad until he has learned to "understand and handle the youth of his own country."
Most of the commentators thought the students were "disgraceful." Some sought to find the reasons for their attitude in social conditions; others in inadequacies or errors in the educational system; "subversion" was widely suggested as being at the bottom of the demonstration and demands were made on the authorities to begin acting tough.
A cabinet meeting was called and Education Minister Toshihiro Kennoki outlined plans to take up the question at a series of meetings involving the heads of state, private and public universities. He said that the conduct of the students went beyond the scope of the student movement but that the Education Ministry “fully realizes its responsibility." He added that the universities needed to take "suitable countermeasures."
At a meeting of the House of Representatives Education Committee he told the legislators, in response to questioning, that legal steps would be necessary concerning the management of universities and colleges.
The Japan Communist party, as reported in the October 14 Japan Times, denounced the demonstration as a clash between "the reactionary forces" and “ultraleftist counterrevolutionary elements." The party officials expressed fear that "the U.S.-dapan reactionary force" might utilize the conflict as a pretext to perpetuate repression of democratic rights.
The Japan Socialist party blamed the government for the violence, stating that it had “trampled upon the wishes of the people who opposed Sato's visit to Saigon." But the party officialdom also criticized the students, stating that it was "regrettable that some Zengakuren students had acted in a manner contrary to what the party had in mind."
The Central Committee even went so far as to say that the party had failed to properly guide the student movement and that it had decided to improve this aspect of party activities.
The Peking People's Daily praised the students, stating, according to a broadcast monitored in Hong Kong: "They feared no armored cars, no truncheons, no bullets, no fascist wolves and bravely stood in the forefront against U.S. inperialism. It is the pride of the Japanese people to possess such heroic revolutionary young people. In them lies the hope of the Japanese nation."
The People's Daily also said that
Sato's visit to Saigon was intended to
further involve Japan in the Vietnam war
and that "This is against the national
interest of Japan, and absolutely intol-
erable to the Japanese people."
The full text of the statement by
the People's Daily was not reported. Thus
it remained unclear whether the Maoist
newspaper mentioned the perspective of a
socialist revolution in Japan or confined
itself to talking about the "national in-
terest" of Japanese imperialisn.
Te Liberal-Democratic party, which
is the party in power, decided October 11
to set up subcommittees in its special
security committee and education division
to "probe" the demonstration at the air-
port.
"Me subcommittees are expected to
reach a conclusion before Prime Minister
Eisaku Sato visits the United States in
mid-November," reported the October 13
Japan Times.
The Liberal-Democrats declared that
the police should have treated the demon-
strators "not as students but as profes-
sional rioters." The antisubversives law
should have been invoked and the univer-
sities should begin remedying the present
situation on the campuses "which seems to
be contributing in part to the formation
of radical student organizations."
Mitsuo Setoyama, deputy secretary
general of the Liberal-Democratic party,
insisted that the demonstration should be
dealt with as “action aimed at violent
revolution." He added that members of the
party's special committee on public secu-
rity were calling for "strong measures"
against such demonstrations.
An attempt at a witch-hunt was
soon underway. On October 12, the Public
Safety Department of the Metropolitan
Police Board asked the Tokyo District
Court for a warrant for the arrest of
Katsuyuki Akiyama, twenty-six-year-old
chairman of the Sampa Rengo. The police
told the press that Akiyama and his fel-
low leaders had gone underground.
The basis for the warrant, accord-
ing to the police, was that no permit had
been obtained for the demonstration and
that this violated the Metropolitan Pub-
lic Safety Ordinance. Akiyama was also
charged with obstruction of police duty
and assault and battery.
On October 16, for the first time
in the postwar history of Japan, three
raids were conducted by some 600 police
at 3 a.m. on the campuses of Hosei,
Waseda and Chuo universities.
In hope of proving "premeditation in the commandeering and burning of police vehicles," the raiders seized 1,600 items.
The predawn hours were chosen for the raids, according to the police, "to avoid student resistance."
In addition the police raided the headquarters of the Revolutionary Commu~ nist League and the Communist League, alleging that they had "incited" the students.
The police said that they were looking for "documents" and that they had run across evidence that only the evening before, the students had burned documents evidently in anticipation of the raids. The police included in the material they seized such bits of "evidence" as pieces of lumber which had allegedly been brandished at the police in the Tokyo demonstration.
Meanwhile the death of Hiroaki Yamazaki had served to heighten the feelings of the students. Preliminary rallies in his memory were staged in a number of cities.
A memorial meeting was held October 17 in Tokyo. About 5,000 people attended. They heard eulogies by Yoshiaki Yamazaki, the father of the dead student, and others. Shunsuke Tsurumi, professor of Doshisha University, Kyoto, delivered an address and messages were read from
student and leftist organizations in Brit-
ain and West Germany.
After the meeting, more than 3,000
of the participants staged a march to the
Tokyo station. The police posted more
than 2,000 men along the route but no
disturbances were reported.
At the beginning of the march, Kat-
suyuki Akiyama joined the front ranks.
The police were waiting, however, as an-
nouncements had been made that he would
lead the demonstration. They arrested him
as soon as he began speaking.
Akiyama refused to answer any
questions put to him by the police, ac-
cording to the October 19 Japan Times.
On October 21 he was dragged handcuffed
into court and fined 50,000 yen [about
US$138] on the charge of having led a
violent demonstration a year ago, Octo-
ber 20, 1966, near Tokyo's Hibiya Park.
Akiyama shouted protests at the judge.
A codefendant, Hisao Akutsu, twenty-
two, a Tokyo University student was fined
30,000 yen [about US$83].
It may be weeks before the court's
decision on the other charges will be made
known.
The Sampa Rengo is planning another
demonstration when Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato leaves for the United States. His
departure has been scheduled for Novem-
ber 12.