An
Exchange in the Belgrade Press:
IS CHARITY THE SOLUTION TO POVERTY IN YUGOSLAVIA?
(The following two articles, "A Morality of Shame," and "Morality, Shame and Solidarity -- a Reply," appeared in the popular Yugoslav weekly Nin in the June 4 and July 30, 1967, issues respectively. The author of the first, Drazan Markovié, is a well-known journalist. The author of the second, Dr. Olga Kozomara, is a leading sociologist in Yugoslavia.
(The views expressed in the articles reflect the severity of the problems that have arisen in that country in the material and ideological sphere. They also show that some Yugoslav Communists are not complacent about then.
(The reply by Dr. Kozomara met with a mixed response among the upper brackets of Yugoslav society. A leading local party official was of the opinion that social scientists should confine themselves to the study of facts and forbear making contributions to the popular press. Another thought that Dr. Kozomara was "ninety percent right but too idealistic," a third that "we need a revolution -- without blood if possible."
{Attention should be called to the terminology used by the authors, which could prove misleading. In accordance with the official nomenclature, they refer to the state and the society in Yugo- Slavia as "socialist." But Yugoslavia has a workers state and the society is transitional, in development from capitalism toward socialisn.
[Many of the limitations discussed by the authors are ascribable to the fact that Yugoslavia was a poor country to begin with and has not traveled far from capitalism. Moreover, the pressures, both _ internal and international, have revived and given vigor to many features inherited from the capitalist past.
(The lack of workers democracy in Yugoslavia makes it very difficult to block and to defeat the regressive trends. It is not possible, for instance, for those who see the dangers most clearly to speak out openly and to argue for effective countermeasures. Thus discussions in Yugoslavia involving topics of utmost concern to the vanguard are often very cryptic. That leading intellectuals are raising these questions, even if in an obscure form, is an encouraging sign. They deserve the fullest support from socialists the world over.
(The translation is by Margaret Coulson and David Riddell.]
* * *
A Morality of Shame
By Drazan Markovié
The idea that in socialism, because of its very name, nothing ugly is allowed, nothing that could be the same as, or worse than, the "other world" -- such an idea probably goes back to Potemkin's village, illusory but promising. And every contrary understanding or feeling, even if correct, has been represented as if it were a religious heresy.
As if by decree it was known what was to be hidden and what was to be ashamed of in the name of such a moral, particularly when people had to compare themselves socially again.
We were ashamed of poverty and the persistence of social differentiation, for according to some old textbooks of political economy it seemed to us that such class phenomena dare develop only in capitalist relationships; that socialism from its first day would be immune from such things; that the target of equality would be achieved as soon as the new power of the people was proclaimed.
There were other similar illusions. Of what else were we still ashamed? Of the unemployed and of those who begged for a roof over their head and a piece of bread for themselves. Of wretched houses on the outskirts of town, which let in the rain, but continue to stand, because it turns out that it is better to be with them than without them. Of poor children in schools, and of those still less fortunate who have nowhere to go when their parents leave to work in the factories, so that their mothers bind them to the bed with cord in order to prevent them from being lost on the streets.
We were ashamed of the position of these old soldiers, war veterans, whose existence has remained unsatisfactory, of war widows in mining settlements, with small pensions and black scarves, of the
lack of flats for highly qualified experts, of begging in the streets, of juvenile delinquency, and of homes for abandoned children.
Of all that we were ashamed (you understand, as good humane people, as citizens of a socialism which is something different from that promised in the books). We have been so much ashamed of that that we have hidden it all, even officially, believing perhaps that it will disappear more quickly when out of mind. And so, after we were ashamed of that (because we thought that all those paradoxes must be solved by the state), we were ashamed of certain rare attempts among citizens to establish various humanitarian organizations to help the socially imperiled.
Such initiatives arise from pure humanitarian impulses; but we have easily built up a convention around them -- that they are morally degrading, that they are Christian, that they indicate the charity of wealth for poverty, that they cover up real contradictions and the social basis of relationships, and that in reality they strengthen people's sense of inequality.
So we have run away from such attempts, in the mistakenly naive enthusiasm that only a little needs to be endured: since everything will be solved by the State (omnipotent and rich "socialist State").
In reality that is the way in which we have deluded both ourselves and others. We have lulled people with our own romantic illusions: that we are already capable, a progressive, autonomous society, and we easily dismiss all difficulties and differences. Constantly we promised, deluded by an unrealistic, conmpletely poetic faith, that it is only necessary to wait a little for everything to be all right, while we did not realize that there is a much more difficult and longer road than that written down in books, than that which we foresaw in all our daydreams about the future.
And so it is both right and wise that we no longer work in that way: hiding our difficulties, speaking as if they would quickly disappear, painting a picture about ourselves. Why speak in that way, when not everything is easy for us, nor exactly good (certainly not everything), and will probably not be for a long time to come. Why such selfdeception, when those who are in difficulty know that they are in-difficulty, and it is futile to try to convince them otherwise?
Now we work in a more sensible and humane way: we recognize that there are people without jobs, that there is social
distress, and poverty; we have come to
know that the State alone cannot solve
everything, and we are beginning to ar-
rive at that kind of solidarity among
people in which they help each other more.
We have no longer anything to be
ashamed of. Such things are logical and
normal occurrences and neither peculiar
to us, nor something we have created. On
the contrary, it would be more immoral to
hear that, because it is wrong to us, we
put red paint over that social inequality
we still have and wait for the State to
solve it.
People have always helped others
in distress. After all, that has always
been a virtue of man, so why have we
passed over that virtue now, when we
still need it, and when we still haven't
arrived at the stage where no one is de-
pendent on another?
Solidarity cannot depend only on
beautiful words, or on willingness to
persevere for future targets, on honest
wishes and wars for the liberation of
man. That is a long-term prospect. But
what will there be without today? How
can we give immediate help to those who
are, for various reasons, in distress.
That kind of solidarity is necessary
(nowadays) from us.
It is on this basis that a group
of people have taken the initiative in
founding "Memorial to Solidarity," a
goodwill fund to help all citizens who
are in social distress. Its slogan is
clear and simple: those who have, must,
as far as they are able, help those who
have nothing and are today in distress.
That is only a beginning, though
both good and humane. If such a thing is
useful to us, why do we not then broaden
this idea further, in different forms,
creating funds for help to children (tal-
ented and worthy) who have difficulty in
going to school, for help in the erection
of schools and libraries, for grants for
students whose parents are poor, for the
development of hospitals, for help to the
old and worn out, and for all those whom
we wish to pull out from want; we still
have not the capability of achieving that
as a community by "normal measures" alone.
In no way would that be the soli-
darity of pathetic Samaritanism, solidar-
ity according to a recipe of cathexis,
which would violate our understanding of
morals and personal self-respect. It is
simply to say that to give real help to
people by people has always (and so in
socialism also, perhaps) had humane and
pure motives. Although small, this help
would be some contribution towards re-
alizing the aspiration that one day the
need for such help would disappear.
Morality, Shame and Solidarity -- a Reply
By Olga Kozomara
In his article "Morality of Shame," Markovié criticizes the way in which problems have been disguised and hidden in the belief that in a gocialist society everything should be as good or better than in capitalist society. In this criticism he is right.
Socialism is concerned with the development of a true understanding of society and social forces. Active and basic contradictions are met by organized social action based on established evidence and directed towards the humane aims of communisn.
Problems which exist in a socialist society but which are concealed -for example unemployment, the poverty of a particular strata of society, housing in peripheral areas, etc. -- these the author attributes to shame. He is critical of us all because, he asserts, such shame need not be shameful -- these are "normal" and inevitable problems, not simply of our own making. Without justifying his assertion, he states that it is because we have been ashamed that we have been silent about social injustice. This is his first mistake.
By asserting that we are mistaken in thinking that social problems can only be solved through state action, the writer falls into his second mistake. In some strange way he claims to have discovered a link between the silence which conceals the conflicting forces in socialism and the conviction that social injustices can be resolved only by the socialist state.
A silence of shame -- but the writer is convinced that shame tied to a blind faith in the power of the state is deprived of humanism. In this way he begins his explanation of the morality of shame. But this merely obscures his third mistake.
Thus -- when we shake off our shame and our belief that only the state can provide a solution to social injustice, we are still left with the conclusion that we cannot ignore these social injustices: so we must found a voluntary humanitarian organization of citizens such as the "Memorial to Solidarity." An individualistic and humane answer, "Those who have, must as far as they are able, help those who have nothing and who today are in distress" insists the author. That is his final mistake.
It must be understood that we would not have offered this criticism of the article if the writer's general argument had been that, like the rest of the world, we find ourselves in hard times of economic reorientation, and because of this it is impossible to avoid various social problems. Thus a different kind of solidarity becomes necessary, a solidarity of voluntary contribution. And if he had argued that although the giving and receiving of charity, especially from one individual to another is insulting and painful, nevertheless at this difficult time humanitarian organizations might enable us to bear this moral and human dilemma -- in such arguments we might have found some humanitarian basis. That would indicate that we supported such solidarity in response to the immediate need but do not accept it as a solution to the problem. Then that would not imply that by this course we could achieve humanism, or gain the tranquility of a quietened conscience.
But in fact what is written in the article has quite other implications. Insofar as space allows we will try to elucidate the misconceptions which it contains.
Firstly. There is a difference between being ashamed and being shamed. Degraded, poverty-stricken people are shamed. But to feel ashamed means to feel moral uneasiness, to have a sharpened conscience, to want to take action and to bring about change. Marx emphasized that to be ashamed could be a sort of passion. The lack of distinction between "shamed" and "ashamed" leads to the misconception that shame automatically produces secretiveness, whereas (in reality) it is the lack of shame itself which causes this silence. Our lack of shame more than anything seems to be social conformity -- passively and with unquestioning indifference we accept what happens without reference to what could have been achieved; nonsocialist phenomena continue and even increase. The suggestion that we should shake off our shame of social injustice implies that we accept it. Such a view represents a threat to socialist development.
Secondly. There is no consideration of the enduring differences between a capitalist and a communist state. The latter is more socially integrated. That is, what seems the state, in reality, is the society, us, all its citizens. The state is only the organized form of society which is necessary so that we may arrange and direct our communal efforts to resolve our problems, relationships and work. If this is so, then the state in itself without us, its citizens, is nothing.
Humanitarian organizations are only temporary forms of organization, revealing
the position of the weakest social class, but they cannot be accepted in the long run in a society which pledges itself to destroy the class system. Such organizations must be seen in this light in a socialist society. If they are not, then the society cannot claim to be socialist. If the solution of social injustice takes the form of such organizations (run by citizens who have for those who have not) then that is a reaffirmation of class distinction. The state, through its organs, draws together our representatives whose responsibility is to act in the general interest and to deal with social injustice. If these injustices are not dealt with they will grow. But, the state in itself can do nothing; only by means of its citizens. Consequently the opinion that the state solves things by itself is a mistake. There is no conception that the state, deriving from society, organizes social action so that social problems are solved in a social way. In reality, every socialist state does not conform with this proposition. In such cases, either the state has not been consolidated as socialist, or has passed over to another position, and in either way it is necessary to search for a basis for criticism and corrective action.
Thirdly. Would life be preferable with a morality of shame, or would it be preferable with a morality of shamelessness. Isn't that nonsense? Morality or immorality! Shame can be an element in or even a basis for morality, but it cannot be a type of morality. If someone transgresses moral norms -- if, for example, he lies -- he either feels ashamed or does not feel ashamed. In the first case there is a moral attitude, in the second, generally, there is not. The whole attack on shame, including the designation of moral shame as a type of morality, would give rise to an ironic smile, regardless of the personal motives of the author, which could be altered, but in fact it is an attack on morality, on moral relations and moral attitudes.
In the article, Markovié suggests that I should not be ashamed because there are beggars, poor and unemployed people, etc., within a socialist systen, for these are common occurrences. We acknowledge this. But the real question remains to be asked. Is this inevitable? The answer must be that in the present circumstances these problems cannot be avoided. All right. But are adequate social measures being taken to meet this situation; does the general trend indicate a decline or an increase in social injustice? If I feel no shame at the continuance of these evils, then I will remain indifferent to the lack of improvements, and to the multiplication of social injustices.
There is a second dimension to
this problem. Can those who are in secure
and privileged positions in society jus-
tify this sufficiently or are they in
danger because of this; because the ques-
tion must be put: who are those who enjoy
security and privilege? Is it true that
the latter are only those who exert the
maximum efforts and who achieve the best
results, or have some of them become
"socially inadequate" themselves? What if
that is so? If that would not be a reason
for shame, then it would show that we had
precisely no kind of moral attitude; in
other words, if we are invited to abandon
shame, then we are invited to abdicate a
moral attitude.
Further, this leads to the concrete
question of the position of particular
professional and educated groupings in re-
lation to an exaggerated standard of liv-
ing and to the productivity of work. If
in our country productivity is one-third
the European average, then that indicates
that all professional groups should be
proportionately hit by lower living stan-
dards. If some professions try to evade
this, and amongst them the most highly
educated, then there opens up a clear
mechanism for the reproduction of social
injustice. Thus a bad lawyer, professor,
politician, doctor, etc., will have a
considerably higher standard of living
than a good welder, foundry worker, or
miner.
Remuneration according to work has
been accepted as a moral norm in our so-
ciety. Not to be ashamed that a bad ex-
pert with some diplomas can enjoy a higher
material and social standard than a good
expert with no diploma is hypocrisy; the
absolute negation of any sort of moral
attitude. We have rightly condemned it.
But, nevertheless, we stick strictly to
frameworks of predetermined social cate-
gories, as is indicated above.
Old class structures have not been
smashed; on the whole, the working class
in the narrower sense retains a subordi-
nate position as the value of work is
measured by diplomas and rank. In that
way, social groups are formed whose needs
are met only with difficulty and whose
living standards are unrelated to the re-
sults of their work. Without a sense of
shame there can be no moral attitude, and
without that there can be neither change
in social structure, nor development of
socialist relationships. The point to be
emphasized here is that a lack of shame
at this range of nonsocialist phenomena
can only lead to a breakdown of the moral
values which support socialism.
Fourthly. Social injustice means
that there are those who have and those
who have not, and whatever may be given
to those who have not, this still does
not have the effect of granting social
recognition for the value and achieve-
ments of their work. The poorest peasants Instead of that, I propose that we have readily helped a teacher, although should discuss the revision of the matethey knew he was not in need. Voluntary rial situation of all categories in soassociations rest on this acceptance of ciety; that on the basis of economic social injustice. Are not the misunder- analysis we should assess the maximum standings implicit in such "cures" ob- possible limitations to monthly personal vious? income so that the necessary means could
be made available to finance enough pub-
The case of natural or social ca- lic works to ensure full employment. tastrophe is exceptional. But generally, having some respect for my conscience I ask myself -- would it be more shameful We call for solidarity, true solito give or to receive charity? Those who darity, and if we haven't enough to mainwould convince me that I should not feel tain the existing standard of living of shame in giving charity are saying to me: certain groups without depriving others there's no need to be ashamed if you are of a minimum standard, then we must open a villain, calm down, ignore your con- up the discussion about the redistribuscience. tion of income in our society.
TWO