documents that I knew of, study circles, how problems were discussed, how I was involved, how I see the problem now.
"Sectarianism. I understood that Fidel had become a Marxist in the course of the struggle, that the taking of power had been possible thanks to the strategy pursued by Fidel; in the struggle, in the Sierra, the PSP had not been able to do it directly. That only Fidel could manage the struggle, but that the PSP had offered it help, which in the beginning was not much, since it did not understand the possibility of armed struggle; but that finally this thesis had triumphed and it had therefore given increased help, above all in 1958.
“The Cuban Revolution had taken the socialist path owing to the errors of imperialism, the help of the socialist camp, and, naturally, the decision made by Fidel and all the forces that composed the Revolution.
"I perceived that the Revolution was advancing along a sure path. When the criticism of sectarianism came about and Anibal was blamed, that is how I understood it.
"I have already explained that my lack of understanding of certain phenomena in which I found myself participating and the circumstances which brought me close to Anibal Escalante made me begin to understand that these phenomena existed because Fidel, although he was a conscientious revolutionary, wanted to do things his way and had placed himself over the Party.
"This conception stood out for its lack of understanding of what form the Revolution's actions had taken in the building of socialism and in international policy.
"In international policy we believed that everything which brought us closer to the Soviet Union and coincided with its basic policies was good, and that what led us away from it was dangerous for our Revolution, because of our inability to defend ourselves alone. We looked to the USSR as the strongest pole in the socialist camp and as the country that was strategically able to detain and finally overcome imperialisn.
"We expected a 'rectification' by Fidel on the basis of his revolutionary honesty when our economy failed and because of our need to depend on the Soviet Union, as I saw this as the only path open to us.
"We even got to the point of hoping for certain pressure from the USSR, and saw in the person of Anibal a symbol of this rectification and believed that this rectification would bolster confidence among the European socialist countries in the path followed by our Revolution. However, this idea related to the policy followed by the Revolution rather than to individuals.
"All these ideas were expressed in conversations with the circle formed around Anibal, discussions not only of a general nature but also applied to concrete circumstances. They were generally accompanied by great political passion in the throes of which certain personalities of the Revolution were caricatured and described in disrespectful terms.
"This circle of aroused political passion led to:
"1. Losing faith in Fidel and the leadership of the Revolution while faith in Anibal became stronger.
"2. Making the whole course of our Revolution and our history depend on this issue, this type of historically impossible 'restoration.'
"3. Producing in all of us a blindness to reality so complete that it led us to do foolish things. I can understand now how the passionate defense of an erroneous cause can blind a man to such a degree as to make him incapable of the most elementary realistic reasoning.
"4. Magnifying the negative aspects and the problems of the Revolution and losing sight of the overall picture of our heroic people and the great things that have been achieved, or at least not seeing them in all their fullness, and minimizing the good things. This situation wore away at revolutionary conscientiousness and caused a loss of enthusiasm in the fulfillment of the tasks of the Revolution.
"5. Not being able to reason and
to understand the strategy of the Revolu-
tion.
"6. Since we were looking to the
past, without understanding the present
-- and without being able to predict the
future -- the Revolution, much greater
than ourselves, passed us by and left us
behind.
"And all of this spread out from
this one group.
"The weakest points in this con-
cept were, I believe, the following:
"1. Not once (as far as I know),
and as I have stated, did our group make
any serious analysis of the true state
of our economy. Instead, the economy was
analyzed, in general, without any firm
basis.
"2. The whole idea collapses for
lack of a basic argument if one takes
into account the concept of dignity as
defined by Fidel in such a grave situa-
tion as the October Crisis. And now I
understand that this concept was not
based on personal vanity, but rather on
our Revolution's need for undisputed
leadership so as to deal with the dif-
ficulties of the times we live in.
"3. The complexities of the prob-
lems involved in the socialist camp could
not be understood by a simple schema with-
out a knowledge of other facts, which was
not available and could not have been ob-
tained.
"4. The policy of principles which
the Soviet Union should follow was not
taken into consideration.
"In regard to the phenomenon of
sectarianism, it was never understood as
a historical reality necessary for the
triumph of the Revolution.
"It was not understood that, be-
cause of the historical realities of the
Revolution, to have followed the road
Anibal proposed would have destroyed
vital unity.
"Marxism was not grapsed in its
truly creative sense, but was understood
rather as limited to certain forms which
may very well not correspond to the his-
toric moment which demands a united peo-
ple with a strong, undisputed and respect-
ed leadership with high anti-imperialist
awareness, firm at all times, and willing
to fight against an enemy which threatens
to attack and destroy us.
"For example, the concept of in-
ternal democracy cannot be examined in
the abstract but must rather be applied
to concrete circumstances." (Quesada continues.) "I believe all men have their weak points and that no one is perfect. But it is true that within the group there were comrades with moral defects which are not acceptable to socialist morality. And this was tolerated (liberalism). It is impossible to defend any cause that way. Moreover, in many cases passions fed upon resentments or frustrations, or were simply expressions of personal affection, pity or prejudice and other such feelings, or merely of an inability to look ahead rather than revert to the past."
(Quesada continues.) "When one comes up against reality he can begin to reason, to slowly recover his ability to think clearly, to understand the basic notions of the Revolution's strategy and regain confidence in those whom, for historical reasons, one should never have lost faith in; to understand the error that has been committed and the need the Revolution had for putting an end to it without shilly-shallying."
, ‘F-Pass on to page 14 of manuscript No. 3.
"Toward the end I worked as a liaison between Anibal and relatives of some of those now in custody." (When arrests had already begun, he was the contact between Anibal and members of the families of those in custody.) "Ramiro Puertas (through his brother Julio), Octavio's family (at times I went to their home, and sometimes through his Uncle Oscar).
"I have now begun to realize certain things:
"1. The damage that these activities did to the Revolution.
"2. The just treatment given this matter by the Party.
"3. That the correct attitude of a Communist was not to lose sight of the fact that the fundamental thing for our Revolution in the present historical circumstances is the preparation for confronting imperialism, and that, because of this, unity of all anti-imperialist forces is necessary. That the worst thing a Communist can do is to rivet his attention on the past and lose confidence in the future. That Marxism cannot be interpreted as a rigid formal pattern; that some forms may be correct under certain circumstances, at definite places and times, but are not necessarily valid in others.
"It is impossible to justify a revolutionary's halting in his march while the process of Revolution is going on, nor his activities' causing difficulties for that process in practice. I have thought
out the reasons for all this in order to
explain it to myself. And I believe they
are:
"]. & rigid ideological concept.
"2. A chain of circumstances.
"3. A large number of personal de-
fects which explain how one can fall into
this error:
"a. A nonrevolutionary idea of
friendship and affection.
"b. A tolerant and weak attitude
toward one's own defects and those of
others.
"c. The arrogance of believing
that one's own ideas are the correct ones,
without attempting to test them against
reality.
"a. An attitude which tends toward
pessimisn.
"e. Noticing others' prejudices
and not one's own.
"f. An undisciplined attitude.
"e. Naiveté.
"h. Allowing emotion to blind one
to reality instead of using it as a way
of serving the Revolution.
"And, in addition, other defects,
all of which I am becoming aware of and
which explain, but do not justify, my
mistake."
(Thus ends manuscript No. 3 of
Quesada. ) :
@ Letter written by
Anibal Escalante to the
Party leadership after
his arrest
Comrades:
Please accept this autocritical
statement that I am making on my own
initiative to explain to you, as the
highest authority of the Party and revo-
lutionary power, the understandings I
have been able to attain and their cor-
Ollaries regarding the serious actions
that have led to my detention. I will
try to be brief.
I should begin this autocritical
statement with a straight confession:
1. I take responsibility for the
actions which have been imputed to me.
2. I accept as valid the assertion
that my attitude led me into factional
activity -- that is, the forming of a
"microfaction" such as Comrade Fidel him-
self described.
3. I spontaneously recognize the need for the measures taken by the leadership of the Party in taking drastic action and eliminating the source of infection that was created.
But, in addition to making this express confession, I should explain something to the leadership of the Party: how I came to end up in this state of affairs, or, even better, how this negative phenomenon could have been created, what it i? and where it may lead, as I understand
One of the questions which has been bothering me most in these days is the following: How did I, starting from a communist position (which cleaves firmly to the Revolution and which reveres the Party and its leadership), come to end up in this business of factionalism and all that goes with it? And I ask myself this question and try to justify myself (there is no justification for what I have done), but doing it because I need to explain realistically, to myself, what happened and not only get at the reason but also find the courage needed to help me aid the Party clean out all factionalism and liquidate this phenomenon which, anyway, weighs on me like a stone.
As I understand it, there are two types of causes that have contributed to the formation, first, of a factional tendency and, then, of factional activity with totally inadmissible implications which I will go into later.
The first type of cause corresponds to what might perhaps be best termed the objective situation or objective factors. It is the situation or factors which serve as a starting point for this attitude or which have nurtured it. I would like to refer to the fact that, over a long period of time, here, among ourselves, in our homeland, an aggregate of ideas, a framework through which to view the world and everything in it, an index that became dogmatic with the years and even created very precise conditioned reflexes was forged and thrived, arising from all the circumstances of its birth and its life in a world hostile to it. Everything that didn't fit in this framework, everything that didn't follow this hidebound index, and even everything that pained these conditioned reflexes had to be considered anathema. Starting in 1962, a great effort was made to clean up this state of affairs, and no few could have benefited by this effort; but I tell you it isn't easy, and it won't be easy, to overcome all these things that are admittedly worn out, dogmatic and schematic and which act as conditioned reflexes.
@ Anibal Escalante's "turmoil"
As far as I am concerned, my head is filled with the turmoil of clashing ideas and the crashing down of a multitude of things that up to now appeared to be irrefutable truths, or created situations which were acceptable or necessary, although, to tell the truth, I often admitted their dangerous character, or, simply, their incorrectness.
The key to most of the "discontent" lay in the "international situation." Or, I should say more plainly, each country's role in the socialist world -- concretely, the USSR's role and Cuba's role. In considering these roles, deep down, many of us have always -- as we did in the past -worked from the outside in: from the USSR, center of the world revolution, to Cuba, a part of the world revolution, instead of working from the inside out, from Cuba, a part of the world revolution, to the USSR, a part of the world revolution -- a great part, very powerful, very respected, but no longer an isolated socialist center but rather a part of the socialist world. I am saying this without any kind of nationalism, but simply and plainly as a fact. Separate, converging facts, of sinm-— ilar structure, but separate. A truth so simple that to some -- to many -- it seems obvious, but it is a serious problem that we must be well aware of if we want to be up-to-date in 1967, when, in addition to the USSR, there is a socialist Cuba and, of course, other socialist countries.
This may sound like a platitude, but it isn't. If we do not understand the essence of the phenomenon, we will always be looking beyond our own frontiers to see what's going on. We shall think, at every turn, that the source of truth lies outside, and we shall always be searching for it abroad, although finding the truth will never be easy in these matters of social and political sciences, which are not so exact and are always subject to so many factors.
It is understandable that, based on these ideas -- I mean fossilized ideas -- "discontent" over anything that did not fit in our scheme of things, or which resulted from hearing strong criticism of Soviet positions, would always seem natural. In the same way it always looked nat-— ural not to distinguish where Soviet citizenship -- or that of any other sister socialist nation -- ended and where our own citizenship -- with all its responsibilities -- began when considering common problems or our problems, or simply expressing our opinions.
I imagine that perhaps those who have never gone through these stratified states of mind may hesitate to admit these arguments and so may attribute what I say to the situation in which I find myself. This is understandable, but, with all due respect, it is not necessarily correct.
It is not my present situation in itself but rather a whole series of facts -which, due to my irresponsibility, I had never stopped to consider ~~ and the seriousness with which others regard these facts that impel me to understand. Yes, that is what hammers at me relentlessly and adds to the crashing turmoil in my head to which I previously referred.
There are comrades of long militancy who, for countless reasons, are freer from past schematic thinking and reflexes, who are marching shoulder to shoulder with the army of the people along the right paths. There are others of us who have lagged behind. Well, it is among those who have lagged behind -- and taking into account other kinds of frustrations, even of a personal nature, and perhaps even the lack of direct encouragement or help -- that the breeding ground for this current of resistance to seeing things a new way came into being; this, at least, is the objective basis of the trend which later crystallized into factional activity.
If we take all those persons directly involved in factional activity, one by one, we would find that all of them -- with the exception of some unusual case -~ would have one common denominator above all: "the international problem." That, and the "schema."
I am not attempting to justify anyone's conduct. I am only trying -- as I said before ~~ to understand how and why such conduct has come about.
Let us now go on to other reasons, the subjective reasons, which each person had. I will analyze mine. It seems to me that things like the following weighed heavily in my actions:
1. The rankling, obsessive idea that, even though I had accepted the events of 1962, there had been things that were not discussed with me. I considered myself a sort of "sacrificial lamb" made accountable not only for my own actions but for those of others. This idea hammered at me constantly; perhaps I did not understand the fundamental lesson of 1962, which I can now grasp more clear-~ ly: a radical change in methods, "schemata" and style. This obsession drove me to two things: to live in expectation of a discussion which could not take place and to openly express personal opinions which could only interfere with the new, more advanced unity proclaimed in 1962.
2. An evident overestimation of my ideas and even my role in the revolutionary development of the country. I don't know, consciously, I have never desired this overestimation, but it is evident that the constant expounding of such ideas alone, without taking into account
the existing reality, and the eagerness
to submit proposals and plans on every
type of problem existing in the country,
could only stem from a magnified idea of
my role in our society. The origin of '
this, its "historic roots," can probably
be found in the positive and certainly
important role I played in leading the
old Party to the triumphant line of
armed struggle; in the prestige this may
have given me among members and allies;
and perhaps in my being accustomed to
working at the center of things prior
to and after victory, etc. And all this
has led me to feel, in contrast, great-
ly underestimated, neglected, and even
persecuted. Embittered.
4. In connection with the above,
we must also note immodesty and exces-
sive use of the word "I," "I believe,"
"I have ideas," "I do have opinions,"
etc. This -- and everything connected
with that exaggerated concept of my role
in society -- must have been, and in
fact has been, continually fed by "the
chorus" -~ that is, by the constant
"visits," the “consultations" on any
little thing, the attending of funerals
and similar events, etc., where -- in ny
opinion -- there was far too much praise
of my supposed ~- or relative -~ capabil-
ities or experience, etc.
4. Stubbornness and arrogance in
holding criteria or opinions, failing to
recognize that at times an idea avails
only to the extent that it is brought
up and discussed in an appropriate and
correct manner, at the proper time, in
the proper place, and among the proper
persons, those who are the right ones
with whom to raise and discuss it. The
arrogant "freedom" to express ideas or
opinions regardless of place, conditions
or timeliness can only lead to confusion
and anarchy, with detriment to the Party.
5. A strong dose of irresponsibil-
ity, of doing things without consulting
anybody, on my own, going only by my own
sense of justice, at times so limited,
and forgetful that what is correct today
may be incorrect tomorrow. Moreover, I
was not in a position to know the whys
and wherefores of many decisions, nor
did I have authority of any sort to set
myself up as sole judge of my actions,
as there was a Party, greater than one
individual, and a state to make decisions.
This irresponsibility led me to make er-
roneous criticism, to transgress regula-
tions and lines, to become irritated at
the logical measures of observation that
resulted from my blunders, and to act,
in a way, without consulting others --
above all, the Party. The same defect
has made me commit acts which now weigh
upon me heavily.
Mixed with all this, there must
also have been a certain sense of frus-
tration, a great deal of bitterness -as Fidel said -- and resentment, although I find it hard to accept this anomaly. To realize that I am no longer what I used to be, to feel displaced and useless "except to a few hens," to feel myself out of the mainstream of life in this country -- all these are factors that must have filled me with bitterness; they have contributed to my errors; I was irritated and went on making mistakes. Comrades: I did not feel this way when I had the opportunity, from time to time, to speak to and consult with comrades in the leadership. Solitude -- in this sense -- has isolated me and made me bitter.
It isn't that I aspire to "vindicate" myself with great things, and much less to become a member of the leadership again. It would not be honest for me to say such a stupid thing. NO. I, myself -in answer to Cesar's question -- suggested the pust in Italy, far from the national ado and the pressures of the old concept. For me ~~ and for my closest relatives -it was a source of joy to hear that I , would be sent to Turiguané to work in the agricultural and cattle-raising programs. I would have liked to participate directly in troubleshooting work in the sugar industry by working in some sugar mill, with or without the ideas I expressed when I came back from abroad. I was fully aware that a "stage" had ended and that, at my age -- at the rate everything, events and people, was developing -~ I could never "aspire" to a "return" of any sort, even one of an unusual sort. To cooperate, yes. To help out with my efforts and opinions, yes. To be put to use somewhere, as an experienced veteran, capable of being utilized in whatever task the Party decided upon, yes; to be respected and taken into consideration, yes. I have indeed wished for all this most vehementye
I want to make it clear that this self-criticism of my defects is not to be taken for breast-beating. I do this because of a spiritual need and to help explain to the Party -- and to myself -everything that so overwhelms me now. And if I have mentioned my isolation and aspirations it was not to "attenuate" my self-criticism but simply to mention facts that explain my bitterness.
I want to make something else clear: I haven't had the time to gather all my thoughts together, and I cannot be exhaustive overnight.
As is known, one's mind is not freed or flooded with ideas at once. There is a process of development, and, for me, the important thing is that I am in that process. For that very reason, my statement must surely be very limited, incomplete and even disjointed. If the leadership would permit it, perhaps I could,
in the near future, write a more compre-
hensive statement. Anyway, this statement
contains the essential things I want to
say.
Let us now look at my conduct, at
the facts themselves.
I realize that the Party leader-
ship did not put me in the hands of State
Security because of my opinions, but rath-
er because of my actions. I am convinced
of this.
And these actions -- carried out
directly by me or closely linked to me
-- were as follows:
1. The formation of a certain cur-
rent of opinions, on the basis of the
aforementioned causes, which became grad-
ually defined and finally led to a fac-
tional trend on the fringe of the Party
-- that is, factional activity. I would
dare to say that I did not seek faction-
alism, but facts are facts. The mechanics
of bitter struggle invariably lead to
factionalism. The only remedy against
this is either not to become bitterly
persistent in statements and discussions
and accept, without subterfuge, the deci-
sions of the center -- or, as the case
may be, of the majority -- or else dis-
band the faction and put an end to fac-
tional activities. The Party cannot tol-
erate any other way out.
2. Attempts and actions aimed at
acting over the Party's head, such as the
attempt to carry out activities around
the 50th anniversary of the October Rev-
olution on our own.
Nobody gave us such authority. It
was an action outside the Party, and, re-
gardless of whether or not it was carried
out, it was a disturbing action that en-
couraged indiscipline. The "initiative"
would have been shown up at once as ri-
diculous by the Party decision, around
the same time, to celebrate that anni-
versary on a large scale.
3. The continued dissemination of
ideas and positions outside the Party,
often in opposition to ideas and posi-
tions of the Party itself.
These actions tended to bring
about an atmosphere of factionalisn.
4. Reporting to foreign comrades
on ideas and positions, which included
private opinions on the national process,
inadmissible discussions on national and
international affairs, details on the
life of the nation, etc.
I wish to state that I consider
it a serious matter to have discussed a
matter concerning Cuba with a Soviet
comrade and to have gone so far --
driven by an extreme degree of overestimation and self-sufficiency -- as to admit or contemplate the thought of discussing, in the USSR, the best way for relations between the two countries to be handled.
Such actions can only be interpreted on the basis of the schema I mentioned before, complete failure to recog-~ nize that there are real national differences and, even more, an impermissible intrusion in a field where only an official voice may speak, lest friction, foreign interference, etc., be produced.
5. Tacit acceptance of the reproduction of polemical material from other parties (in contradiction to our Party).
Let me make it clear that I did not approve of the procedure, but at no time -- except perhaps on two occasions -- did I disapprove of it as I should have. The logical attitude should have been one of rejection and condemnation, without leniency of any sort.
6. Interference with functions of the leadership, trying to find out the opinions of leaders, giving consultations on reports, accepting reports I had no right to receive, giving advice on matters which did not concern me, etc:
This is the conduct -- as I see it -- for which I should be held responsible. I do not know if I have managed to express it clearly in this brief summary. I wish to make two additional remarks:
One: that during the course of the interrogation I learned several things I had never before imagined. I honestly think that, had I heard such things outside, I would have condemned them firmly.
Two: that, for me, the entire factional activity operated as a trend, or state of opinion, and those who shared my views and opinions were only a small number of persons linked to me by close friendship. In other words, to me, the faction consists of a small group, and I can do no less than share responsibility for their actions. I say this as a point of clarification, not to look for excuses for my responsibility.
Let us look at my aims, my purposes, in all this activity so justly condemned as factional.
As a matter of fact, comrades, I did not have any program or schema of preconceived objectives.
In general, I had estimated that the whole situation would lead to some sort of discussion with me. In that case, I had planned to bring up with the leadership such matters as aspects of international policy, the situation of the ¢ ideological-struggle and the Party's role, the economic plan, the problem of incentives and voluntary work, reinforcement of the sugar industry plan, the plan for grain growing, etc. I expected that the discussion announced by the Party would take place this year, to be followed up by the Congress sometime later.
In readiness for this eventuality I kept my position "alive" and made every effort to have everyone know that I "held opinions," although at times I did not express them in detail. These were the grounds for my effort to make my thinking known to others. And I felt confident that somehow I would be heard and that the strength of my arguments -- and the facts of real life, which I expected to prove me right -- would result in their being given some recognition.
I never told anyone of any other aim but "to wait for events to prove who was right." It was my habit to advise everyone to work at whatever task he had, to advance the Revolution there, for "life would tell the tale." Honestly, I had nothing else to say. Meanwhile I waited for my discussion. My plans for the future were vague.
Several times I thought of moving to the farm and going into isolation. I also thought of asking the Party to send me to some obscure post abroad. I. saw nothing else ahead.
One might then think that I expected life to prove me right in this or that viewpoint, that I expected the leadership of the Party, forced by circumstances, to have to adopt this or that change of position. Well, but in any event I never said which circumstances would change, and, moreover, if new circumstances came about, new conditions, and the Party modified its orientation or line in some way, wouldn't that be evidence of its leadership ability?
In reality, if I have spoken of the future, it has simply been a question of waiting, of seeing whether or not time told the tale, as the saying goes, and proved me right. But when all is said and done, all of this is relative. Take the example of the sugar plan about the inplementation of which I gave some ideas. The plan -- according to what I saw in 1964 -- is, in my opinion, quite good. But if we do not hit the 10-million-ton mark by 1970, if circumstances do not make it possible, it will not be a catastrophe but, at the very worst, a setback. Moreover, it appears to me that if by that time we produce not 10 but 8 million tons it will be a great success for the
Revolution. Furthermore, it will be evident that we will hit the 10-million-ton mark in very short order. For me to speak of these things is, of course, mere spec-— ulation, because I have no data, but it seems to me that a serious effort is being made to build up the sugar industry, and that eventually we will overcome all difficulties and achieve the 10-millionton goal. And that is what is important. Therefore, when I spoke of time, I referred to nothing specific but to positions in general; moreover, I have said
times that I am in agreement with the general Party line, with its strategy, with its plans, etc., and that my discrepancies have been on matters of international tactics, on matters of incentives, etc. On the other hand, I am obliged to give serious consideration today, under the stimuli of life itself, to the general overhauling of my thought; it is my duty to do so.
Furthermore, I am sure that socialism is being constructed in Cuba. I am sure that we are making progress, and I know the source of our difficulties (the blockade, inexperience, etc.). I have always said that we must support the leadership of the Party and the state, something I have said to anyone who wanted to hear me. Moreover, I am convinced to the very core that this is communism, and that the Party is the guiding force and that Fidel's leadership is indispensable and necessary for thousands of reasons about which I will not go into detail here. Fortunately, I have no doubt or hesitation about that. I am firmly convinced.
About my personal ambitions, aspirations? There were none. I have committed serious errors, but I have not been ambitious. I never was. And if I wasn't in the past, I certainly am not now. If I have ever spoken of personal "vindication" or anything similar, I referred to it solely in the noblest sense of the word, in the sense that Comrade Fidel spoke to me of this in 1962. To be vindicated, or put back on my feet, through work. In the struggle. In Turiguané, for example, where I would have felt "back on my feet." Carrying out my work there -- and I would have tried to do the best work possible -- I believe that I would have succeeded in being recognized by Fidel himself. I never thought of anything but serving the Revolution. And, of course, at my age, and with certain physical problems, I do not think I would be up to the work at Turiguano.
I have behaved badly, very badly, comrades, but I never harbored intentions that were petty or unworthy of a Communist.
Comrades, this exposition has been much too long, and so I must now conclude it.
The reason for this petition to the
leadership of the Party is, above all, to
aid in rooting out all traces of this mat-
ter, both ideologically and in practice.
The purpose of this petition is to
aid the Party to integrate or eliminate
the last scattered remnants of any type
of sectarian or dogmatic resistance. If I
could, I would tell all of them there is
only one way, that of the Party. This is
the Revolution, as it is, as it must be.
Everyone to the heart of the Revolution,
no one outside. All other ideas, no mat-
ter how correct they may seem abstractly
(and it remains to be seen if they are)
will only serve to add grist to the mill
of the enemy.
In the final analysis, I make this
petition to the Party leaders because I
am a Communist and because what is of
greatest importance, of far more impor-
tance than myself, is the Party, the Rev-
olution, communism; these must come first.
Now I wish to present my conclu-
sions.
With this statement of self-criticism
I present myself to the leadership of the
Party stating that I am aware of my mistake.
I have committed serious errors, errors
which are unpardonable in a Communist.
Such serious errors -- I am very
well aware -- call for drastic measures,
and I am going to state this to the Party,
to its leaders. I am prepared to receive
what I deserve and to respect in every way
the Party's decisions and the Party leader-
ship's judgment in order to end this irre-
sponsible turmoil of factionalism and
breach of discipline, for which, to a great
extent, I am responsible.
Here I would sign and submit this
petition.
But if the Party leaders should ask
me, "What do you think of these measures?
You with the grey hair, with your past
record, with the name you bear, what do you
think?"
In this case, and greatly concerned
over not falling into new errors of over-
estimation with only the title communist
and to show the seriousness with which I
evaluate all this, I would answer the Party
leadership as follows:
In spite of everything, prepared to
fulfill whatever orders I am given, I would
venture to ask the Party leadership for
severity, with consideration. That is, I
would request them to attenuate the logical
penalty to the maximum. The arguments for
this could only be the sure strength of the
Party and the Revolution; the great author-
ity of its leadership; the relative weak-
ness of the factional activity; the fact that other condemnable activities did not spread, thanks to the Party's vigilance; and the fact that also, according to everyone or almost everyone, we are prepared to eliminate the remnants of this focus, even in our consciences, and so help the Party to wipe out all that remains of dogmatism and sectarianism. And I am convinced that all, or almost all, of these men can be saved to do something useful for the Party and the Revolution as ordinary citizens, after the necessary measures have been taken for political rehabilitation of those in the Party and even the others.
This is, simply, what I would request for the others.
@ Anibal Escalante suggests
his own "sanction"
As far as I am concerned, no, I would not dare to ask for such kindness. Morally, I feel very responsible for all this trampling on the discipline and norms of the Party and the Revolution. I can feel it burning inside of me, like a volcano. For the first time in my life, I find myself involved in problems of a factional nature. Comrades, I myself did not realize how serious these things were; now I see them all as a whole, and it isa very painful blow to me. Moreover, they give me the feeling that I have acted in a most irresponsible manner. It is also precisely due to this blindness, this irresponsibility, that I did not, at any time, imagine that security measures would be taken against me.
Yes, and it is because of all that, because I feel indebted to the Party and I wish to pay my debt, that I do not expect to come out of this without paying as much as possible. In this connection, should the leadership of the Party say to me: "We are asking you, what is your opinion? What do you consider benign treatment for yourself?" I would answer: Assuming that you understand how I am thinking now, as well as the load weighing on my spirit, I would consider -- unless you have a better idea -- the following a benign sanction: that I be sent into seclusion, for whatever period of time the leadership may consider correct, to the El Yarey Farm (there is an isolated house to which I had expected to retire) with the express provision that no one visit me except my close relatives. There I would be obliged to work in charge of technical management of the farm and to study poultry genetics.
My wife and the rest of my family nucleus would live with me. And I wouad only beg you -- if this is possible -- to allow me to visit my old mother for two or three hours every month.
That I be entrusted with respecting the provisions of the sanction ~- in other
words, I would be in seclusion on my word
of honor to the Party.
That either once and for all or
else every year, on this date, I write out
an analysis of self-criticism on what a
Communist should not do in regard to this
factional affair and on its implication
and harmful effects, and turn it over to
the Party leadership.
The sanction would be, of course,
both severe and instructive. In addition,
the years to come must be marvelous years,
and being kept in seclusion, separated
from the mainstream --~ being, as one is,
a revolutionary, and not having any other
point of view but this, our own, that of
the Revolution and communism -- would be
really hard to bear.
For me, the sanction would be --
in certain respects -~ a benign one, for
the following reasons:
1. Because I would be able to serve
it, shall we say, in the company of and
aided by my family.
2. Because it would still permit me
to work on something useful to the state,
doing something I like and working ina
subject requiring serious study. Moreover,
even if I was not in direct contact with
the outside, I would feel more like a part
of the Revolution, of the people on the
march.
3. Because, at the same time, it
would make it possible for me not to see
anybody, at least anybody who was not a
member of my family or a worker or a
technician of the farm and the enterprise.
This is not a sudden attack of
misanthropy but simply a desire, deep
inside of me, to be alone -- I should
rather say isolated -- in order to medi-
tate, carry out self-analysis, and have
the opportunity to concentrate my thoughts
on this whole affair and other things con-
nected with the theory and practice of
our cause.
Therefore, what I would suggest as
a benign sanction -- should the leadership
of the Party authorize me to do so -~
would not be orthodox; neither can it be
conceived within orthodox canons, but I
would ask, How many things has the Revolu-
tion done -~ and very successfully, by the
way -- by not going by the books? And
wouldn't this be a good way to give a les-
son on how Communists settle these prob-
lems? And wouldn't the fact that I was my
own guardian, responsible to the Party and
the state, set a precedent for a new moral
standard, a new type of social responsibil-
ity, of the new material and moral order
we are now building? Wouldn't it be some-
thing akin to a look into the future, a
way to show what the future will be like
in these matters of infringement and indiscipline?
Comrades, I still don't know whether or not this is an absurd idea. I don't know if it may be taken for demagogy or for a desire to seem different from others. I do not know, but speak to you with absolute sincerity. This is because I recognize all my errors, I am deeply repentant for having committed them and my only desire is to settle my debt to the Party in the most exemplary and dignified way possible. I leave nothing behind me. I consider myself an honest man. I am a convinced Communist. I believe in this new concept of morals. Future experiences will demonstrate to you whether or not, in this painful hour, I have been acting honestly toward the Party, toward communism and toward the Revolution, and even toward my own children, whom I wish to help to be better.
At any rate, should you consider this part of my conclusions as another error, I beg you to excuse me. An excuse could be found in my enormous confusion and my desire -- created by my communist conviction -- to undo my errors in any possible manner.
I write this letter to you, Comrade Fidel, and to you, comrade members of the Party leadership, and -- since you are all men of action -- I ask not for pity but rather for a little understanding, if such a thing is possible. I have nothing else to say. I am at your command!
Anibal Escalante
(This letter needs no comment, ex-
cept the clarification that only a few
days afterward bal sent a letter to
the Political Bureau suggesting the way
he believed sectarianism, do tism, etc.,
could be eradicated. Therefore, if anybody
is interested, if some Secretary_of the
Party in the J
provinces wants to learn
Twise man
bal's method, we place it
at his service.
This Commission wishes only to get
on the record that it does not believe in
the sincerity of the man in custody. He
did not tell the whole truth, and many of
his affirmations are self-justifications
and falsehoods.
The total number of implicated per-
sons arrested was 43, among them four
women who were later sent home to remain
under house arrest. The same treatment
was given to three men for reasons of
health.
This is what we wanted to tell the
Central Committee, so that whatever deci-
sions considered correct may be taken.
I have finished the report submit-
ted by the Armed Forces and State Security
Commission of the Central Committee of
the Party.
[The End. ]