THE
CRISIS IN ALGERIA: ITS MEANING AND PERSPECTIVES
By Larbi Hamdane
During the night of December 14- 15, a number of tank units led by Tahar Zbiri, the chief of staff of the ANP [Armée Nationale Populaire -- the National People's Army], and several officers rolled toward Algiers. They were halted at El-Affroun after the air force stepped in. The head of the first military region, Said Abid, "committed suicide" in circumstances which were, to say the least, obscure (some claim that he was shot with the customary formalities).
So much for the most spectacular and well-known events which marked the crisis. Was this, however, a mere episode in a power struggle within the same "family" -- that is, the group which removed Ben Bella on June 19, 1965 -- or a more profound crisis. For my part, I consider that no struggle for power, even within a highly bureaucratized apparatus is outside the dynamic of the social forces, the struggle among these forces, or the relationship of forces at a specific moment.
Therefore, I will analyze the meaning of this crisis in the light of Algeria's evolution since 1962, and more specifically of the development of class relationships since the crisis in the Near East, as I described this in my previous article. [See "Algeria in the Year Five," World Outlook, January 12, p. 10.]
The Official Version
Let us first review the official interpretation. After Algeria took its well-known position on the problem in the Near East, this version holds, it became imperialism's number one target. The question then was whether imperialism would move. from without or from within the country. Of course, it chose to move from within, through the intermediary of a band of unscrupulous and dim-witted adventurers (this is said about the head of the ANP).
However, according to this version, the revolutionary veterans plus the maturity of the people foiled the plans of these adventurers. And Algeria and the Algerian state came out of the crisis with increased stature and are continuing their triumphant march toward socialism.
None of the political differences which, according to Boumedienne, developed between Zbiri and the Conseil de la Revolution [Revolutionary Council] after November 1 are revealed. Only one thing stands out from this pseudorevolutionary verbiage: the pressure of the masses is still strong enough to force the liquida-
tors of the revolution to set themselves
up as its defenders. The crucial task of
revolutionaries in the coming months is
to transform these vague aspirations of
the masses into a developed understand-
ing.
The Social Base of the Regime:
Compromise and Political Crises
For my part, I will place this new
crisis in the context of Algeria's short
history since independence and seek the
explanation therein. The fundamental char-
acteristic of the Algerian regime since
1962 is that it has not been an expression
of the dictatorship of a class or social
stratum but the result of an always very
precarious equilibrium -- of a compromise
among forces which are violently antago-
nistic, but not one of which is suffi-
ciently formed, nor possesses sufficient
homogeneity, cohesion, organization, or
self-consciousness to crush the others.
But it appeared very quickly that
this compromise was not viable, because
it was based on a special equilibrium of
forces at a specific moment; and the dy-
namic. of social forces has altered this
balance. What basically has happened is
that the bureaucracy has grown stronger
within the state apparatus and the bour-
geoisie has organized, while the masses
have been demobilized by the petty-
bourgeois apparatchiks of the party and
the unions.
In the first period, the weight of
the worker and peasant masses made itself
felt and the balance often leaned in
their favor. They paid a very high price
for this compromise, however. They were
completely disorganized. This was the
reason for their passivity at the time
of the coup d'état of June 19, 1965.
The equilibrium was broken toward
the end of 1964 by an extensive series of
strikes followed by the Second Congress
of the UGTA [Union Générale de Travail
Algérien -- Algerian General Labor Feder-
ation]. This was the cause of the coup
d'état of June 19, which was a victory
for the reactionary forces: it was the
qualitative transformation of the molecu-
lar changes which had been occurring day
by day in the state apparatus and in
class organization and consciousness.
But the result of this coup was a
new compromise, a new equilibrium of
forces. This balance would tip more and
more in favor of the right; but this did
not mean total victory for the right or
the crushing of the revolution because
the bureaucracy still lacked homogeneity;
it was still far from being cemented to the bourgeoisie and it was fearful of the reactions of the masses.
But this new compromise was to reveal itself still less viable than the first. Moreover, as I have already shown in my previous article, "Algeria in the Year Five," the crisis in the Near East played an important role in deepening the cleavage between the classes and in fostering class struggie. In fact, the first four issues (Nos. 125-128 of November and December 1967) of Révolution et Travail (Revolution and Labor -- the organ of the UGTA], which was the barometer of the activity of the Algerian workers in this period, show that they conducted their struggles against the employers, the management of the state corporations, and ' the bureaucracy with stubbornness and determination.
It was in this context that the second coup [December 10-12] occurred. At the same time, this equilibrium among more and more antagonistic forces had produced a total deadlock in the system, an inability to choose among completely dif-. ferent orientations on all of the major problems -- planning, agrarian reforn, the state corporations, and foreign policy.
This second coup saw a much clearer reactionary take-over with the elimination of the party executive secretariat and the rise of Kaid Ahmed, the exminister of finance to the top post [party secretary] in the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale -- National Liberation Front -~ the official party in the Algerian one~party system]. This development came a few days before Tahar Zbiri's revolt, which was a hopeless outburst by the victims of the December 10-12 coup d'état.
It seems then that the sharpening of the class struggle in recent months was the real and underlying cause of the upset in the balance of forces which led to the coup d'état. The UGTA communiqué of December 18 [see below] was quite symptomatic in this regard.
The Situation After the Outbreak
of the Crisis
Let us take note first of all of the total absence of a response among the masses. Once again this showed the failure of political action confined to the apparatuses and divorced from action among the masses -- despite the good intentions of a Zerdani and a few others.
The response in the UGTA has been ambiguous. The last issue of Révolution et Travail (December 18, thus more than a month ago, and it is a weekly!), published a communiqué calling for the democratiza-
tion of the state enterprises, the orga-
nization of a vanguard workers party, and
struggle against the bureaucracy and the
bourgeoisie. This issue has not been sold
on the newsstands but only in the facto-
ries by trade-union activists.
But, on the other hand, in a meet-
ing called by Kaid Ahmed, the executive
commission of the UGTA -- or at least a
part of it -- aligned itself with the gov-
ernment position and decided to call a
congress in the near future (this had al-
ready been decided once and then post-
poned), which would be under the leader-
ship of the party.
But the most significant develop-
ments immediately following the revolt
took place in the Oran region. In Oran
the party leadership quite logically
thought that it could now move against
the left. And there had been an agitated
situation in the region with numerous
strikes, extending even to civil service
functionaries -- the civic hospital work-
ers in Oran.
So, without informing the army, the
party leaders arrested the principal offi-
cials of the UL [Union Locale -~ Local
Union] in Oran as well as oppositionist
students. Various pressures were exerted
by the union, ranging from telegrams of
protest to Boumedienne to strike threats,
while attempts also were made by the party
strongmen to intimidate the recalcitrants.
Finally, after the intervention of the
army, everyone was set free.
This incident is interesting in
more than one respect. It shows, on the
one hand, the depth of the crisis, the
fact that the UGTA was at its center, and
that in the coming months the trade-union
organization will be the object of a de-
cisive struggle between the bureaucracy
and the workers. On the other hand, it
shows the nature and the profoundly re-
actionary role of the party. And the up-
shot of this affair shows the choice made
by the various forces present at the out-
come of the crisis -- to seek a new com-
promise.
But what was the reaction of the
new regime --— aside from the important
fact just stressed of the mildness of the
repression and its extremely limited char-
acter -- what steps did it take? The only
thing that stands out in Boumedienne's
speech to the party and state cadres was
his veiled attack on self-management in
agriculture. He let it be understood that
it was not to be excluded that certain
state farms would be broken up and plots
of land distributed to landless peasants.
The main concern of the leadership
team, however, has been to reassure the
masses. To this end it has taken a whole
series of steps, around which a propa-
ganda campaign has been orchestrated, which are designed to get across the idea that a wholesome wind of democratization is blowing in Algeria and that finally a "return to the source" -- the people -is on the order of the day. This is the reason for the creation and appointment of the Département* Economic and Social Assemblies -- which could have been done more than a year ago, since they are conposed of the chairmen of the Peoples Conmunity Assemblies [Assemblées Populaires Communales] of every département. This is the reason also for the announcement of a reorganization "from the bottom up" of the party and the trade-union organization.
The real goal is to organize the state on a base broader than the arny, which has completely failed: to exercise a much closer control over the masses at the neighborhood level through the FLN and at the point of production through the UGTA -- to totally integrate the party and the trade-union organization into the state.
Is this program realizable? First of all, it must be determined who the new regime represents and on whom it is based. In the person of Kaid Ahmed, it can be said that today it rather clearly represents the top functionaries of the state apparatus, the technocrats, the merchants allied to the traditional agricultural sector, and a large part of the army commanders. Fundamentally, the instruments by which power is exercised are the state apparatus, although it is very feeble, the secret police forces, certain military security bodies, and what remains of the party apparatus -- commissars, inspectors, and officials in general, who are mostly linked to the various secret police forces.
However, all these bodies are unable to execute an all-out repression be~ cause, as I have already emphasized, the dominant social strata are not sufficiently well constituted to face the consequences of this. Therefore, they are seeking a compromise, especially with the UGTA leadership. Since repression is excluded for the moment, the two principal objectives of the ruling clique for the coming year are organizing the party and gaining control of the trade-union federation.
The Party
Virtually nothing remains of the party. Immediately after the first party congress in April, 1964, directives were issued to block rank-and-file participa-
* Algeria like France is divided into départements which constitute the second level of government. -- Translator.
tion and organization. A turn was made
from organization in the factories and at
the point of production to organization
on a territorial basis in kasmas [cells]
and federations...in which the political-
ized sectors were in a distinct minority.
But even this form of organization
was to be sabotaged because neither the
kasmas nor the federations had a concrete
program of work. As an indication, I might
point out that even publication of the
Charte d'Alger (Charter of Algiers] was
held up for several months because the
political bureau felt that it was not re-
quired that the rank and file study a
document which many elements considered
too dangerous.
At the time of the June 19 coup,
ninety percent of the kasmas consisted of
leaders alone and they had almost ceased
meeting. After the coup, the situation
only continued to deteriorate until the
party was virtually liquidated. The basic
cause of this situation was the insoluble
contradiction between the interests of
the social stratum which the party leader-
ship represented and the program of the
party -- the Charte d'Alger -- whatever
its limits.
Of course, in making repeated
statements hostile to the First Congress
of the FLN and thereby to the Charte
ad'Alger, Kaid Ahmed tried to solve this
contradiction. However, it. can be pre-
dicted that as long as the class compro-
mise lasts, as long as the bureaucracy is
incapable of independent expression, any
attempt to build the party will be a
labor of Sisyphus.
The Union
A little history is necessary to
explain the UGTA's role since indepen-
dence. In January, 1963, the party secre-
tary, Khider, perceiving the danger repre-
sented by a strong workers movement, de-
cided to strike a decisive blow. He exe-
cuted a veritable "coup" in the best
fascist-gangster style to impose on the
UGTA a leadership subservient to the par-
ty clique. From that time on, the Alger-
ian workers movement has suffered repeat—
ed blows, which the reactionaries who
infiltrated the government and the party
have inflicted on the Algerian workers
and peasants "in the name of the social-
ist revolution" and in the interests of
the "nation."
In late 1964, the apparatus in-
stalled to keep a rein on the masses
proved incapable of blocking numerous
strikes in which the workers engaged.
Ben Bella, using all his authority, tried
again to take the leadership of the union
for the party. But the congress overruled
his attempt and imposed a leadership
which, while the product of a compromise,
was much less servile than the preceding one; however, it was completely incapable of implementing what nonetheless remains a fine program -- the Charte Syndicale ([Trade-Union Charter].
The coups carried out at the time of the First Congress of the UGTA, the struggle against "syndicalism" of 1963- 1964, the arrests of trade unionists during the congress of the Union Locale d'Alger-Centre [the Central Algiers Local Union] in 1966 and the numerous arrests which trade-union leaders have suffered since independence ~- make necessary a deeper analysis of the evolution that the union has followed for the past five years and of the measures necessary to avert the total nullification of the socialist objectives established by the First Party Congress, of which the Charte Syndicale was to be the guide to implementation.
The first fact which emerges is that the UGTA leaderships have accepted compromises: at the decisive moment they have either capitulated or at best retreated. The result has been a considerable decline in trade-union activity.
The second fact emerging is that while the years 1962-64 were characterized by opportunist collaboration with the state, since 1965 there has been a more or less strictly observed "refusal to col~ laborate"; this is a gain but a belated one because in 1963-64, the reactionaries used the trade unionists for their own purposes, having seduced them with slogans, while they installed a repressive apparatus and organized a party within the party.
The trade unionists stifled all their criticisms; they "toed the line" and helped to make the workers and the peasants "toe the line," leading them to believe that they were building socialism. But the trade-union leaders were perfectly aware of the blows being dealt the revolution in high places.
Why did they serve as accomplices of the enemies of the revolution? Some doubtless out of opportunism, others out of cowardice. But the majority, I would like to think, did so out of a lack of understanding, out of a lack of a correct analysis of Algerian society, of the social classes which go to make it up -and above all, of the role of unions in the development of socialist revolutions and their place independent of the state and political organizations.
Party-Trade Union Relations
Already in March, 1965, there was an attempt to make it compulsory for union leaders at all levels to be parry members. But today Kaid Ahmed, the secretary of the party, considers that not only is this an obligation but that trade unionists must submit to party discipline.
The consequences of this would be: first, that the UGTA would no longer be the organization of the workers but a mere appendage of the party apparatus from which all who did not follow the party line would be expelled; second, that the UGTA, like the party today, would lose all its authority for the masses and in very short order would be totally liquidated. If this situation develops in the wake of the Third Congress of the UGTA (which is theoretically to take place around July 1968), the workers should create a new: instrument for the day-to-day defense of their economic, cultural, and political interests.
The Second Congress of the UGTA rejected any formal requirement of party membership but gave permission for union leaders, to be active in the FLN. The fact that Kaid Ahmed poses this question again today and in such terms is proof of the party's extreme weakness, since no party member has been able to win the confidence of the masses sufficiently to be elected to a leadership position in the union.
However, the bureaucracy has not given up hope of controlling an instrument which, as the UGTA does, has the support of the masses. This is why Kaid Ahmed set up three regional preparatory commis-— sions for the Third Congress. These commis-— sions were presided over by préfects [chief administrators of the départements], army commanders, and party cadres, while unionists played subordinate roles.
What Is To Be Done?
On December 20, 1967, the UGTA leadership capitulated before this new coup. It accepted being an accomplice of a new machination against the masses. However, the experience of the last months of 1964 already showed that the Algerian workers can break out of the limits of a compromise made at the top and demand their rights. The struggle has now begun and it is yet to be decided whether the Third Congress will be a wake or the stepping-off point for a life or death struggle against reaction in all its forms.
The workers know what the reactionaries want; they also know the consequences of compromises -- June 1963, June 1965, and December 1967. They must rise up to break the alliance of the big landowners, the big merchants, the high functionaries, and the capitulationist elements of the working class; they must provide themselves with a leadership capable of putting into practice the Charte Syndicale of the Second Congress. They must struggle against all forms of compromise at all levels and above all at the level of the production point.
An uncompromising line means unremitting denunciation of the schemes of the reactionaries and the maintenance of a strong, active trade-union organization at the local, regional, and plant level. And this organization must base its activity on an effective organization of all the rank-and-file workers, hold regular meetings, and keep the ranks informed on a daily basis; it must develop a structure which can withstand police repression.
If the paper Révolution et Travail does not appear every week in every factory, this lack must be compensated for by assemblies. The workers must be kept up to date on the local and national situation -- and the same goes for the local and regional unions. The struggle will be a hard and bitter one and will require devoted militants. Anyone who loses his nerve, who does not respond to the demands of the struggle must be replaced on the spot.
Today it is said that the "war reflexes" of the trade-union movement during the national liberation struggle must be replaced by a proper attitude for the period of "building" socialism. Quite the contrary, however, these “war reflexes" must be relearned, because this is a new war, a class war, also to be won.
The party could be liquidated but the Algerian workers will not allow their trade-union organization to become an apparatus directed against their interests.