ACTIVITIES OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE GROUP
(We are publishing below the first installment of the report made by Major Raul Castro, Chairman of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and State Security Conmmission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, at a Central Committee meeting January 24.
{On the basis of this report, the Central Committee expelled José Matar from the Central Committee, expelled Ramon Calcines from the Central Committee and the Communist Party of Cuba, and remanded a number of others, including Anibal Escalante, to the Revolutionary Tribunals. The trial began January 27 and ended February 1 with verdicts of guilty against the defendants. The sentences, announced February 3, ranged from two to ten years in prison for twenty-six of the group, twelve years for eight members, and fifteen years for Anibal Escalante. Two, who belonged to the armed forces, were turned over to the military for courts-martial.
(The translation is the official one and has been taken from the February 11 issue of the English edition of Granma, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. The subheadings appear in the text provided by Granma.
{For a preliminary estimate of the meaning of the case, the reader is referred to the article by Livio Maitan on page 155 of this issue. ]
x * *
MAJOR RAUL CASTRO RUZ: Comrades of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau: We herewith present the report of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and National Security Commission on the activities of the microfaction.
@ Background
In the middle of 1966 certain information reached us concerning opinions critical of the leadership of the Revolution and specifically of Major Fidel Castro, as well as statements against the ideological line of the Party, coming from some former members of the People's Socialist Party (PSP).
Up until that time, reports had appeared spontaneously, many of them referring to statements that were made at the end of 1965 at the Dos Hermanos Farn, operated by Anibal Escalante Dellundé, where holiday dinners were given by Anibal for former PSP members, friends of his.
At those dinners political observations were made to the effect that Anibal Escalante represented the true ideological line of the working class; that his presence in Cuba alone, although he was not participating in political activities, constituted a brake on the pettybourgeois elements entrenched in the leadership of the country; that a policy exists to eliminate the old Communists; that the said policy began with the events of March 1962 (that is, the criticism of sectarianism), when the petty bourgeoisie concentrated its attacks on Anibal Escalante; and that time was proving Anibal Escalante right, and Major Fidel Castro's speech in Santa Clara on the occasion of the anniversary of the attack on Moncada Garrison was presented as proof of this.
For this group, that speech represented a rectification of the points of view for which Anibal Escalante was expelled from a position of national leadership. They based this judgment on Major Fidel Castro's affirmation that key posts should be held by revolutionaries, even if they are not technicians. According to them, what Anibal Escalante had done was to put the most revolutionary elements in key posts.
They spoke of the existence of a strong anti-Soviet current and emphasized, moreover, that the USSR should hold a position of hegemony. They considered the departure of Major Ernesto Guevara Serna from the country a healthy development for the Revolution, as they believed Major Guevara to be one of the strong opponents of Soviet policy and one of the representatives of Chinese positions, going so far as to state that Major Guevara had left because he was a Trotskyist and that he had been one of the strongest critics of Anibal Escalante.
They maintained that the pettybourgeois line was the prevailing current in the policy of the Revolution and that the petty bourgeoisie had made attempts to seize all the power in its hands. The most important example used by them was the following: upon the triumph of the Revolution, rightist elements tried to frustrate it and keep Cuba in the capitalist camp, but with the establishment of the Agrarian Reform and the passing of other revolutionary laws, imperialism cut off trade, thereby strengthening the genuinely revolutionary current within the country. Later, the petty bourgeoisie and the anti-Communist elements centered their attacks on the former PSP members and especially on Anibal Escalante, who was the one who most firmly defended the ideological positions of the working class.
The petty bourgeoisie and the rightist elements set about preparing the
conditions for the denunciation of March 26, 1962, reinforcing their position with the October Crisis. These two events, the 26th of March and the October Crisis, facilitated a reorientation of the trade policy, once again toward the capitalist countries.
The aims of the petty bourgeoisie (that_is, the revolutionary power) were not only to shift trade to the capitalist areas, but also to bring Cuba back to the system that had been abolished in January 1959.
This supposed rapprochement with the capitalist countries seriously danaged, according to them, the trade relations between our country and those of the socialist camp, which finally agreed to resume the discussions on trade agreements that had been set aside without previous notice by Cuba when Cuba turned toward capitalist markets.
This resumption of discussions was possible thanks to the Soviet Union, which underwrote all the financial operations.
Anibal Escalante did not express any opinions on the October Crisis. However, some of the group expressed their belief that, thanks to the wise policy of the USSR in withdrawing its missiles and to Nikita Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy, not only was war avoided but long-term immunity from attack by the imperialists was assured.
They maintained that the serious differences between Cuba and China fortified the positions of the proletariat -that is, that they fortified the position represented by Anibal Escalante; that the problem with China was also beneficial, because, according to them, it weakened the thesis that the only road for the peoples of Latin America is that of armed struggle.
They generally opposed armed struggle, alleging that neither the subjective nor the objective conditions for it exist.
They viewed the struggle as it was conceived in Venezuela as an adventure.
{mong the facts and antecedents we cite here the fact that during these gatherings at the Dos Hermanos Farm certain long-time leaders of the PSP were severely criticized, not for any particular political error but for the attitude they assumed in the case of Anibal Escalante, since it was postulated that they should have offered opposition to so great an injustice.
Anibal Escalante was also described as the leader of clearest political judgment within the leadership of the old PSP.
Similar reports indicated that this position existed among certain persons in the Academy of Sciences, among some former trade-union leaders and among certain groups in the newspaper GRANMA -where a group of journalists who had originally worked for the daily Hoy and the weekly Mella, headed up by Carlos Quintela Rodriguez, sustained a position of criticism of the Party's line and of sounding out the positions of their co-workers.
We also learned that certain exleaders of the Socialist Youth organization, such as César Gémez, Alfredo Pons, Thais Aguilera (Gémez' wife) and Adolfo Rivero, visited each other frequently and conversed about their disagreements with the line of the Revolution, in opposition to the stands taken by Major Fidel Castro on July 26, 1966, when he referred to aid given by the Soviet Union to the Governments of Chile and Brazil and other Latin- American oligarchies.
(I mention this business of their criticizing and of their being against this point or that in order to further clarify things. Early this morning I made
rades who were going over this material with me: let's look for a single thing that the Revolution has done that these people support. And really, comrades, we could not find a single one which had been able to gain the support of these citizens. That is, any measure taken by the Revolution, important or not, met with their systematic criticism. )
Quite apart from these reports, others had also reached the Party, through the militants, which did not refer to the same persons, but the statements coincided and indicated the existence of a profoundly sectarian position. That is, around the middle of 1966 data began to come in from various fronts, all of them reliable, which led us to suppose that a current of ideological opposition to the line of the Party existed, and that this did not come exactly from the ranks of the enemy but rather from people who were active in the very ranks of the Revolution and were motivated by supposedly revolutionary positions.
In the course of our examination of all the reports which had come in spontaneously through Party channels and State Security channels themselves, when we began to see that it was no longer a matter of simple criticism or divergences of opinion, but that the first seeds of conspiratorial activities were beginning to make their appearance, we decided to propose to the Political Bureau that systematic investigations be instituted so as to obtain full information as to the existence of this trend, its leader-
ship, connections and the group activities which we had reason to believe it was carrying out.
@ What the work of investigation approved by the Political Bureau showed
The data and evidence obtained in the course of investigation permitted us to establish the following beyond any doubt:
First -- That a homogeneous political grouping existed, centered about Anibal Escalante. If this group did not go so far as to organize itself formally because of the arrest of its leading figures (and_we believe also because of the repeated warnings issued on various occasions by the First Secretary of the Party and by myself, cautioning them, in the course of public speeches, to retire from this activity before finding themselves completely out of their depth. Some of them treated the whole thing as Seriously but responded by taking, in turn, more security measures of a conspiratorial nature in order to continue with their machinations), if it did not go so far as to organize itself formally, we repeat, because of the arrest of its leaders, it did begin to take preliminary steps in this direction and carried on factional activities alien to the Party line.
@ The aforementioned group carried out the following activities:
-- The sounding-out of opinions of long-time militants and former PSP leaders. -- Attempts to sound out several members of the Central Committee.
-- Approaches made to Soviet, German and Czechoslovakian officials and citizens, including Party members, govern~ ment representatives and journalists with access to leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the purpose of informing them of their viewpoint, contrary to the position of the Communist Party of Cuba, in order to create an opinion in the leadership of such parties in favor of their position. They even went so far as to aspire to the application of political and economic pressure by the Soviet Union to force the Revolution to draw closer to that country.
(It_is our opinion that this point should be expanded briefly.
ally, what was stated on that point by the prisoner Dr. Emilio de Quesada Ramirez in his written declaration of November 28, 1967,_in relation to the role the economy would play in a policy change by our Government. This man was one of the strongest pillars of the microfactional group headed by Anibal. Once arrested, he wrote the following of his own free will:
"The opinion was expressed that the objective factors were determinant, especially the external factors. By this we meant economic realities that tended to lead the Revolution along the road we considered the best. Bluntly speaking, we even wished for a certain degree of political pressure and that economic realities come into play that would help us in this sense. This may sound monstrous, but it is understandable from the point of view that we believed that the path of coincidences would, in the long run, save our Revolution; that a little pain was preferable to a course that would lead to serious dangers."
(When the prisoner speaks of the path of coincidences, he means that they were of the opinion that our Party should put into effect a policy coinciding with the line of the CPSU.)
(The following paragraph -- which iI now repeat -- is very important for understanding the intentions of these gentlemen: )
"Bluntly speaking, we even wished for a certain degree of political pressure and that economic realities come into play that would force us to change course." (Not only for the reason that they_give, but also for others which will appear later.
(We continue with the evidence obtained through the work of our investigators:
-- Dissemination of Anibal Escalante's ideas and orientations.
-- Reproduction and distribution of articles written by Latin-American leaders and other polemic material in open disagreement with our political line, many of which were obtained at the TASS and Novosti agencies.
-- Meetings and study sessions where the Party line and the measures taken by the Revolution were criticized and revolutionary leaders maligned.
Second -- That the arguments used by this political group to combat the political line of the Revolution consisted fundamentally of:
-- Penetration of the Central Conmittee by the petty bourgeoisie.
They declared that there was a petty-bourgeois influence in the Central
Committee which brought with it contempt for the working class and lack of recognition of the vanguard role the working class should play; that workers are used in the country's great mobilizations, as in voluntary work, and that their utmost effort was requested in production while they were excluded from leadership of the Revolution and responsibility for leading the socialist emulation was taken away from the trade unions. They argued that persons promoted to middle-level cadres were all professionals who did not proceed from the working class and were, therefore, endowed with a mentality and method of work not in accord with the proletariat.
They described the construction of socialism in our country as "theoretical."
As principal examples of the pettybourgeois influence in the Party, they pointed to Comrades Armando Hart Davalos, José Llanusa, Faure Chomén Mediavilla, Haydée Santamaria Cuadrado, Marcelo Fernandez Font, Ratiil Roa Garcia and Celia Sanchez Manduley.
-- The existence of an anti-Soviet current in the Party leadership.
The existence of an anti-Soviet current in the Party leadership was affirmed, based on the argument that we were drawing closer economically to France as a result of an alleged loan made by that country to ours, qualifying as loans trade operations identical to those carried on by all socialist countries with Europe. According to them, it was also the purpose of Comrades Jose Llanusa, Marcelo Fernandez, Alfredo Guevara and Carlos Franqui to bring us closer to that country politically, thus drawing us away from the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.
In the international field, this group claimed for itself the role of defenders of the policy of the USSR, describing its economic policy as correct and arguing that it allowed it to blackmail imperialism in Latin-American coun-tries on the grounds of economic penetration.
-- The ignoring of long-time militants of the PSP.
They refer to the ignoring of former militants and members of the PSP by stating that a policy exists to liguidate and disregard the old militants, since, while many of the PSP members were denied the right to become members of the Party because of some weakness, others who had done nothing against the tyranny were promoted. It was also stated that the appointment to the Central Committee of some leaders of the old Party was merely a formality, since their opinions are not taken into account when it comes to making decisions. They made use of the dismissal of José Matar as head of the CDRs, of Felipe Torres and Armando Acosta, and the changes within the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions to create propaganda and intrigue around the alleged relegation of old militants by the Revolution. Nevertheless, at the same time they bitterly criticize leaders and militants from the PSP, their main targets being Comrades Blas Roca, Lazaro Pefia, Isidoro Malmierca, Joel Domenech, Severo Aguirre, Jorge Risquet, Manuel Luzardo, Lionel Soto and others to whom they apply such epithets as opportunists, sellouts and traitors, criticizing their activity in the work to which the Revolution has assigned them.
-- Intervention of the Revolution in the internal affairs of Latin-American Communist Parties. They affirm that each Party must lead its own revolution, and accuse us of following a Trotskyist line of exporting the Revolution. They argue that an effort is made to impose the Cuban line on the other Communist Parties, and criticize the fact that public statements were made concerning the rightist leadership of the Communist Party of Venezuela, whose position they justify and defend.
@ Investigative work proved that
Anibal Escalante was top man
in the group
When Anibal Escalante returned to Cuba in 1964 a number of luncheons were organized by various friends of his. These luncheons were attended by old PSP members who were in sympathy with Anibal Escalante, most of whom were not in agreement with the treatment he had been given in March 1962, when he was separated from the Secretariat of Organization of the ORI (Integrated Revolutionary Organizations). Some of these luncheons were held on the Dos Hermanos Farm, of which Anibal Escalante had been put in charge; other luncheons or dinners were held on the farm of the father of Giraldo Victoria (in custody), which is located in Arroyo Arenas; in the home of the mother of Ramiro Puertas (in custody); and in the home of Dr. Emilio de Quesada (in custody)
The topics dealt with at that stage were, fundamentally, the Sino-Soviet question, the worker-farmer alliance, friendship between Cuba and the USSR, and the return of Anibal Escalante, and toasts to revolutionary unity were made. At these gatherings Anibal Escalante explained his point of view and made statements to the effect that in the years 1956, 1957 and 1958 he had been in favor of armed struggle, unlike other leaders of that Party. He stated this on various occasions so as to make himself a figure of prestige and cast aspersions, with his intrigues,
on other PSP leaders who are at present members of the Central Committee. Criticism was made of any revolutionary measure, regardless of the matter involved. For example, at the luncheon given at the home of Ramiro Puertas' mother there was conversation about the measure the Revolutionary Government had adopted concerning the departure of gusanos via Camarioca; the group expressed the opinion that this provided the imperialists with material for argument.
In general, the tone of those dinners was one of adulation and flattery of Anibal Escalante. Many of the things he had to say about the period of struggle against the tyranny and the internal discussions of the PSP were unknown to those attending; therefore, he attained great standing in their eyes and his role in the development of the Revolution was overestimated.
The opinions that Anibal Escalante spouted during those luncheons, as well as those he expressed to his visitors on later visits to his house or farm, were accepted by them as truths, which they sallied forth to spread and defend outside, using them as arguments in their contacts with other long-time militants.
Among those who attended those dinners were: Octavio Fernandez, Raal Fajardo Escalona, Reinaldo Puig, Mario Aja, Alberto Merino, Pedro Margolles, Manuel Bravo Chatman, Inaudi Kindelan, Genaro Cajiao, Edenio Herrera, Israel Castroman, José Solis, Jacinto del Peso, Francisco Brito, Jorge Suarez, Francisco Diez, Evelio Tieles, Manuel de Jesis Zamora, Emilio de Quesada, Manuel Cruz and his two sons, Carlos Quintela, Luciano Arguelles, Giraldo Victoria, Félix Fleitas, Francisco Pérez de Armas, Lazaro Suarez, Angel Gutiérrez, Victor Trejo, Oscar Gémez, Inocente Martinez, Edith Escalante, Roberto Arguelles, Francisco Demetrio, Yolanda Pulido and Alfredo Rancafio.
After the death of Comrade César Escalante, visits by these elements to Anibal Escalante' s farm and home became more frequent and criticism of the revolutionary leadership became sharper, the revolutionary leadership being termed petty bourgeois and anti-Soviet; such statements went hand in hand with systenatic criticism of each and every measure taken by the Revolution. (It_is clearly_seen here that after César's death there was a ch e_ in the action of the group headed by Anibal. Anibal. )
@ Some of the criticisms and comments made by elements of the microfactional group
On combat preparation: They criticized it severely, finding all kinds of
flaws and defects; this, at bottom, re-
vealed an attitude of opposition to mili-
tary preparation of the people.
On the elimination of the job of
bus conductor: Arguelles states that they
expressed the opinion that the elimina-
tion of the job of bus conductor would
increase the number of surplus personnel
and that there would be more conflicts on
the buses.
Arguelles on the mobilizations: He
said that the constant mobilizations or
changes of cadres from one activity to
another, from one post to another, would
not permit specialization and the gaining
of experience.
Arguelles on agriculture: He stated
that the two years in agriculture were
not going to solve any problem, that it
was necessary to have the workers who had
left the farms return, and that this could
be achieved through the use of material
incentives -- that was Lazaro Suarez.
Arguelles said that it was incorrect to
send militants to the countryside, that
they could not make up for the practical
age-old experience of the peasant. (This
was the Arguelles who headed the micro-
factional group_in the Ministry _of In-
dustry.
Arguelles on planning: He said that
the existing planning was bad, that it was
not being used as the major instrument in
the harmonious development of our econony,
that plans are drawn up, then re-drawn
up, that everyone takes part in drawing
them up, at all levels, that it results
in working three or four times as much as
necessary.
Octavio, on the departure via Cama-
rioca: He stated that the Camarioca busi-
ness had had to be suspended because the
number of people who were leaving was
greater than expected, that a negative
impression was being given.
Arguelles on free admission to
sports events: He said that this measure
was demagogic, since it increased the
amount of money in circulation and pro-
moted inflation.
Caballero commented, on publica-
tions in the press, that material with
Marxist content was not published.
Arguelles: He severely criticized
and made fun of work rationalization,
especially as carried out by the Ministry
of Industry.
Lazaro Suarez: The leaders of the
old Party, the PSP, had less and less
participation in the leadership of the
Revolution; Luzardo had maintained an
opportunistic position concerning sec-
tarianism, and, as of 1962, had begun to persecute the Communists; Felipe Torres had been replaced because he would not permit the old Communists to be persecuted in his province.
Some criticisms made by Anibal Escalante to various microfactional elements, with slanderous comments: Anibal said that the influence of the petty bourgeoisie was quite strong in our Revolution, that this was bad for Cuba and the Party, and that the ideological strain which now prevailed was that of the petty bourgeoisie.
Arguelles: Our Party was weak ideologically, and we would find it hard to pay our commitments, in accordance with the availability of sugar at the moment -- 1966-67. We would not have enough, and this would mean that the USSR would have to continue furnishing aid.
On volunteer work in the countryside on Sundays, he commented that this did not yield any benefit, because it cost more to transport the people than was gained, that socialist emulation should be under the responsibility of the labor movement, with the application of moral and material incentives, each playing its part.
Arguelles, on the handicrafts workshops, stated that there would be a limit to articles for export, for even if a country such as France bought a thousand or ten thousand hats or handbags, the time would come when it would not buy any more, and there were other countries that could compete with us under better conditions, as they had greater experience and excellent credit.
Referring to the Salon de Mai, Anibal Escalante commented that this group was directed by Llanusa; that the tendency of this group was to move us away from the USSR and the socialist camp; that Llanusa had extraordinary power and influence, since, besides being Minister of Education, he participated in the activities of INDER (the National Institute of Sports, Recreation and Physical Education) and INIT (the National Institute of the Tourist Industry); and that Betancourt, Party Secretary in Havana Province, was a man trained by hin.
(All this, as you see, is selected at_random, because they systematically opposed everything, and, in turn, looked for solutions to everything with the facility common to classic highball and coffeecup strategists -- for many of the comments, and you will see the proofs later, were made with an elbow on the bar, highball in hand.
When Anibal was put in charge of the small El Yarey State Farm -- where he was working last -- early in 1966, specializing in poultry genetics, Octavio Fernandez organized some volunteer work sessions with the ar ent that it was necessary to give Anibal Escalante a hand so that he would make a success of the work the Revolution had entrusted to him. Many of those who attended the dinners, and some employees of the La Corona Factory, brought by Inaudi Kindeld4n and Renay Hern4éndez, went to those volunteer work sessions -- on the one hand, they criticized volunteer work, and, on the other hand, they went there so that Anibal would triumph. By this time, some additional elements clustered around Anibal Escalante: some of them had been intermediate-level leaders in the underground struggle. Such were Octavio Fernandez and Inaudi Kindelan, who served as vehicles for transmitting his ideas, being identified with his position.
They came to Anibal Escalante to consult him about work and personal problems, to talk with him about their worries and lack of understanding of certain problems, to know his position on each measure taken by the Revolution or each national or international problem that came up.
Anibal Escalante gave orientation, advice, directly or indirectly through those close to him, to many long-time militants; he was sent documents that, due to their state and political character, he should not have seen. We could mention, for instance, several brochures on exports and imports that were sent to him by Ramén Mirabal Carrién, at that time the Subadministrator of the MINCEX (Ministry of Foreign Trade) School of Cadres and at present working in that ministry's Department of IBM Machines. These were handed over to Anibal by Inaudi Kindelan or by Mirabal Carrién himself.
From Luciano Arguelles Botella (in custody), he received a document on the arguments and Resolutions of the Communist Party of Uruguay, which had been brought from that country by a member of that Party, Mario Troccili, a functionary of the Ministry of Industry.
In investigations we made later, it was determined that this comrade from Uruguay had turned in the document as a matter of his Party, not as anything clandestine nor for the use that was to be made of it.
Similarly, Anibal received from Higinio Casuso (in custody) various special documents put out by the COR (Commission for Revolutionary Orientation), which were provided by Orestes Valdés. Among these we could mention a
list of union leaders approved as Party members, a document on Party statutes, and, moreover, a document that was put out only for members of the Political Bureau and was, therefore, secret in character.
When a report on bureaucracy was going to be discussed in the Party nucleus of the Ministry of Industry, Oscar Gémez was appointed to draw it up. When the paper was finished, Luciano Arguelles took it to Anibal Escalante , who reviewed it and made his observations, which were taken as orientations of his and, according to the confession of Luciano Arguelles, had to do with the actions of members of the group who were in the Party nucleus at the Ministry of Industry.
On another occasion, the Ministry of Industry ordered a study made on the reorganization of the Ministry. For this purpose, a document was drawn up by Angel Gutiérrez (in custody), who was acting Vice-Minister at the time. This document, too, was taken to Anibal Escalante, who made some corrections on it.
When José Matar was national leader of the CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), the Party sent him orientation that the CDRs should adopt a structure similar to that of the Party, and, in addition, raised some questions such as the elimination of the CDRs in work centers, the elimination of dues, and several other points. Matar drew up a document opposing these orientations, which he took to Anibal Escalante, who checked it before it was sent to Comrade Armando Hart.
According to the confession of Dr. Emilio de Quesada, José Matar also asked Ramiro Puertas for his opinion in drawing up the document.
Shortly after Ramén Calcines Gordillo was replaced in FRUTICUBA, he was to draw up a document addressed to the Prime Minister in which he was to describe the work done.on the fruit farms. He sent this to Anibal Escalante through Rail Fajardo Escalona (in custody). Anibal Escalante reviewed the document and sent it back to Ramén Calcines through Fajardo Escalona, sending him his opinion on some of the points raised and on what should be added to or omitted from the document.
@ Established activity of the group
Anibal Escalante expressed the opinion that during 1967 the orientation of the Revolution would become clearer as to whether it would draw closer to the USSR and the socialist camp or, on the contrary, there would be closer relations with France, in keeping with the criteria of the "petty bourgeois" or the Central Committee.
Anibal went on to say that, in view of this and inasmuch as there were many long-time militants of the PSP left up in the air and without proper orienta~ tion, it was necessary to see them in order to discuss things with them, clear up their questions and win them over to the opinions held by the group.
This orientation was given by Anibal to the prisoners Octavio Fernandez , Inaudi Kindelan, Quesada and others, who were charged with passing it on to other members of the group.
The reconnoitering of the position of long-time militants of the PSP was done in a subtle way. For example, they would ask them what they thought of such and such a speech by the Prime Minister, ask them what they thought of the USSR and comment to them on the replacement at the time of a long-term PSP member in his administrative or political post. In those cases in which they held the same opinions on various aspects, contact was maintained in order to win them over conpletely to the opinions of the group.
Sometimes -- in the second phase of this probing about -- to determine whether or not an ex-militant was "clear," he was invited to visit Anibal Escalante; if he steered away from the meeting he was considered "unclear," and the comrade was termed a "turncoat," a "sellout," or a “weakling."
As for the prisoner Emilio de Quesada, a member of the Party nucleus at Calixto Garcia Hospital, he received orientation from Anibal Escalante on the way to express his opinions on various topics that were discussed in study circles held by that Party nucleus, something that had to be done subtly and without directly contradicting the viewpoints of the other comrades, but always arguing in defense of the USSR when topics such as the Middle East Crisis, relations with Latin-American countries, or aid to Vietnam were discussed.
This method was used in discussion of the book Revolution in the Revolution? to express his opinions in relation to the role of the Party, the working class, etc. It made it possible for Emilio de Quesada to work to feel out and win over persons within the nucleus to which he belonged, aS well as professionals with whom he had contact.
It was through Quesada that Anibal Escalante found out that Dr. Lépez Sanchez, Assistant Director of the Academy of Sciences, agreed with his opinions but did not state them in public. Escalante then instructed Emilio Quesada to discuss
the matter with Lépez Sanchez so that the latter would change his attitude and begin to speak out actively in favor of the group's opinions.
To give weight to the opinions held by the group, and in opposition to the line of the Party, Anibal Escalante would base himself on various excerpts from Lenin's writings -- chosen with ill intentions -- on peaceful coexistence and the role of the working class and the unions which he read to those who visited him or advised them to read. Anibal Escalante discussed these theoretical formulations fundamentally with Dr. Emilio de Quesada.
They not only probed about for the opinions of long-time militants of the PSP but also tried to find out the opinions of leaders who are at present on the Central Committee.
When Octavio Fernandez (in custody) happened to meet Justina Alvarez, the secretary of Comrade Blas Roca, at the Central Committee of the Party and started up a conversation with her about a trip which this prisoner -- Octavio Fernandez -- was trying to make to Germany, she casually asked him if he had seen Comrade Blas. Octavio Fernandez (in custody ) went to Anibal Escalante to raise the advisability of talking with Comrade Blas. Anibal thought it would be well to make inquiries first of someone who was close to them as to what opinions Comrades Blas Roca and Lazaro Pefla had on various questions.
However, Octavio Fernandez took advantage of the funeral of Blas Roca's daughter-in-law to approach him at the cemetery and make an appointment to see him later. He did see him at his home, but when he stated some of his opinions Comrade Blas Roca tore them apart, and. he realized that the results were negative and immediately informed Anibal Escalante of this.
Prior to this meeting of the Central Committee, Comrade Blas Roca had reported that he had been visited by several persons who voiced certain opinions and that he had always refuted them -this can be seen in the declarations made by the prisoners -- and criticized those who kept visiting Anibal and hanging around in groups here and there, advising them to stop doing foolish things and devote their time to work.
Octavio Fernandez did not agree with the idea that he should feel out Lazaro Pefia's position. He explained to Anibal that he did not consider it best, because once when he had come across Lazaro at the Hotel Capri and told him
~165-
that he could not make a trip to the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Lazaro had paid
no attention to him and continued on his
way. Therefore, Octavio Fernandez sug-
gested that it would be better to have
Inaudi Kindelan visit Lazaro Pefia, but
the meeting never took place.
e Circulation of documents
contrary to the Party line,
meetings and study sessions
The group reprinted, put into cir-
culation and exchanged various documents
contrary to the Party line, with the
knowledge and participation of Anibal
Escalante. Escalante received from Félix
Fleitas Posada (in custody) a pamphlet
by Daniel Chirino, a leader of the Com-
munist Party of Venezuela. After he read
the document, Anibal Escalante gave it
to Octavio Fernandez and asked him to
read it and then return it to him. Octa-
vio Fernandez read the document and gave
it to Anibal's daughter, Niurka Escalante.
The document was later picked up at Ani-
bal's house by Félix Fleitas Posada.
Anibal Escalante also gave his
former secretary, Yolanda Pulido Averoff
(who, in practice, was still acting as
his secretary), a reproduction of the
Venezuelan Party's answer to our Prime
Minister, for her to read. This reproduc-
tion was delivered to Yolanda Pulido at
her home.
The group also made reproductions
of Teodoro Petkoff's letter to Mexican
journalist Mario Menéndez, of an article
by Luis Corvalan, and of the article
entitled "To Create One, Two, Three, Many
Vietnams ," which appeared in the Czecho-
slovakian magazine Reporter, in which the
terms "romantic," "adventurer" and "an-
archist" were employed to describe Comrade
Ernesto Che Guevara.
Anibal Escalante gave Emilio de
Quesada (in custody) the reproduction of
the pamphlet by Venezuelan leader Daniel
Chirinos. Reading was also recommended of
the article entitled “Batallones de Hierro
del Proletariado" (The Proletariat's Iron
Battalions), which appeared in the maga-
zine URSS, published in Cuba, and material
from Novosti was obtained dealing with
material incentives and the October Revo-
lution. These materials, together with the
editorials appearing in URSS, were read to
the workers of the H. Upmann and La Corona
cigar factories because the group believed
that such material postulated theses op-
posed to our Party's line.
These documents were reproduced in
various places such as the office of
Félix Fleitas Posada (in custody) in the
Fishing Port; the Fiancée Jewelry Shop,
managed by José A. Caballero (in custody);
the home of Edmidio Lépez Castillo, at
964 Oquendo Street; the home of Nereida
Valdés Oliva, at 118 Kholy Street, Nuevo Vedado; and the home of Ramén Chavez Cornaris (in custody), at 117 Industria Street.
Simultaneous with the reproduction of documents, meetings and study sessions for exchanging opinions were held at Fleitas Posada's home, at 168 16th Street, Vedado; Giraldo Victoria's home, at 221 San Mariano Street, Santos Suarez; Edmidio, Lépez Castillo's home; and Luciano Arguelles' home, at 59 Arzobispo Street, Cerro.
While all this went on, several deaths occurred among the old Party militants and commemoration ceremonies were held in honor of Miguel Fernandez Roig, Octavio Fernandez' father, and Comrade César Escalante.
These acts of mourning were unscrupulously used by this group as an excuse to meet, exchange opinions, criticize the Revolution, and find out where some long-time PSP members worked and whether or not they were having trouble of any sort where they worked.
Anibal Escalante's presence at all these activities was always noteworthy. He attended every funeral and even delivered the funeral oration at Dr. Sergio Arce's funeral. He would speak with several former militants, voice his criticism and give opinions on questions put to hin.
These "appearances" brought Anibal Escalante back into the public eye, as he went probing about to see what support he could get from some former militants. (I'm going to tell you_an anecdote: this incident occurred on April 4, during Anibal's visit to a wake he had decided
activity. A number of army mer were pres-— ent at _the wake, and the comrades there were surprised when the army men rose to their feet when Anibal walked into the room. When we investigated we found that these were well-prepared "shows": a small claque would hang around the elevator waiting for Anibal to appear. As soon as
feet, and, in turn, the army men would rise to their feet, too, thinking that a leader or a high-ranking official had just come in.) —
On April 4 Sixto Quintela died.: He was a newsSpaperman who had had problems at GRANMA owing to his anti-Party position. The eulogy was given by José Solis, separated from GRANMA (he came from the ranks of the 26th of July Movement), who took advantage of the opportunity to voice his resentment and support anti- Party activities.
It is unfortunate that the deceased, Sixto Quintela, was part of this group.
Attending his wake, among others,
were the journalists who had been dis-
missed from GRANMA along with Sixto and
with various ex-members of the Socialist
Youth, who made comments such as the fol-
lowing: "And what do the people of the
ORI say?" “The ORI is the greatest."
These remarks were made by Rubén Placeres,
a journalist from Juventud Rebelde, and
Thais Aguilera, the wife of César Gémez.
Responding to somebody present who said
that that period was dead and gone, Thais
Aguilera alleged that that was a great
period, to which history would give prop-
er perspective and would say that it was
better than this phase, that of the op-
portunists.
Of course, Anibal Escalante at-
tended that wake and spoke with several
ex-nilitants. There were some expressions
of elation at Anibal Escalante's presence
-- for example, on the part of Lt. César
Gémez (not to be confused with Lt. César
Gémez who works in the COR of the Provin-
cial Party Committee), who gaily con-
mented that the old man was already con-
ducting affairs i- the halls.
At the funeral of Comrade Luis
Fajardo Escalona -- chief of diplomatic
couriers -- as well as at the rec2ption
ot the body at the airport (he had died
in the Soviet Union) one could detect
interest in mobilizing a good number of
long-time members of the PSP. Félix
Fleitas (in custody), speaking with a
group of those now under indictment,
said: "We must prepare a demonstration.
I've called several people who won't
fail to go, and above all we must look
for a way to get people such as Pepe
Solis from 'the 26th' to go, so that
these people will realize that it isn't
just us, but their own people are there,
too. We have to prepare a good demonstra-
tion." He added: "And Anibal Escalante
must give the eulogy. I know that Ratvl
Escalona (referring to the brother of
the deceased) won't let somebody out-
side our group give the eulogy."
They tried to use the reception
(at the airport) and give it a political
tone, to use the wake as a center of
agitation against the Revolution.
The leadership of the Party, aware
of all this, selected Severo Aguirre, a
comrade of impeccable behavior known by
all, who had been a leader of the PSP
Youth Movement and who had even been the
superior of the deceased in that organiza-
tion, to prevent this maneuver of having
Anibal speak (Anibal was quite ready and
willing to deliver the eulogy).
Some commentaries made: At the
funeral parlor, Félix Fleitas told sever-
al of his comrades, "The PSP neither sub-
mits nor sells out," and showed his dis-
pleasure at the choice of Comrade Severo
Aguirre to deliver the eulogy, stating
that it was an insult to them that that piece of s--~ had given the eulogy. Another arrived and said: "Look what kind of S.0O.B. they have sent to speak at the
funeral services." (And none of this was
gaid delicately. )
(To be continued. J