REPORT BY MAJOR RAUL CASTRO ON ACTIVITIES OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE GROUP
(Continued from last week. ]
@ The exemplary conduct of the
vast majority of Soviet tech-
nicians and those from other
socialist countries
(I_would like, however, to clarify,
small number of advisers, journalists and functionaries of foreign embassies who participated in the activities of members of the microfaction, numerous technicians from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have worked in our country, demonstrating exemplary conduct and absolute respect for our Revolution. I personally can state that in these years thousands of Soviet officers, including advisers, specialists and technicians of all kinds, have worked with us in the Armed Forces; and there is, really, not a single com- Plaint that can be made about them; quite the contrary, we hold pleasant memories of them and are deeply grateful to them. )
@ They fear the State Security
Organization and the Commit-
tees for the Defense of the
Revolution
In the middle of last year Anibal Escalante told Octavio Fern4ndez Bonis that he knew the Department of State Security was going to move against the longtime Party militants and that, in line with this, the government would surely make one person in each CDR responsible for watching the long-time PSP militants. He said that it was necessary to watch out for the CDRs.
Following the closing address at the OLAS Conference, in which the Prime Minister spoke about the microfaction (this was the last of several warnings), a meeting was held in the house of Octavio Fernandez (in custody), attended by Anibal Escalante, Inaudi Kindel&an and another person who has not been identified. At that meeting they discussed questions brought up by Major Fidel Castro in his address and, in their analysis, arrived at the conclusion that the Revolution could not take any measures against them, as their group was not formally organized.
There were some, more impatient than the others, who wanted to set up a clandestine organization, but Anibal, as always a bit more astute than the rest of the group, opposed the formal creation of an organization, although the work was, in fact, perfectly organized. And all the measures they took were of such a nature that, if any difficulty arose, a cover-up could be found.
That is, in their analysis at
that meeting following Fidel's last warn-
ing, they reached the conclusion that
the Revolution could not take any steps
against them because theirs was not a
formal organization.
In that meeting they agreed to
protect Anibal Escalante by keeping him
out of the foreground and to keep him
informed, and agreed that he should
orient them through a very small number
of persons in order to make it appear
that he was not connected with this
whole situation.
Fidel not only gave out several
public warnings but also, when he was
with small groups of people, taking ad-
vantage of the presence of this or that
person whom he kmew to be in contact
with Anibal's group, he spoke of activ-
ities against the Party and against the
Revolution being carried on by members
of the microfaction so that they would
realize we were not unaware of their
activities.
As a result, on July 18, 1967,
Anibal Escalante sent Fidel a letter
which is a model of hypocrisy and cun-
ning.
@ Hypocritical letter
of Anibal Escalante
Excerpts from the letter sent to
Bidel by Anibal Escalante on July 18,
1967:
"For that reason and because I
believe (he refers to rumors heard at
the University_about his activities)
that the passive acceptance of rumors
started by enemies from any quarter --
be they simple intrigues of the numerous
anti-Communist sectarians and opportun-
ists, playing the tune they deem to be
the tune of the day, or ‘active measures'
by the CIA or other imperialist intelli-
gence services which also attempt to
stick their fingers into the Cuban pie
-- does not lead to any good, nor does
it benefit the Party or the Revolution,
I feel obliged, Comrade Fidel, to bother
you once again, because to protest
against such slander is not only to de-
fend my revolutionary honor but, at the
same time, to defend the necessary na-
tional solidarity and revolutionary
unity, more necessary today than ever
before, if that is possible. I have no
proof of what I am fighting against, but,
when a river roars, it may not only be a
sign of an impending flood -- as you
said in 1962 -- but also a sign that it
carries with it a great deal of muck and
trash.
"I am sure, almost instinctively, that a nauseating provocation against me is at large, using me as the instrument against the incorrectly-called old Communists, to which confused people of good faith may unwittingly contribute.
"Where does the provocation stem from? I do not know for certain, but by the smell -- by the stench, I should say -- it can only have sprung from within the dirty recesses of the CIA or its associates."
(Anibal goes on:) "What's up now? Now it's a case of Anibal forming groups! That's the rumor, isn't it? -- no more, no less; the enemy, of course, is shrewd. To form groups is to divide the Party, it is factionalism, it is contrary to revolutionary unity, it is anti-Party intrigue. And divisionist agitation, the spurring of frictions and the fomenting of rancor encourage the split or, at least, add fuel to the confusions that damage the Revolution. And there may even be some who, believing the slander, will contribute to increase the confusion by adopting intolerant attitudes or taking arbitrary measures in an environment in which intolerance and arbitrariness may seem the easy way to convince others.
"Of course, it is needless for me to say that, on principle, and as a Party militant, I am not forming any sort of a group. Being a genuine Communist, I favor democratic centralism and, in general, the Leninist theory and practice on Party organization. Furthermore, I have known for a long time what my duty is. And, parodying Bebel, I could say: 'If Washington wants disunity, I want unity; and if Washington attacks Fidel, I support Fidel.' You can be sure that I make no mistakes in that sense, ever.
"In a word, by writing this letter I do not attempt to 'clarify' actions or conduct of any sort on my part; I only wish to set the record straight on a phenomenon I see, and, in addition, to repudiate all those who seek falsely to use my name, the CIA agents, the provocateurs of every type and the anti-Communists in general. I defend revolutionary unity, I support the Party and obey its leadership and I need no justification. That is my line of conduct."
I am not going to read more. I thought of making a comparison, showing the contradictions between these paragraphs addressed to Fidel and the "selfcriticism" that he wrote four months later, once under arrest, to be sent to the leadership of the Party. I leave it to you to make this comparison when you read Anibal's last letter.
Thus, in response to the warnings, rather than halting their infamous activ- ~203-
ities, they took measures to protect Anibal and pretend that he was removed from all political questions.
At that time, Anibal Escalante gave instructions to use the telephone as little as possible and to halt group meetings, limiting meetings to no more than three comrades, always in different places. He called a halt to the reproduction of material, the content of such material to be transmitted verbally. He warned against going to one another's places of work, so as to avoid establishing a direct relationship, leaving the care of those places to comrades in those sectors and fundamentally to those who worked directly in them. Finally, he advised them not to visit the homes of the members of the group, and especially not by car.
In order to call this meeting, Kindelan called Anibal, referring to the latter by the name of "Roberto. "A few days later Anibal Escalante left a message at Octavio Fernandez' house for him to visit him at his home at 7:00 p-n. When Octavio arrived, Anibal told him he wanted to talk to him on the front porch and, in the course of the conversation, gave him to understand that the conversation might be taped. For that reason he made favorable comments on the Prime Minister's speech at OLAS, although he stated that he did not agree with some points. Octavio Fernandez refuted the points, since he did not understand the defense that Anibal was making of the speech.
(They were talking on the porch of the house, Anibal defending Fidel's speech and Octavio not knowing what to do.
At the end of the conversation, Anibal Escalante took Octavio to his room and told him that a microphone might even have been put in the electric wires that ran past the house.
He added that the speech of the Prime Minister was not what Fidel had hoped for as the conclusion of the Congress, since the delegations of the Latin- American Communist Parties had not agreed to a condemnation of any Communist Party in Latin America. He also added that he considered that Fidel had made a mistake in bringing up the matter of the microfaction, because that revealed abroad that an ideological struggle existed in Cuba and that discrepancies existed, even in the line set down by the Party
@ The group continues
aking precautions
After the group began taking precautions Anibal Escalante told Octavio Fernandez that, as it was nearing the
5Oth anniversary of the triumph of the Russian Revolution, it would be a good idea to send the Soviet Embassy in Cuba telegrams of congratulations on the anniversary and, furthermore, to send workers' commissions to the Embassy so that the Soviets would see that, despite existing differences, the Soviet Union was beloved, respected and admired by the masses. And they emphasized: "They should see our hand in all this." The members of the group were not to participate directly in this activity but to promote it through third persons and by taking advantage of meetings or assemblies in work centers; it was said that this did not go against the Party, because a commission had even been created for the celebrations and therefore there would be no risks involved.
Anibal Escalante also gave that orientation, in a similar form, to Ramiro Puertas. Immediately, Octavio Fernandez assumed the responsibility of talking with various members of the group, giving them this orientation and informing them that it came from Anibal Escalante.
Among others, it is known that Octavio Fernandez discussed this mission with Inaudi, Kindelan, Félix Fleitas, Luciano Arguelles, Renay Hern4ndez, Orlando Olivera, Edmigio Lépez, Alberto Maceira, José A. Caballero, Rafael Gonzdlez Berano and Lazaro Salgueiro.
Meanwhile, Kindelan passed this orientation on to Manuel Lorenzo Torres, a functionary of the Villamil tobacco factory in Pinar del Rio, and to Renay Hernandez and Euripedes Nifiez.
Ramiro Puertas (in custody) passed this orientation on to Radamés Mancebo and Arturo Garcia (also in custody). He conversed with the latter, who worked in the ICR (Radio Broadcasting Institute) department of documentaries, on the possibility of presenting some documentaries or programs about that anniversary on radio and television. He also told Félix Fleitas that, taking advantage of the fact that many Soviets worked at the Fishing Port, a party could be given there. (Fleitas always was one for drinks, parties, goat and pig feasts.
@ Places where groups and persons who hold a microfactional position were discovered
Small groups of microfactional elements were known to exist in the Ministry of Industry, where they were headed by Luciano Arguelles (in custody); in the newspaper GRANMA; in the Fishing Port; in La Corona cigar factory; in H. Upmann and Gener plants; in FRUTICUBA; in the Worker- Farmer Faculty of the University; among the long-time PSP members in the Marte and Arsenal neighborhood; in the Ministry of the Interior; in the Academy of Sciences; in the ICR; among some former trade—union leaders; in some offices of the Central Committee; and in MINFAR (where there was
members of the Communist Youth or the PSP, each one with very special characteristics,
a _ prosecutor in the Legal Section of General Staff Headquarters and who took part in the underground movement against the Batista tyranny in the organization of i-don't-know-which strike. When Ventura found out about it, this man became frightened and, through the President of the Journalists' Association of Havana Province, requested an interview with Ventura, which was granted. Ventura rebuked him and gave him a cigar; he smoked it there and left; he didn't conspire again. Naturally, when he was discussed for admittance to the Party organization in the Armed Forces, he was not accepted; from then on, he has been "disgruntled." )
We also have information about persons who, though there is no evidence of their having participated in a definite group, hold a microfactional position. Similarly, we have information about some persons who maintained relations with microfactional elements without combating their positions.
In the enterprise FRUTICUBA, the microfactional elements were concentrated in positions of leadership. When that enterprise was created, several exmembers of the PSP, who were alike in many ways, began to work there. All of them had failed in the jobs they had been assigned before; they were resentful and always had some "explanation" to try to justify their failures. They all considered themselves victims of the Revolution and believed they had sufficient merit to be political leaders. Some were kept in their positions in spite of their ineptness and lack of prestige, and others, after having made mistakes due to their lack of ability, were sent to other posts in the enterprise but almost always continued to be leaders.
This entire group of resentful individuals had a position of constant, ill-intentioned criticism of everything the Revolution did and the orientations that were given to the enterprise. Those arrested from this enterprise were: Ricardo Bofill Pagés, who was head of the Publicity Department of FRUTICUBA; Francisco Brito Rodriguez, who was in charge of marketing; Reinaldo Puig Berdeja, in charge of installations and project planning; and Ratil Fajardo Escalona, administrator of a FRUTICUBA ice cream factory.
Some of the opinions that Bofill expressed to the group were of this nature: that the methods used to remove Anibal Escalante from the National Lead-
ership had not been the most correct; that Che had left Cuba because of discrepancies with Fidel, and things of that nature.
Bofill had belonged to the ORI.
Francisco Brito publicly stated that Che had created problems for the economy of Cuba, trying to industrialize this country with importations of pencils, refrigerators, spark plugs, etc.; that he had installed a technocracy and brought in Latin-American Trotskyist technicians; that the best thing was for him to get the ---- out of the country. He said that after Major Fidel Castro had put Che down he had taken his line, which is very ----, that nobody could understand Fidel, that he was crazy.
These prisoners have given information that verifies and fills out the information we had about FRUTICUBA, which revealed the situation of resentment and mistrust that existed in that enterprise.
We are not going to speak of the moral attitude typical of most of the prisoners -- with a few exceptions, of course. It will suffice to read a short paragraph from document No. 2, written by Dr. Emilio de Quesada, which reads as follows: "As for some comrades" -- he was referring to those in the group -- "they were considered Communists because they shared those ideas, regardless of their human weaknesses. They were considered firm in their convictions, and the rest was tolerated." (For "firm" read loyal to the line that the group held; for "firm" read loyal to Anibal.)
(How this paragraph reminds me of one of the factors that first began engendering sectarianism: Loyal to me, no matter what you do, what you have done,
a good Communist because you are loyal to me.) 1 chose a quote from Dr. Quesada, Anibal Escalante's first lieutenant, in order to bring up this aspect of the problen.
@ Objectives of the microfactional group
Anibal Escalante stated that his objective was to create a trend of opinion that would force his points of view to be discussed in the Party.
(That is, he said that his objective was to create a trend of opinion that would force his points of view to be discussed in the Party. I'd like you to permit me to tell a brief anecdote here that is called to mind by Anibal's argument.)
(It was during the difficult years when bands of counterrevolutionaries rose up_in various provinces of the country. February 1961. I remember I was in Oriente. The Chief of the State Security Department, Capt. Mendez Cominches, called me, after having arrested an individual in Guantanamo with a load of rifles; several of his companions had risen up in Monte Rus. I believe, ironically enough, that fellow was also named Anibal, Anibal Rodriguez. Méndez called me at home one morning around dawn and told me, “Listen, I'd like you _to come down here and question this man to see if he has the nerve to tell you what he is telling me." I put on my clothes and left for Security. I questioned the man; they had captured him with weapons, with a group of bandits who
he told me the same story, one similar to Anibal Escalante's, that his objective was to create a trend of opinion that would force his points of view to be discussed with the Party. What did that Ani-
rise up. We weren't going to fight against you." “And those weapons? Don't you admit that you were going to the hills of Monte
with these Communist things that are being put into practice here, and, since we couldn't talk to Fidel, we were going to Monte Rus. We were going to go there with men and rifles, and that way Fidel would be forced to discuss matters with us.")
Meanwhile, the prisoners Octavio Fernandez and Inaudi Kindelan Reyes declared that the failure of the economic plans of the Revolution would mean a political failure of the petty-bourgeois leadership, forcing a rectification of the line and a consideration of the points of view of the group, some of whom would be called on to occupy positions in the Party and the trade-union movement.
@ Their total lack of a
revolutionary attitude
and their propensity
for lying
(From this we can better understand how some of them provoked discontent and gave instructions for provoking discontent among people in shopping lines against the present Communists, although in honor of the truth and in the spirit of honesty and exactitude that have characterized these proceedings we must say that the person who stated this now denies it. However, we have irrefutable proof that he said it and gave such orientation. Moreover, with all of the other things, their verbal and written accounts, our investigations were complete because, in the same way, they denied all of their infamous statements about leaders of the Revolution.
(They denied this, and he denied it. I clarify this in order to be truthful_and_ in fairness to the prisoner, but we do have proof. Such orientation was in no way contrary to the views they held, and evidence of this kind is present_in the documents that we shall read next.
ure" of the Revolution and its plans would force a rectification of the official line and consideration of the viewpoints of the group, some of whose members would then be called to take up official posts because they are the representatives of the proletariat and we are the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie. They could not accuse us of strengthening ties with Yankee imperialism, and so they say_that we are drawing nearer to French imperialisn.
(Moreover, attempts were made to win over Party_members to their opinions in order to exert pressure on the Party leadership from the base.
(But, more than our own words, we prefer to base ourselves on the documents written by them, in their own hand. I wish to point out to you, comrades of the Central Committee, that in what we have been reading thus far we have limited ourselves exclusively to what they have
when we have expressed our opinions we have qualified them as such.
(We have stated what they have
we are going to use their own words, their own confessions, their own writings. Naturally we cannot read all of them, because there are reams and reams of paper. Therefore, the Political Bureau decided to organize an exhibition in a locale next to this room. Each member of the Central Committee present will be given a_numbered booklet bearing his name, which should be returned before you leave here and which contains a complete index of all the evidence in our possession, so that _all who so desire may examine it: captured documents, statements made by
cused engaged in various conspiratorial activities, tape recordings of conversations and meetings, an exhibition of the documents and films of the questionings made by _the investigation section, etc. -All of this is at the disposal of the Central Committee.
(After you have made use of these indexed booklets, please return them to the same place where they were given to you_to assure control in view of their content, as they are guides for the convenience of the comrades of the Central Committee, who may examine the exhibition during any of the recess periods or at the end of today's sessions.)
(In other words, our investigation is based on innumerable and irrefutable facts and on what they themselves have written, accepted and confessed. And to destroy their arguments the Revolution does not need to defend itself from the infamous statements which these individ-
that might be present in their criticisms of the Revolution is invalidated by the fact of their absolute absence of any revolutionary attitude, their propensity for lying, the defamations which are mixed with their criticism, their monstrous distortions of history and the very characteristics of the revolutionary process, their disloyalty _to the nation and the perverse, selfish and traitorous goals they pursued.
(This is not the healthy criticism that we constantly apply_to_ ourselves. In a_ word, they wished the Revolution to fail so that what they termed the pettybourgeois leadership of the Revolution might be destroyed.)
(Let us turn to the documents that they themselves composed.
(Manuscript No. 2 of Octavio Fernandez. ) —
"Anibal maintained that, as of 1970, difficulties would increase because, economically, we were not going to be able to hit the 10,000,000-ton mark in sugar production, since the measures necessary to guarantee this were not being taken. He said that the very pace of the present sugar harvest indicated this, since we would need almost a 4,000,000-ton increase in two years' time. He said that the shortage of food products as well as manufactured goods would not be solved at the level proposed. And, for all these reasons, the promises that had been made to the people, such as free rent by 1970, could not be kept. Politically, the Latin- American Communist Parties would be stronger" (this is by 1970, according to the "prophet" Anibal Escalante) “and in positions to exercise full leadership of the struggle in their respective countries. The Soviet Union would be much stronger because of its headlong development, technologically, economically, politically and militarily, and, on the contrary, imperialism would be much weaker.
"Because of this situation, it would surely become imperative to rectify the Party line in Cuba, to change the organiz-— ing methods and the work of the Party, giving the workers greater participation. More realistic methods would be applied to production, with greater attention given to workers' opinions, utilizing the tradeunion movement in its true role of leader of the working class. And, as for the
Soviet Union, we would draw much closer to all its policies, thus eliminating a whole series of differences that we have today, because life itself would provide the example in this case. And also because the trend toward closer ties with France was doomed to failure, in spite of everything, in spite of all their attempts, since France was a capitalist country which in its dealings with us would not abandon its class position, and since it did not have such vast resources as the Soviet Union.
"As this was the situation, the group would work in the interest of defending the Soviet Union's stand on current events, such as, for example, the recent conflict in the Middle East, as well as clarifying that country's stand in its policy of peaceful coexistence. It would instill in the masses the nec~ essary confidence in the Soviet Union's solidarity with our Revolution and with all revolutionary movements. It would assure the masses that the Soviet Union would never leave us to face the imperialists alone, since this was a question of principles in the defense of the Revolution. It would work to have the points of view of the working class on produc~ tion taken into consideration as well as to have due recognition given to the role of the trade unions as the proper vehicle for putting socialist emulation into practice, raising the educational level of the workers and advising management in all administrative policy-making. It would work to convince all comrades of the correctness of this policy.
"In the work of winning over others, we established a method for feeling out comrades," (Octavio continues) "that is, one would see a comrade and talk events over with him in order to find out his opinions. In most cases mention would be made of Anibal, to see if the reaction was positive or negative. Then it could be judged whether or not it was likely that the comrade could be won over on this question. And, as for some leaders, Anibal suggested that I go to see Blas and Kindelan to see Lazaro" (I_mentioned this matter previously) "in order to find out their opinions.
"Anibal maintained" (Octavio's writings state) "that when events had led to the situation he expected to see after 1970, as the result of an analysis made to overcome the existing weaknesses, changes would be made in the Party's work methods and in production and the tradeunion movement, as well as in the policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of Latin America. Anibal maintained that then there would have to be a new attitude, recognizing his opinions, and, therefore, he would once more be asked to take up a leadership post in the Party or simply the same one he had held ~207-
before, that of Organizing Secretary.
“Moreover, he maintained that the necessary moral support would surely come from the Soviet Union and that the Soviet comrades would even make suggestions to Fidel concerning a fraternal rapprochement with all those comrades who had been acting under Anfibal's orientation.
"The first precaution was to keep comrades from going to his house or to the farm. That is, to make it appear that he was aloof from the entire situation. But he was to continue giving orientation through a very small group of comrades, making such contacts individually and very infrequently.
@® Continuation of
Octavio Fernandez'
report
"Other measures taken included keeping use of the telephone down to a minimun, especially with him; limiting to three at most the number of comrades to be seen together in public; and making sure that such meetings occurred in different places. The comrades were advised not to frequent the same places all the time and to avoid, in particular, reproduction of material, it being better to communicate material verbally."
(Some of the group thought that Fleitas was a "provocateur" because he was always insisting on mimeographing material and on taking other measures.)
"Recently, Anibal told me that in case he was arrested I would surely be arrested afterwards...and that it would be necessary in that case to send the answer he had made to the newspaper Le Monde in 1962 on sectarianism to 1'Humanité and the Communist Party of France, another copy to the Soviet Union and a third to the Germans, because an explanation of his arrest would be found in that statement.
"Concerning the responsibilities which we would assume once this situation led to rectification of the Party line after 1970," (Octavio continues) "it was expected that, if Anibal again held a top post, those of us who had taken part in these events would be promoted along with him, in keeping, of course, with our abilities, background and experience.
"But it is right to point out" (Qctavio's report continues) "that the motivations of the great majority of conrades were not exactly to kick off a fight for official posts but to defend the Revolution, in keeping with Anibal's orientation and viewpoints on this matter. In my own case, for instance, this was not the motivation, since I had, in the past, voluntarily proposed that I be transferred
to production.
"Now, in the specific case of Anibal, having analyzed all these events and coming to understand his character and behavior, I see that, basically, what motivated him was the desire to figure once again among the leadership of the Party, because of personal pride and arrogance."
(Octavio continues.) "After having given a detailed account of this whole situation and having mulled it over, there is no room for doubt that the only conclusion I can reach is that all this was disgraceful and shameful. And the rest of the group must feel as I do, for the only thing we were truly interested in was the defense of this, our Revolution, nothing else.
"However, personal devotion and superficial evaluation of problems led us to fall into a position where we served as instruments for someone else to climb up the ladder only to selfishly satisfy his personal ambitions (referring to Anibal)."
@ Dr. Quesada's manuscript
Manuscript No. 1 of Dr. Quesada. Objectives: From the content of these procedures, it is clear that no attempt to seize power was ever intended; that would have been ridiculous. Anibal could not get the cohesion nor attain the unity of the Revolution, and no one else in the group possessed the faintest possibilities of doing so.
"On one occasion, in the analysis of what should be done, we reached the conclusion that the situation in this respect was most difficult to define, that the presence of our most powerful enemy only 90 miles away was a factor that could not be forgotten. Once an attempt was made to hold a discussion on this matter, and it was concluded that for the moment it was only possible to create a climate of opinion by defending those points, which might work as an influence toward their being taken seriously -- beyond that it was not possible to make more specific formulations, it depended on what happened -- to form opinion, to defend points of view in all places and in every possible way, to gain wider acceptance of these ideas, etc."
(According to Quesada:) "The opinion was expressed that the objective factors were determinant, especially the external factors. By this we meant economic realities that tended to lead the Revolution along the road we considered the best. Bluntly speaking, we even wished for a certain degree of political pressure and that economic realities come into play that would help us in this sense. This may sound monstrous," (Quesada states) "but it is understandable from the point of view that the path of coincidences would, in the long run, save our Revolution; that a little pain was preferable to a course that would lead to serious dangers.
"TI believed" (Quesada continues) "that such factors would come up as part of the basic objective evaluation that would be made outside our country without our participation. It was never expressly stated that we should take definite steps ourselves, but that is not important. And, anyway, examining the facts objectively, our activity as such was a way of bringing about such a situation. And, on one occasion, as I have already stated, I even explained to Octavio that it would be better if we did not have the help of the GDR in the setting up of the printing press. .
"From what has been explained to me by the comrades in charge of these proceedings," (Quesada continues) "Comrade Anibal was the one who took those steps. I knew nothing about the matter, but that does not matter, since, if I had been informed of the matter, I would not have opposed it, because by then the concept we held of things was essentially the same -- that is, I do not now claim innocence on this question."
(Now he refers to moral incentives. )
"We believed that moral incentives were only effective in stimulating production among persons with highly developed awareness, not among the backward strata."
(It_appears that for Dr. Quesada and his group the Cuban people are made up_of the backward strata.)
{To be continued. J]
GUEVARA'S