CICAP: an example
The following interview with a member of the soldiers' commission of the RASP (Artillery
Regiment of Serra do Pilar) was taken in Porto on October 15. It describes the struggle against the general staff's dissolution of the CICAP, the Instruction Center for Military
Vehicle Drivers in Porto. Question. Can you tell us why the CICAP was dissolved by the general staff of the northern military region? What was the military and political importance of the CICAP? What is the significance of this measure? Answer. As a military unit, the CICAP was not very important; it didn't have many weapons. It was an instruction center for automobile drivers, and that's all. It's importance in the Military Region of the North (RMN) was essentially political. The dissolution was supposed to set an example. The chasm between the officers and soldiers in CICAP was very wide, for several reasons. First of all, the training was very reactionary. One of the sergeants, for instance, was an old PIDE candidate. (PIDE was the Salazarist secret police -INPRECOR.) One of the noncoms was an ex-member. of the Portuguese Legion. The soldiers, on the other hand, had become the most combative of the whole region. They are working class in origin, which is understandable considering the technical knowledge required in such a unit. Also, the CICAP had played a vanguard role in April 25 in the North. This had stimulated a radicalization among the militia officers. Some of these militia officers had been in charge of the struggle against the ELP in the North. (The ELP, Portuguese Liberation Army, is a fascist military gang - INPRECOR.) They had recently come back to the barracks. In fact, they had resigned from the general staff when the militarist Brigadier General Veloso was named to replace General Corvacho as commander of the RMN. This combativity was expressed on September 11, 1975. The soldiers massively paid homage to the struggle of the Chilean workers. (See INPRECOR, No. 35, October 9.) The pretext for the punitive measure of dissolution was the soldiers' disobedience of a purge order given by the commander. Five soldiers and two militia officers were ordered purged. The soldiers held a plenary assembly and rejected this saneamento. The barracks became a real cancer in the North, with confrontations between soldiers and officers taking very severe forms. During this general assembly, for example, all the career officer were tossed out.
PORTUGAL The decision to dissolve the CICAP heralded other measures that, if the hierarchy was unable to halt the indiscipline, could go as far as the more or less complete elimination of soldiers and militia officers and the creation of a professional army. Q. How was the dissolution decision applied, and what was the immediate reaction of the soldiers? A. The dissolution decision was made on the night of. Friday-Saturday (October 3-4). The soldiers were on leave at the time. A company of commandos from the BAAF (Fixed Anti-aircraft Battery, which is now a Copcon unif) occupied the barracks, The few soldiers present were taken unawares. They immediately got in confact with their comrades on leave and organized a meeting on that same night. They issued an appeal to oll their comrades to come to the gates of the barracks that Monday (October 6) to demand the reopening of the barracks. Explanation brigades were formed and went through the working-class neighborhoods calling for solidarity from the workers. On Saturday, October 4, a first demonstration was organized. It marched toward the barracks but was brutally dispersed by the operational company of the RIP (Infantry Regiment of Porto). Groups of workers besieged the barracks on a permanent basis, alongside the soldiers. One worker was wounded by a shot in the stomach. Q. After that, a much larger response was organized. What role did the SUV play in this mobilization? (SUV: Soldados Unidos Vencerão - Soldiers United Will Win. For the SUV founding manifesto and an interview with one of the SUV leaders, see INPRECOR, No.35, October 9.) A. The northern secretariat of the SUV immediately organized solidarity in all the barracks of the region and mobilized the workers commissions and tenants commissions for a support demonstration on October 6. Thousands of leaflets were distributed in all the barracks. Plenary assemblies were held at the RASP and the RTM (Transmissions Regiment) in order to structure the support for the CICAP. On Manday (October 6) Humberto Delgado Square (the main square in Porto) was filled; tens of thousands of workers had mobilized. If was the biggest demonstration since May 1, 1974. Two thousand soldiers participated and combativity was running high. The demonstration marched to the command headquarters and then to the CICAP. When the march got to the CICAP barracks, the soldiers massed in front of the main gate and called on the soldiers occupying the barracks to join the demonstration. The officers of the RIP did everything they could to hold the soldiers back. The noncoms had torn off their rank insignias and spread through the ranks of the soldiers in order to strengthen the officers' control and assure discipline.
The demonstrators issued an ultimatum giving Veloso half an hour to come over and explain his position to the demonstrators and open the gates of the barracks. When the half an hour was up, they started filing the padlocks off the gates. The demonstration was about to penetrate into the barracks, but the occupying troops made it clear that they were going to open fire. The leaders of the demonstration then gave the order to move to a nearby barracks that was prepared to support the CICAP soldiers. That was the RASP barracks. And in fact, this barracks opened its doors to the demonstrators. After a discussion with the soldiers of the RASP during the night of October 6-7, the demonstrators occupied the RASP; the red flag was raised over the barracks! The RASP is an important barracks, because it's heavily armed. It has, among other things, many artillery pieces, tanks, and so on. Q. The PPD quickly organized counterdemonstrations. (The PPD, Partido Popular Democrático - Popular Democratic party, is the largest bourgeois party in Portugal - INPRECOR.) Can you explain the importance and meaning of this initiative by Sá Carneiro's party? A. During this period, the PPD wanted to build up its own image as a reactionary striking force. So it tried to offer a very tough response quickly. On October 6 the PPD had a counterdemonstration that stopped in front of the CICAP barracks. The PPD demonstrators offered drinks, money, cigarette lighters, and so on to the occupying soldiers. When the big SUV demonstration approached, the PPDers took off. On October 8 the PPD organized a new demonstration with super-reactionary overtones, which corresponds to the policy impressed on this party by Sa Carneiro, who took over again as general secretary a few weeks ago. He was personally present at the demonstration. The 20,000 demonstrators marched to the CICAP barracks, the doors of which were open to them - against all tradifional army regulations! Then the demonstration moved to the RASP. The RASP organized self-defense against this reactionary offensive. The PPD troops were heavily armed with pistols, hunting rifles, and even some G3s (automatic weapons). There was a clash with the RASP defenders. The soldiers occupying the RASP decided to come ouf unarmed to separate the two demonstrations. There was some confusion among these soldiers. But the cordon of soldiers was attacked by the PPD militants; then they changed their attitude. The combat tanks rolled out of the RASP courtyard and dispersed the PPD marshalls and the fascist scum. It was very clear that the PPD wanted to show itself as an important independent force capable of mobilizing
for the "struggle against indiscipline in the army. " And with this confrontation, the PPD was also seeking to justify a military intervention against the RASP. The military police regiment had already tried to carry out this project, with the support of commandos and machinegunners from the RCP (Cavalry Regiment of Porto). But the response of the RASP soldiers was so determined that they had to give it up. Q. How was the occupation and the struggle organized? A. During the first few days, the organization of the struggle was rather confused. There had been no experience in this sort of thing; it was the first barracks occupation. On the night of Monday-Tuesday (October 6-7) there was a general assembly of the RASP, the CICAP, and the soldiers of other units who had rallied to this struggle. The comrades of the RASP were hesitant, especially since their commander, Castanheira, told them that the unit would be attacked and bombed and that he himself was threatened with imprisonment, And that was possible, in fact! Nevertheless, the soldiers of all the other units tried to make them understand the importance of this struggle for all the Portuguese workers. They then accepted our presence there, which was confirmed by a plenary general assembly of the RASP the following day. A list of demands was drawn up: immediate reopening of the CICAP, reintegration of all the comrades, and the removal of Veloso were the main demands. A "struggle commission" wos elected in general assembly. It is responsible to this general assembly and recallable at any time if a meeting of the general assembly decides that it has not carried out its functions properly. The members of the commission completely accepted this decision by the general assembly.
PORTUGAL On October 8, during the PPD demonstration, the organization of the struggle proved to be insufficient. Hence, other bodies were formed to be added to the struggle commission: a military commission, a press commission, a financial commission, an internal organization commission. All these commissions were elected and are recallable and coordinated by the struggle commission, which is the real leadership. Thus, between general assemblies, the other commissions are responsible to the struggle commission. This self-organization must not be looked at from a purely technical standpoint. In fact, two very important elements have to be stressed, First, it was very important to develop a political leadership subordinate to the decisions of the general assembly and thus able to assure the unity in action of all the comrades in struggle, of l theolite problem was paste tion posed the necessity of a radical modification of the structures and functioning of the army during this struggle. For instance, squad leaders were elected. In the mess halls, tasks were divided equally among the soldiers and militia officer. This heralded the form that could be taken by a future proletarian army. All the soldiers who participated in the struggle could see concretely that another kind of army was possible. During the first week of the struggle, the many pressures (PPD and SP demonstrations, threats of attacks, and so on) generated great confusion among the soldiers occupying the barracks. The reflex of automatically assigning the militia officers to the most important tasks was often asserted. Thus, it is important not to idealize the forms of self-organization. The main thing is to see the tendency that is developing and the dozens of significant examples that have already been set. Q. How did the reformist parties, the SP and the CP, react? A. They did not react in the same way, far from it. The SP tried to mobilize all the living forces of bourgeois democracy to reestablish order and discipline in the barracks and to support Veloso, a pillar of the sixth governOn October 10 they organized a big demonstration (smaller than the action of the SUV, though). Among the working-class rank and file of the SP there were some reactions against this initiative. For example, an SP leader of the fishermen in Afurada (near Porto) participated in the struggles of the RASP. There were many SP sympathizers among the soldiers, and they obviously did not appreciate Soares's initiative, When Soares attacked the strike of the metalworkers in his speech, the metalworkers left the demonstration. The SP demonstration stayed in the center of the city and did not move toward the RASP barracks. Neverthe6 less, the fascist groups took advantage of this demonstration to go and aftack the headquarters of the UDP (União Democrático Popular — Popular Democratic Union, a Maoist group). It has to be stressed that the soldiers of the RASP, meeting in plenary general assembly, agreed to allow the SP to demonstrate in front of the RASP barracks if they wanted. But the soldiers decided to respond if any groups tried to attack with firearms. The CP, after several days of official silence, publicly supported the struggle of the soldiers. But the CP constantly tried to reduce the struggle to a clash between reactionary and progressive officers. The CP members tried to raise the slogan "Corvacho will return!" But this slogan was not taken up. They also tried to use the differences between Fabião (army chief of staff) and Veloso to arrive at a solution of conciliation. Likewise, they tried to insert this struggle into the framework of a reform of the MFA. On the whole, this project failed. Q. Could you describe the links between the RASP occupiers and the workers commissions and tenants commissions? A. When the constant guerrilla warfare of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations came to an end, two things were clearly understood: First, we owed our resistance and our position of strength to the support of the worken, who supported us from outside the barracks. They sfood guard of night and went to work during the day! At around 7:00 at night they would come over to the RASP barracks to show their support. Their courage was fantastic. On more than one occasion, a worker would be wounded, go to the hospital to be treated, and come back to stand guard again. Second: We had grasped the vital importance of extending and organizing our links with the workers in order to beable to keep the struggle going. Some workers and tenants commissions came to us to propose a meeting with the "struggle commission" in order to structure the support by creating actual support committees. Jornal de Gaia, a newspaper under workers control, offered us machines to produce a struggle newspaper, the first issue of which has just come out. At first, the RASP brigades went to the factories to explain our struggle. But now the work can be shared with the workers and tenants commissions in a coordinated manner. Q. What was the meaning of Army Chief of Staff Fabio's intervention and what were the results for your struggle of his meeting with the "struggle commission" and the professional officers of the RASP? A. On October 11 a delegation had been sent to Fabião to tell him about our struggle and to discuss our two cenfral demands, around which the delegates were not