Transkei, ihe firs: of the so-called Bantustans to complete the transition from South African tutelage to fraudulen: independence ordained by the white racist regime. ("Independence" was proclaimed on October 26.) Some 1 million rands ($833, 000) have reported ly been se aside for this purpose, and top public relations firms in the Uni ed States, Canada, and Britain retained to do the job. For the pasi few weeks advertisements from the Transkei Development Corporation have been appearing in ihe principal British daily and weekly papers. For example: "October 26 sees the birth of the Republic of Transkei - peaceful, progressive and fully democratic. Thai's because we preferred to work alongside South Africa in peaceful evolution to independence. Rather than unpack the rifles. But the real situaiion in the Transkei belies these claims. As the "independence" ceremonies were being mounted, a special force of 600 South African policemen had to 8
SWAZILAND Johannesburg®
LESOTHO
• Durban Uretata Indian Ocon by ROY ALEXANDER be drafted into the territory to ensure the "peaceful" image of the Transkei. Meanwhile, the leader and sixieen members of the Transkeian Democratic party, the main opposition group, which opposes "independence" as a capitulation to the racisi apartheid system, lanquished in prison, where they had been clapped just before the recent Transkeian assembly elections. Their detention was ordered under a state of emergency that was first proclaimed in 1960 to deal with the widespread peasant unrest and has remained in force ever since. South African racism It is no coincidence that the decision to grant independence to one of the Bantustans came at this time, nor that the Transkei was selected. Both decisions grow out of the basic objectives of the Bantustan policy and the role it plays in the political strategy of the South African regime. The historic problem facing the South African ruling bloc is that it rests upon a social order in which racial siratification and oppression are integral elements in an international relationship of forces that is increas-
ingly unfavorable to the preservation of such structures. South Africa differs from the other white settler societies that developed to its north in that it was the object of much more intensive European settlement, achieved political independence at an earlier period, when white domination on the continent was relatively unchallenged, and was accordingly able to use the mechanism of the state io develop a diversified industrialized economy and a powerful indigenous (white) bourgeoisie and to fragment and crush opposition from the oppressed black majority. The social formation iha: emerged from ihis historical process did not reproduce the charaieristics of a "normal" bourgeois socieiy but was doubly marked by its white settler, colonialist origins: on the one hand its economic structures rested on the superexploitation of black labor, and on the other hand its ruling bloc became firmly structured around the principles of racial siratification, integrating white workers and petty-bourgeois layers with indigenous capital. History marches on, however, even for white racists. The rise of the colonial revolution and the neocolonial "Africanization" of the former colonial societies was paralleled in South Africa by the creation of a powerful and class conscious black proletariat and the deepening politicization of the black masses as a whole. The South African bourgeoisie thus increasingly had to devise a way to deal with the growing tide of political unrest in the country as well as the growing external hostility to the racist regime, which has tended to make even South Africa's imperialist allies uncomfortable about excessively open association with the regime. The immediate threat of overt political revolt, which came to a head in the early 1960s, was dealt with through brutal repression. But there are limits beyond which repression cannot be used to crush a genuine mass movement without in itself becoming socially disruptive and even unproductive. Moreover, whatever its success in dealing with domestic problems, repression also served to accenivate the external hostility to the regime. Ii was in this context that the Bantustan policy was developed. The Bantustan policy The ideology of apartheid as developed by the South African Nationalist party and implemented by successive Nationalist governments from 1947 on always contained the notion of "separate development" - that the various black social groups would have their own particular and unique route and form of social and political evolution. Hence, political democracy and the social benefits of South African economic development were the exclusive preserve of the white population, while the blacks were to be confined to institutions and living standards in accordance with their own "traditions" (which in reality, of course, were nothing more than the "traditions" of racist subjugation and unfettered imperialist exploitation).
A government commission was established in 1949 to "conduct an exhaustive enquiry into and report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning. " While the specific recommendations of this body, the Tomlinson Commission, were never implemented, the idea began to crystallize of centering the political strategy of apartheid around the "Native Areas" or "reserves. " These areas had first been created in 1913, shortly after self-government had been granted to the Union of South Africa. Certain areas of the country where the African population had become concentrated were "scheduled"; whites were precluded from acquiring land in these areas, and Africans, in turn, were forbidden to acquire land elsewhere. This measure had the double effect of formalizing the dispossession of the African population from large parts of the country occupied by white settlers and at the same time ensuring the African population the minimum of land necessary to provide the agricultural subsistence base for a migratory labor system. In the succeeding years this was followed by a series of measures that completed laying the foundations of the migratory labor system: the introduction in 1923 of "influx control" to regulate the movement of Africans into the urban areas (based upon the principle, first enunciated by the Commission on Local Government in 1921, that "the Native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister. "); the establishment in 1927 of the power of the South African president (as the "Supreme Chief" of the African population) to legislate directly for the reserves, without going through Parliament and subject to no legal check by the courts. The postwar Nationalist government thus found the essential ideology and structure of the Bantustans ready made. Throughout the 1950s the successive governments built upon this, creating a systematic and coherent structure which at the same time constituted a political strategy to deal with the historic problems of South African capitalism. This system was predicated on the following assumptions: 1. South Africa consists of a number of nations or national groups, among which are the whites and a series of African groups. 2. Each of these nations has the right to develop and exercise (or move towards the exercise of) self-determination within their own historic territory. 3. For the whites this means that they hold exclusive rights within "white South Africa" - defined as the bulk of the territory of the republic, including all the principal urban areas. 4. For the African masses it means the limitation of the exercise of their political rights exclusively to the territory of the reserves, now labelled "Bantustans". 5. The African population in
9
IRANSKEI the "white" areas is thus regarded purely as migrant labor, with no claim to political or social equality with the white "nationals" of this territory. 6. The Asian and "coloured" population, while having no territorial expression of "national" rights, does benefit from slightly higher status within "white" South Africa than the blacks, and is able to exercise strictly limited political rights through its own institutions.
MATANZIMA: Transkei chief minister The patently ideological character of this schema and its flagrant injustice in both historical and contemporary terms is only too obvious. It allocates 88 the territory of South Africa (including all the economically productive sectors) to 17 percent of the population; it bases its assignment of territory to the African majority on the "historical" situation produced by more than a century of white incursion, imperialist maneuver, and military conquest; it ignores the fact that throughout the history of South Africa as an independent state something like 50 percent of the African population has lived outside the reserves and has constituted the majority of the population in the "white" areas; it totally ignores the fundamental role of black labor in the creation of the "civilized" standards of "white South Africa." But these facts are more than mere evidence of the oppressive character of the Bantustan policy. They are also fundamental contradictions within this political strategy which threaten to blow it apart and leave the South African regime resting upon nothing but naked repression. These contradictions express themselves in two areas: the complete unviability of the Bantustans as "independent" states and the "problem" of the permanently urbanized African population that today makes up the majority of South Africa's supposedly "white" cities and the majority of industrial workers. Why the Transkei? The choice of Transkei as the first of the Bantustans to evolve to formal independence was made quite deliberately in order to gloss over the first of these problems, for of all the Bantustans Transkei is the one in which the cracks are least evident. It is the only one of the territories that has any claim to an independent historical existence (British imperialism conquered it 10 only in the 1880s; it was annexed to the Cape Colony and was preserved more or less intact until most of it was scheduled as a "native area" in 1913). As a result, it is a comparatively compact territory with a relatively high proportion of its nominal "citizens" actually making their homes in the Bantustan. It also benefits from relatively fertile agricultural land compared with many other Bantustans. The Transkei is thus the regime's best hope to establish acceptance of the Bantustan policy internationally, which in turn is essential if this policy is to be sold to even a small layer of the South African black population as a viable outlet for their social and political aspirations. Nevertheless, even a mildly critical scrutiny of this "best hope" of the Bantustans shows just how much these structures rest on foundations of sand. Ironically, one of the first acts of the South African government in "preparing" the Transkei for self-government and eventual "independence" was to destroy the only institution that had even a semblance of political representivity, the Native Council or bunga. This body dated back to 1895 and although essentially powerless had developed a certain independence and assumed a critical stance toward apartheid policies. By government decree it was replaced by a "traditional" system of government by "chiefs" appointed by the South African government. In the late 1950s this was modified with the development of "Bantu authorities" that included both governmentappointed chiefs and elected representatives (with the former in a clear majority). Kaiser Matanzima, chief minister of the Transkei under South African tute lage and of "independent" Transkei today, is just such a government appointee and thus has never had to stand for election. His ruling party, the Transkei National Independence party, has always rested on the 60 percent of the Assembly that was appointed and until this year had never received a majority of votes cast for elected representatives, despite widespread use of intimidation and support from the South African government. This was clearly not an adequate basis for an "independent" government (moreover in the new Transkei Assembly "only" 50 percent of the representatives are appointees) and so the problem was solved by calling a snap election and jailing the opposition (whose main crime was to have called for a referendum on independence). Naturally, under such circumstances Matanzima managed to win his majority. Transkei will be administered by its own civil service, which is more than 90 percent black. But the white civil servants occupy all the top positions, with advisers from the South African government playing a decisive role in shaping policy in most areas. Similarly, Transkei has its own so-called army (286 strong), which has been thoroughly trained (primarily in counterinsurgency and crowd control) in South
Africa and is under the command of a white South African officer with accompanying staff. Matanzima has made it clear that he sees the main job of this army as dealing with "terrorism" in the Transkei. Moreover, BOSS, the notorious South African security agency, will continue to operate in the territory, although it will now be "responsible" to Matanzima. The most obvious indication of the Transkei's total political subjection to the South African racists is Matanzima's announcement that all the most notorious racist legislation of the republic - the Terrorism Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Mixed Marriage Act, and the Immorality Act - will remain in force in "independent" Transkei. Finally, of the new republic's 3 million citizens only 1.6 million actually make their homes in the Transkei; the others are permanently settled in "white South Africa" and many have never even seen the Transkei and have rio desire to live there. This was the only real point of conflict between Matanzima and the South African government. For the latter it was essential that all the country's Africans designated as "Xhosa" (with the exception of the 1 million that have been allocated to the separate Xhosa "homeland" of Ciskei) should be assigned Transkei citizenship. Matanzima, who despite his long record of collaboration with apartheid felt reluctant to identify himself openly with such a blatantly repressive policy and is also worried about the disruptive effects of shipping unwanted blacks back to the Transkei from the urban areas, argued that Transkei citizenship should be voluntary for those settled outside the territory. In the event the South African government imposed its viewpoint, thus demonstrating the dependency of the Transkei government (but there is little doubt that this dispute will continue). The economics of 'independence' The political dependence of Transkei on the South African Republic is a precise reflection of its economic position. The resident population of Transkei is overwhelmingly dependent upon migratory labor for its subsistence. According to official government figures in 1974 some 257,000 of the territory's 310,000 economically active males (that is, more than 80 percent) were migrant workers on the farms, mines, and industries of "white South Africa." Almost half of those who remained were in government service; only 4,000 were employed in manufacturing in Transkei pot on iting oduce itself. Economic activity in the Transkei consists primarily of women, children, and old men scraping a miserable subsistence out of the land in order to reproduce the flow of black labor for "white South Africa." This reality is summed up precisely in a simple statistic: of the total "national income" of the Transkei only 26 percent is actually earned in the territory itself. The picture is similar with regard to financing of government activity. In 1972-73 more than two-thirds of the Transkei authorities' income came from the South African government. By 1974-75 the proportion had risen to more than 75 percent, largely as a result of the funding of prestige projects in preparation for "independence." Despite all the supposed concern about the "traditional" character of Bantustan society, the situation is no better in the agricultural sector. The growing population pressure, the character of the labor force, and the absence of any capital investment in agriculture has resulted in stagnation - or even dec line - of food production in the face of a rapidly rising population. As a result, the Transkei currently has to import some 70 percent of its maize, the staple food item. For 1.4 million black South Africans the "independence" of the Transkei has but one meaning: it is another blow against their struggle for democratic rights and social equality in the society that has been built up with their labor. These people -all of whom have been away from the Transkei for a minimum of eight years (since 1968 no African has been allowed to migrate permanently from his or her "homeland") and many of whom may be second or third generation inhabitants of the urban areas - now lose their South African citizenship and become citizens of the Transkei. Already their right to live and work in the urban areas is severely curtailed (they can, for example, be shipped to the homelands for losing their jobs or being involved in social or political unrest), but there is genuine danger that the "independence" of the Bantustans is the prelude to an even more thorough assault on this already slender security. It is this concern which is at the heart of the discontent among the urban blacks - particularly the younger generation whose whole horizon is centered in the urban areas and for whom the mirage of the homelands holds no appeal. It is from these social layers that the concept of "black consciousness" arises - a rejection of the racists' efforts to divide the oppressed masses into several "national" groups and an affirmation of the single national identity and unity of interests of the entire oppressed population. The determination to fight for full democratic and social rights against the South African racist state and its structures is rooted among these same layers. The "independence" of the Transkei is a treacherous blow to that struggle and must be opposed as such by all those in solidarity with the struggle for black liberation. Thus far, no government, whether neocolonial or imperialist, has been prepared to associate itself with such a blatantly transparent maneuver. But already sections of imperialist opinion are preparing for such a move: rumors persist of the possibility of recognition of the Transkei by West Germany and France, and in Britain one of the main representatives of "enlightened" imperialist views on Africa, the Guardian newspaper, has openly adopted such a position. In the context of the complex maneuvers currently going on in southern Africa it is probable that the South African regime will seek endorsement of its Bantustan policy as a quid pro quo for its cooperation. It is the duty of the international solidarity movement to expose the fraud of Transkei independence and to oppose any such deal.
11
SMITH TALKS IN THE REV. NDABANINGI SITHOLE GENEVA
JOSHUA NKOMO ROBERT MUGABE by JULIUS KARANJA On November 2, while the various nationalist leaders were busy in Geneva haggling over the possible date for "constitutional" independence for Zimbabwe, the Smith regime was busy preparing the basis required for a neocolonial transition. White Rhodesian armored forces, backed by helicopter gunships and jet fighter-bombers, carried out a horrific massacre of several hundred Zimbabwe militants based in camps in Mozambique, razing seven camps. Under the flimsy excuse of "hot pursuit" the Rhodesian forces viciously attacked the camps based at Nura, Chicoa, Chicombizi, and Gentu to the northeast and Chiqualala and Chitanga to the southeast. All these - Changes on the camps lay within fifty miles inside the Mozambique border. Also attacked was the town of Changara on the road between the Cabora Bassa dam and Beira. Other areas still under attack at the time of writing were the provinces of Tete and Gaza in Mozambique, where according to the Mozambique News Agency, at least eighteen civilians were killed and thirty wounded during a Rhodesian attack on a railway station. 12
BISHOP ABEL MUZOREWA AND ATTACKS MOZAMBIQUE The bourgeois press in Britain and elsewhere has provided minimal coverage of these massacres; indeed its cynical attitude to the fate of the black masses of Zimbabwe was clearly expressed in the headline to the leader comment of the November 3 Guardian: "Geneva is the real battlefield. " The black nationalist leaders attending the conference, Sithole, Mugabe, Muzorewa, Nkomo, etc., are clearly in accord with this view. The outcome of the same day's talks amounted simply to the agreement that an ad hoc committee should be set up to investigate "whether constitutional mechanics for independence could be established by next September. " Meanwhile, Smith declared his intention to return to Rhodesia, commenting, "As soon as they (the nationalists) are ready to talk about what we have come here to talk about, I shall be back." The only comments the nationalist leaders (including Mugabe) had on the question of the massacres were framed in the context of "