Smith attempting to disrupt the talks at Geneva."
Geneva: the seventh attempt The present conference in Geneva is in fact the seventh attempt to produce a constitutional solution for Zimbabwe. It reflects, above all, the central weakness of the black nationalist leaders, which has been operative ever since the formation of nationalist organizations in that country: the illusion that constitutional lobbying, pressure group activities, and "peaceful" actions could bring about a transition to black majority rule. The illusions of the leadership played a major part in the events that led to the defeat of the nationalist movements in the 1960s. Mass arrests and repression by the Rhodesian Front regime were carried out with relative ease. (In fact, all the present leaders attending the Geneva conference were arrested during this period.) Today, as if to confirm this very point, the nationalist movement has suffered a significant blow during yet another constitutional conference, from which it will take some time to recover. It is no coincidence that the Rhodesian offensive was launched at the onset of the rainy season; the Rhodesian army chief, Lieutenant General Walls, stated only last week that their forces were under virtually full mobilization and that the "security forces" would not be able to contain the guerrillas. The forthcoming rain, he stated, was likely to make the situation more difficult. Far from being a "disruption" of the aims of the Geneva conference, the attacks on Mozambique actually begin to establish the basis for the success of the Kissinger/ Callaghan plan. (See INPRECOR, No.59, October 7, for an analysis of the Kissinger/Callaghan plan.) In spite of the rhetoric on the part of the various nationalist leaders, it has been very clear that the only section of the nationalist movement that held any significant bargaining weapon were the guerrilla forces of ZIPA. During ihe preparation for the conference, each leader tried to demonstrate the extent of his mass base and to influence the guerrillas. Nkomo was even reported to have claimed that he was a member of ZIPA, which was not taken seriously even by the bourgeois press. Muzorewa made a "triumphant return" from voluntary exile to be met by a crowd of some 100, 000 blacks in his home town of Highfields. This massive show of strength derived from the fact that the ANC (external wing) has not been as directly implicated in the in the collaborationism that has characterized Nkomo's wing. This move assured Muzorewa a place at the conference. The attendance of Sithole was ensured primarily by the encouragement from the "front line" states, in particular Nyerere of Tanzania, in spite of Mugabe's attempts to claim leadership of ZANU. Joshua Nkomo is in fact the "favorite" of imperialism (confirmed by the fact that he was the only black leader to meet Kissinger recently). His consistent willingness to participate in "constitutional talks" such as the Victoria Falls talks with Vorster last year has won him this honored position. Eager to demonstrate his accord with the Kissinger/Callaghan plan, he has called on Garfield Todd to be an "adviser" at the conference. The importance of this move lies in the fact that Todd (prime minister during 1953-58) led the imperialists' "struggle" for "reforms" agains: •-= strong reactionary white settlers in Rhodesia c.ri-= ..= 1950s. These "reforms" fundamentally represertes sire of imperialism, based in the then expandirg -a-ufacturing sector, to expand the skilled labor marketo include black workers and to create an African middle class that could ultimately provide a basis for a neocolonial solution for Rhodesia. The attempts at "reforms" failed drastically precisely because they directly threatened the interests of the white workers, petty bourgeoisie, and the settler bourgeoisie. They thus provided the basis for the crystallization of white solidarity that led to the victory of the Rhodesian Front. Nevertheless, Todd was able to have a significant credibility, which was further emphasized when he was placed under "house arrest" (that is, confined to his 100-acre farm!) by the Smith regime. The second important maneuver of Nkomo was the formation of the "patriotic front" with Robert Mugabe of ZANU. The latter was said to have substantial influence over the guerrilla forces of ZIPA. Such an alliance is intended to allow Nkomo to acquire the left cover that might enable him to recover some of his influence over these cadres. This alliance represents the reforging of an older alliance between Nkomo and Mugabe which existed in the NDP of the early 1960s. It also confirms the willingness of Mugabe to involve himself in "détente" maneuvers, in spite of much fine sounding leftist rhetoric. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that prior to the conference Mugabe had announced certain demands which he said had to be met before he would attend a conference. These included the call for the immediate release of all political prisoners; in addition, he said he would not recognize a delegation from Smith unless the latter attended "as part of the British delegation. " Although neither of these demands were met, the opportunist Mugabe nevertheless turned up for the Geneva conference. Mugabe's credibility in ZIPA is hard to estimate. He has promoted himself as the spokesman for ZIPA, though this has been hotly denied by D. Machinguara, deputy political commissioner of ZIPA. To cover his willingness to attend the conference, however, Mugabe proclaims, "We shall negotiate in Geneva and make war in Zimbabwe simultaneously ... . Vietnam is our model." Whatever differences there may be in the "programs" advanced by the various leaders, they are united on one central question: that "the British Government assumes their full responsibility, and call and chair a constitutional conference . . . ." This clearly betrays their willingness to accept the terms of imperialism: that Britain, responsible for years of brutality, oppression, and exploitation of the black masses of Africa, should have any claim to determine the future of the masses of Zimbabwe. Crisis of the Smith regime The imposition of international sanctions against Rhodesia had important effects on the expansion of the Rhodesian economy. This is reflected in the fact that
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ZIMBABWE Rhodesian exports increased from R$399 million (R$1 = US$1.48) in 1965 to about R$640 million in 1973. This was mainly as a result of the world demand for chrome and asbestos (for which the Byrd Amendment in the United States allowed one of the major loopholes in the sanctions); the mining sector was thus able to undergo a substantial expansion. The manufacturing sector benefited most from the imposition of sanctions, for in effect they acted as a "blanket tariff protection" for the Rhodesian industries and stimulated the development of import substitution industries. The gross value of manufacturing production increased from R$430.6 million in 1965 to R$1, 388 by 1975. The agricultural sector was essentially the only sector to be adversely affected by sanctions in the early period, but even here it managed to recover as a result of the international demand for tobacco. Also, there was a substantial diversification toward production of maize, for which Japan provided a substantial market. The colosure of the border with Zambia in 1971 and the developments in the Portuguese colonies, particularly Mozambique, began to have substantial effects on the political and economic situation in Rhodesia. By 1975 the Rhodesian Railways had accumulated a deficit of some R$21.2 million as a result of the closing of the 14
Zambia border, and a concerted effort was made to accelerate the completion of the Beita Bridge railroad to allow the redirection of goods for trade through South Africa. By the time that Mozambique had closed its borders with Rhodesia, 70 percent of the traffic had already been redirected southward. However, this placed severe restrictions on the export of goods, since the ports of South Africa were congested and were unable to cope with the demands placed on them by Rhodesian goods (Vorster was able to apply selective control of traffic to begin to exert pressure on Smith). The closure of the Mozambique border and the removal of access to the ports of Beira and Maputo resulted in a loss of about a third of Rhodesia's rolling stock and put severe pressures on the southward traffic. Furthermore, the strategic attacks by guerrilla forces on the Beita Bridge railways and roads have severely disrupted the use of this route. The development of substantial guerrilla activities, which have escalated since 1972, has played its part in heightening the general crisis of the regime. Between 1972 and 1975 the defense expenditure had increased from R$20 million to R$84 million, while police expenditure increased from R$16 million to R$44 million. This has been supplemented by a further R$6 million allocated for "special" services. Severe demands have been placed on the economy as a result of the conscription into the armed forces of all "able-bodied men" between the ages of 20 and 38. The acute shortage of skilled labor power caused by industrial expansion has been exacerbated by the enormous increase in emigration. The crisis is sharpened by the fact that substantial sectors of the population have been removed from the productive process to officer the "security" forces. Furthermore, of the 270,000 whites in Rhodesia, only about 80,000 males are over school age, and less than half of these are eligible for call-up. The number of troops killed during the guerrilla struggles has increased substantially: the cynical statistic known as the "kill ratio" (the number of blacks killed in ration to the number of whites) has in fact declined from 10:1 to 7:1. International capital urgently needs a settlement for Zimbabwe. The present situation has severely affected the capitalists' ability to reap profits from the country and they are eager to see the return of a stable (capitalist) situation. Firms like Lonrho (whose interests include mining, real estate, industries, and the Beira to Feruka oil pipeline) have been in the forefront in demanding a "settlement. " Toward this end they have long been supporters (including financially) of Nkomo. The immediate benefits of a settlement would include a stable climate for capitalist investment, the reduction of expenditure on arms and defense, the return of the skilled labor force to the productive process, the opening of the oil pipeline from Beira, and access to international markets via the ports of Beira and Maputo. On a wider scale, a "settlement" in Zimbabwe would provide the basis for easing the general political and social crisis in southern Africa as a whole and for beginning to relieve the pressures now mounting on that bastion of imperialist interests, South Africa.
The "front-line' states The "front line" states of Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola have also been in the forefront of those demanding a constitutional conference (and asking that Britain call and chair it). Their political positions and degree of "radicalism" on the question of Zimbabwe are influenced by the degree to which each would be affected by a "settlement. " Zambia has been the hardest hit by sanctions and the Rhodesian crisis, since Rhodesia provided 40 percent of Zambia's imports during the 1960s. None of the major imports have been replaced by Zambian industries; instead vast and expensive imports have come from Europe and Japan. Secondly, a settlement would allow the use of the cheap sea route for Zambia's copper via the Victoria Falls bridge to Salisbury and Umtali to Beira; since the closure of the Benguela railway (which runs through Angola), Zambia has had to transport copper through Rhodesia "illegally" as well as using the Tanzam railway to the north. Although the Victoria Falls bridge, which connects Rhodesia with Zambia, has been officially closed for four years, it is an open secret that up to 18,000 tons of goods a week from Zaire are sent through Lambia, Rhodesia, and Botswana to South African ports. But the Tanzam railway is much more expensive than the Rhodesia-Beira route. Thus, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda nas been in the forefron: of those demanding "peaceful" negotiations and has indeed played his part in harassing the militant sections of the Zimbabwe nationalists. Tanzania is far enough from Zimbabwe to enable Nyerere to hold a fairly radical position, while at the same time urging a peaceful settlement. On the one hand Nyerere fears developments in Limbabwe could have a radicalizing effect on his own base, while on the other hand, since "African socialism" has failed to bear any real fruits for Tanzania, he maintains a "progressive" foreign policy so as to gain a certain credibility. Botswana has a vested interest in continued use of the 400-mile railway connecting Rhodesia to South Africa. Further, a solution in Limbabwe would allow Botswana to have access to Beira and thus reduce its dependence on South African ports. Hence its desire to see a quick and "peaceful" settlement. In the case of Angola, the existing pressures derive from a social base that has only recently been engaged in armed struggle. Initially, Agostinho Neto favored the constitutional conference with Britain. Since his hero's welcome in Moscow, however, certain changes have occurred in the Kremlin's line which, while making no concrete criticism of the line favored by Britain and the "front line" states, has become more "radical. " In a joint statement issued October 14, Neto and the Soviet bureaucracy stated: "Imperialism and its stooges in Africa give all round to the racist regime (and) feverishly seek ways and means of prolonging their existence.... "The statement also expressed opposition to "the interference of reactionary forces in the affairs of southern Africa. "
No indication was made as to who these "stooges" ar= "reactionary forces" are. The return of the use of the railways and ports of Mozambique would of course greatly benefit the economy of that country. Moreover, the political and economic strains created by the presence of guerrilla camps in its territory are severe. The Samora Machel regime thus has an interest in a rapid solution in Zimbabwe. Frelimo's support for a constitutional conference with Britain and the constant interference in the affairs of the Zimbabwe militants of ZIPA betray the interest of this regime in the Kissinger/Callaghan plan. Nevertheless, it must be said that the support Mozambique has given to the ZIPA forces has been crucial to the effectiveness of the guerrilla activities and the struggles in Zimbabwe. Mozambique has also been forced to bear the brunt of the vile atrocities of the invasion of Rhodesian troops. The latter amounts to a concrete declaration by the Smith regime (and by imperialism by implication - since it has not condemned these actions) of their wish to smash the development of the struggles not only in Zimbabwe but also throughout southern Africa. There should be one main response to the recent attacks by the Rhodesian troops: that of mounting a counteroffensive against the Smith regime and its supporters. November 4, 1976 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT The Zimbabwe nationalist movement has been marked by the formation of various organizations which have undergone repeated splits and fusions. Below is a brief description of the major organizations and personalities which speak in the name of the movement today, The African Nationalist Congress was formed in 1957 by Joshua Nkomo (as president) and George Nyandoro, a trade unionist. They favored political equality and advocated following legal channels. In 1960, the ANC adopted the name National Democratic party (NDP): which sought the support of "democratic Great Britain" and included Robert Mugabe in its ranks. Later, Nkomo was to join the United Federal party while Ndabaningi Sithole joined Garfield Todd's Central African party. The NDP was outlawed by the British in December 1961, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was then formed under the leadership of Nkomo. Banned a year later, the organization went underground. While still maintaining the underground structures, in 1964, following the release of Nkomo from restriction, the leadership of ZAPU formed the People's Caretaker Council, itself banned a year Tater.
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ZIMBABWE - 1963 ZAPU split and Sithole formed the Zimbabwe frican National Union (ZANU) which was banned in 1964. Mugabe then joined the ranks of ZANU. In 1971, a further split occured which led to the formation of Frolizi (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe) by members of ZANU and ZAPU led by Nyandoro and Chikerema. Also in 1971, Abel Muzorewa led the formation of the African National Council, also involving members of ZANU and ZAPU. The year 1972 saw the formation of a joint political council and combined military leadership between ZANU and ZAPU. In December 1974, under the auspices of African diplomacy (in particular Kaunda of Zambia), a conference took place in Lusaka to form a right wing umbrella organization, ANC (African National Council), combining the four organizations ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, and Frolizi. Disagreements over political line, the interference of Kaunda, Nyerere, etc., and the longstanding clashes of personalities and ambitions of the leaders led to a split in this ANC between an internal wing led by Nkomo, and an external wing led by Muzorewa; 'upon his release from prison, Mugabe joined the external wing. Following the formation of the umbrella organization (the ANC), an external Zimbabwe Liberation Committee (ZLC) was formed consisting of four members each from ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, and Frolizi. The appointment of Sithole (of ZANU) to the ZLC led to clashes, and in 1975 ZAPU was suspended from the committee. By this time the ANC had already split into internal and external wings. In October 1975 ZANU members also quit the ZLC to form their own army under the leadership of Josia Tongogara and other LANU militants. The latter were later arrested by Kaunda for alleged complicity in the murder of Herbert Chitepo and other "tribal" killings between the Manyika and Karangas in exile in Zambia. These militants have recently been acquitted, but their organization in Zambia has been severely disrupted by Kaunda's interference. The so-called third force was then established (in late 1975) by ZANU and ZAPU, with a leadership made up of nine ZAPU and nine ZANU members. They are alleged to have some 10, 000 militants under their command in camps, of which 4,000 are said to be fully trained guerrillas. (Zimbabwe People's Army - ZIPA.) The present leadership is said to be composed of Solomon "Rev" Nhonga (implicated in the international commission's enquiry into the death of Herbert Chitepo), Elias Hondo, Dzinashe Machinguara and James Nrikadzinashe, all members of the Karanga tribe. We do not have sufficient information as the extent to which -"balism" plays a part, but indications are that it is : considerable.
THAILAND'S D A CIVIL WA On Wednesday, October 6, 1976, nearly three years to the day after the fall of the previous military dictatorship, the Thai army seized full power once again. The semi-civilian regime established with great difficulty after the popular uprising of October 1973 was dead. The baptismal fountain of the coup ran red with blood. Between 100 and 300 students were murdered on that day. Thousands of others were imprisoned. All democratic rights were suppressed. A reign of complete arbitrariness set in. A page in the history of