AUTUMN STORMS
ITALY THE COMING The criminal attack of August 4* and the economic crisis have once again raised the problem of the political leadership of the country. It is true that the latest edition of the center-left government managed to carry out its plan to get the fiscal decrees approved and that the accommodating parliament confirmed that for the moment no one wants to take the initiative in overturning them. But the decisive layers of the ruling class are aware of the risks involved in going into an extremely difficult economic and political period that could provoke explosive tensions equipped only with an intrinsically weak and largely discredited government that has survived more than anything else because of fear of the vacuum that would be created by its fall. Hence the anxious search for a way out; hence also the reappearance of public polemics about what governmental formula can allow for overcoming the crisis of leadership that opened up some years ago. We have never underestimated the fact that for about two years now the working class has objectively been thrown onto the defensive, above all because of the development of inflation. And we are aware that the re-emergence of terrorist acts and reactionary plots can work in the same sense. In the absence of decisive initiatives of struggle in the coming weeks and months, it cannot be excluded that a serious recession accompanied by the spread of unemployment could provoke phenomena of discouragement and confusion. Nevertheless, all the indications of the past year -- from the struggles around the contracts in the big factories to the divorce referendum and the mass mobilizations after the Brescia massacre -- confirm that the mass movement is not at all in retreat and that, on the level of the masses, it is the Christian Democracy and the far right that have lost ground. Under these conditions, only marginal fringes can project overcoming the crisis through an authoritarian or dictatorial solution. For this reason the question of a radical political turn is posed today above all in terms of the possible inclusion of the Communist party in the government bloc. The inclusion of the CP *The bombing of the Italicus train by fascists of the Ordine Nero (Black Order). 8 in the government would change the fundamental political context that has existed for the past several years and could lend a certain credibility to the government, which would be in position to widen its maneuvering room. In any case, such is the hope of those in the bourgeois camp who are more or less openly advocating this move. In the past several months, certain conditions for realization of the Historic Compromise (or some variant of it) have effectively ripened. The inclination of some sectors of the bourgeoisie to accept it has undoubtedly increased. The Communist party offered new proof of its "respectability" by the attitude it took toward the government's fiscal decrees. It refused to obstruch the decrees, although this would have inevitably blocked their application and probably would have led to the government's resignation. On the other side, the events in Portugal, where the CP is now in the government, and Greece, where the two CPs have converged in a favorable attitude toward the heirs of the colonels, have likewise contributed to easing the old resistance and have allowed for overcoming some traditional fears. This is the reality that lies behind the polemics that have gone on this summer; it would be a mistake to regard these polemics as a mere diversionary fig leaf. But despite all that, it remains improbable that the turn to the Historic Compromise will be made in the near future. When the bourgeoisie decides that it has reached the end of its rope, it will most likely make up its mind to definitively crush the sectoral resistance and routinist reflexes of the political apparatus, the clique in power, and their electoral agents. But the problem is to determine when the end of the rope has been reached. The conviction that so far continues to prevail is that the margins for maneuver have not yet been exhausted and that it is still possible to obtain indirect aid from the CP without adding it to the government or to the parliamentary majority. This calculation is not without foundation, for the CP itself seems for the moment to be more inclined to function on that level than to take direct responsibility for the government, which could cause it serious difficulties with the masses without providing any concrete compensation. On the other hand, the internal crisis of the Christian Democracy serves to raise obstacles or to postpone the operation. The arguments for rejecting the Historic Compromise advanced by the leaders of this party both during the July meeting of its National Council and during the August press debates seemed to center not so much on the old and obviously worn out traditional objections, but rather on the notion that it is too risky for such a daring operation to be carried out by a divided party that is suffering many difficulties with the social forces that have supported it up to now. Finally, the proposals for an agreement between the CP and the CD continue to offer little in the way of concrete openings, for they have not gone beyond discussion of generalities and have therefore not produced a government program corresponding to the requirements of the present situation. These propos-
als will hold out the real possibility for an agreement and will begin to present the immediate conditions for such a turn only when they begin to make some progress on this ground. Although it is conscious of the dangers involved, for the moment the bourgeoisie can only continue to live from day to day, seizing on any existing solution and fearing the worst. And all those who favor the status quo out of fear of being
EVILI• CONTRO L'AUMENTO DEL COSTO . DELLA VITA Currency reserves are down to almost nothing; the balance of payments deficit continues to grow; demand for consumer goods has been reduced even before the first effects of the thievery organized by the state economic decrees have been felt; industrial production is beginning to slow down, particularly in certain sectors; small companies are closing down. Thousands of workers are being laid off or are on technical unemployment while awaiting layoff. These are the initial signs of the economic crisis, an extremely grave crisis that could lead Italy to total collapse in the near future. We have previously stressed the fragility of the miniboom of 1973, which was both stimulated and undermined by inflation. We have pointed out that it was in contradiction to the evolution of the world capitalist economy, which was moving toward general crises. The energy crisis accelerated these processes, both in Italy and throughout the world. Today the beginnings of the Italian crisis are intermixed with a crisis that has already struck the most important capitalist countries to a greater or lesser extent. The Philco corporation has placed its workers on technical unemployment because it can no longer export its products. Fiat exports are going better than those of Volkswagen or General Motors, but, unlike in the past, the foreign market is unable to substitute for internal demand during lean periods. As ulways, of course, the capitalists are using the crisis for their own ends. In two ways. On the one hand they are trying to make the workers bear all the costs of the crisis. It is the swept away completely or seriously damaged by a grave jolt are able to carry the day. But will the terms of the situation remain the same if the gathering clouds of summer give way to violent autumn storms? No definitive response can yet be given to this question. But it is certain that many things will change. AN