CONFRONTATIONS
ITALY The events of the spring and summer of this year have raised the level of class struggle in southern Europe to new heights of intensity. The collapse of the Salazarist dictatorship in Portugal and the military junta in Greece has opened new possibilities of class confrontation at the easternmost and westernmost extremities of southern Europe. In our editorial on the Portuguese and Greek events ("After Portugal and Greece: A Hot Autumn in Mediterranean Europe, • INPRECOR No. 5-6, August 3, 1974), we referred to the possibility of a "chain reaction" sweeping across southern Europe. Spain, ruled by a dictatorship already suffering from advanced senility and the victim of two severe blows in the fall of its companion right-wing dictatorships, was mentior~d as a likely area for an early explosion. In the last issue of INPRECOR (No.7. September 6), we published a dossier on the Spanish situation produced by the comrades of the LCR-ETA (VI), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International on the territory of the Spanish state. The fourth major component of crisis-racked southern Europe is Italy, where a new rise of workers struggles against the bourgeoisie's attempts to force the workers to bear the costs of economic ruin is creating yet another potentially explosive situation. In this issue of INPRECOR we are publishing three articles on the Italian situation produced by the comrades of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (GCR -- Revolutionary Communist Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International. They were published in the September 3 issue of the GCR's fortnightly newspaper, Bandiera Rossa. The first is a perspectives resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the CGR during the summer. The second, the lead editorial of Bandiera Rossa, deals with the possibility of the bourgeoisie adding the CP to the government. The third is an outline of the Italian economic crisis. To set the context for this dossier, certain elements of information must be recalled. The most recent congress of the Christian Democracy (CD), the dominant party of the Italian bourgeoisie since the fall of fascism, was held in the spring of 1973. At that congress, the many tendencies within the CD agreed to vote for a common resolution and elected Amintore Fanfani as secretary general. (He had already held that post during the 1950s.) But the defeat suffered by the CD in the May 12 referendum on the divorce law (see INPRECOR, Nos. 0 and 1) was a heavy blow to the Fanfani leadership and reopened polemics within the CD, ending the 1973 accords. For its part, the Italian Communist party, largest CP
TOWARD DECISIVE in the capitalist world, launched a campaign for the "Historic Compromise" just after the coup in Chile. The Historic Compromise envisions collaboration among Communists, Socialists, and Catholics; in practice it means a bloc between the CP and the CD, with the participation of the Socialist party. The groups of the far left, more and more sliding down the incline of centrism, have taken increasingly equivocal positions on the CP's drive for the Historic Compromise. Lotta Continua has gone the furthest of all the groups. If considers collaboration between the CP and the CD as an inevitable stage in Italian political development and believes that the CP, if it entered the government, would be obliged to express -- even if in a deformed manner -- the "workers program" generated by the masses. Avanguardia Operaia has explicitly pronounced itself in favor of the CP's struggle for reforms. The "trade-union let " in this situation is represented above all by the leaders of the metalworkers union, the Federazione dei Lavoratori della Metallurgia (FLM -- Federation of Metallurgical Workers). Some of the members of this leadership, among them Trentin, a member of the CP, can be characterized as right centrists. Others, members of the PdUP-Manifesto (Partito di Unita Proletaria - - Party of Proletarian Unity -- il Manifesto, an organization based . -ound the daily paper of the same name), two groups that are in process of fusing, are further to the left; but on the essential matters they do not differ from the right centrists. The centrist groups often fall into line behind the positions of these trade-union currents. They have even gone so far as to hail as a great victory the winning of a very partial and limited minimum wage guarantee at Alfa Romeo, to support the line of the trade unions (including the central bureaucracy) on the necessity of increasing investment in the South of the country, and to consider as an important victory a modest agreement granting certain workers the possibility of studying (the "150 hours"). The economic decrees referred to in the articles below were adopted by the government at the beginning of July and were confirmed by the parliament in mid-August. They involve a whole series of fiscal measures having the effects of reducing the buying power of the workers and increasing prices very sharply (the price of gasoline for example). According to some calculations, workers whose monthly wages range between 180,000 and 200,000 lire (about US$275-300) will suffer losses equivalent to 25, 000-30, 000 lire a month. In the parliament, the CP deputies made only minor amendments to the decrees. The decrees on education
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ITALY were adopted last spring and call for the establishment of so-called representative structures in which the students are underrepresented.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in the past several weeks the trade unions have decided to begin a FOR A GENERAL ANTICAPITALIST MOBILIZATION! • 1. At their national conference last November, revolutionary Marxists sketched out the tendencies of development of the Italian situation in the following terms:
"The perspective on which we must base our orientation remains that the social and political crisis that opened in 1968 will go on and, in a general way, will intensify. The tendency will be toward an ever more direct and unmediated clash between the two antagonistic classes over very basic alternatives: a new rise of profits or a dynamic of rising wages; an incomes policy or an affirmation of the right of the working class to struggle in every possible way to defend its own interests and to satisfy its own needs; restoration or maintenance of the employers* 'authority' in the plants or development of workers democracy; intensification of the rate of exploitation or reduction of the work week with workers control over the work pace, employment, etc." In the framework of this general tendency it was explained that there was a "prospect of a certain prolongation of the present governmental formule, which neither the trade unions nor the CP itself has any interest in challenging. Nevertheless, struggle for a demand that they hud earlier denounced as demagogic and maximalist: equal wage increases for all -- at the level of the categories getting the biggest raises and tied to a sliding scale.
INPRECOR at the same time, the prospect is for a prolongation of a situation in which no reformist action of any great scope will be carried out and, consequently, for a prolongation of a situation in which none of the most explosive contradictions of these past years will be attenuated, not even the 'peripheral' ones that the original center-left government theoretically wanted to eliminate." The events of the past ten months have demonstrated the correctness of that analysis. The situation remains characterized by deep-going tensions, heightened conflicts, and persistent instability. The bourgeoisie has been unable to take a single step toward overcoming its total political crisis, while on various occasions broad sectors of the masses have confirmed that they retain a high potential of combativity. 2 2. In various respects, the situation for the bourgeoisie today is even more serious than it was in 1969. Economically, because after having emerged with great difficulty and in any case only partially from the most serious recession of the post-
war period, the bourgeoisie now sees its economic mechanisms threatened by an inflation that is tending to become uncontrollable; it is threatened by a new approaching recession, and is suffering heavily from the effects of the international financial crisis and the oil crisis. Politically, because the state apparatus has in a broad sense been weakened by multiple centrifugal tendencies, is blocked more than in the past from carrying out even its elementary functions, and has suffered an unprecedented loss in credibility, for the ruling party is ever less capable of asserting its hegemony, having failed in its attempt to relaunch the Fanfani leadership and finding itself once again in the grip of internal difficulties. Ideologically, because the fundamental mystifications that had bolstered the "democratic reconstruction" and the "economic miracle" have lost all credibility and have had their fraudulent character exposed even in the press organs that express the interests of the ruling classes. 3. The understanding of the depth of the crisis of the ruling class should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that the bourgeoisie now finds it necessary to act decisively and to deliver hard blows at the working class. Contrary to what many had supposed in the past and to what some continue to maintain, the economic crisis was not at all artificially stimulated through political manipulation, but is rather the result of structural contradictions that, because of a convergence of conjunctural factors, are coming to assume vast dimensions in the present phase and are dealing devastating blows to the "normal" functioning of the system both nationally and internationally. Consequently, the crisis will be able to be overcome or circumvented only through drastic measures of restructuration that will inevitably strike not only the working class but also at wide layers of the middle classes and even at the weakest sectors of the ruling class itself. Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact that the reconstruction operation and the redistribution of income is favored by the very mechanisms of the situation in that no effective general action of the exploited classes is being counterposed to the "automatic" economic processes that feed inflation and strike heavily at employment levels. And here is the essential heart of the present period: possible partial successes of the working class have only a defensive and on the whole ephemeral value; they are rapidly placed in question after they are achieved. The restructuration and redistribution operations can be countered only on the scale of a comprehensive struggle based on central political initiatives. This explains why the working class, despite the virtually uninterrupted development of struggle during the past two years, has suffered a reduction in its income and has lost part of the territory it had gained in the first phase of its big ascent. It also explains why the bourgeoisie, despite its intrinsic weakness and its grave crisis of political leadership, was able through the decrees of early July to resort to measures of unprecedented breadth in the current phase of capitalism. both inside and outside Italy, thus inflicting a defeat on the working class. 4. The working class should have responded in an immediate and militant way on a comprehensive political scale to the attack of the bourgeoisie, the culminating point of which was reached with the decrees of early July. But the reformist political and trade-union organizations once again revealed their inability to defend the vital interests of the working class and the other exploited layers, avoiding a general political confrontation and instead seeking a compromise that was ever more difficult to obtain, even from their own point of view. They postponed the dates of the decisive struggle, seeking to bring pressure on the government and the employers through limited mobilizations (regional strikes, sectoral actions, the July 24 actions, and so on). The major organizations of the non-traditional left acted in the framework of the orientation they had drawn up during the autumn of 1972, when they renounced presenting a real alternative to the bureaucratic leaderships on the field of the great battles around the contracts. In practice they accepted or supported the actions of the trade-union bureaucrats in that they did not put forward substantially different comprehensive platforms to those of the bureaucrats, instead limiting themselves to making criticisms about the methods of struggle. They thus contributed to mystifying the bureaucracy's conception of the general strike, associated themselves uncritically with the hailing of certain alleged successes (like the "guaranteed income" at Alfa Romeo, the investments in the South, the "150 hours"), and often lined up behind the so-called trade-union left or behind some of its most noted representatives. All this made very difficult the tasks of the workers vanguard in the factories, who have been the advocates of meaningful actions of struggle during the past two years. It likewise constituted a very serious obstacle to the intervention of the revolutionary Marxists. But despite all that, despite all the ground that has been lost, real possibilities of recovery and relaunching of struggle still remain. In reality, in coming months the broad masses will have ways of verifying in the concrete the consequences of the government decrees and the consequences of the soaring inflation, and they will therefore move to respond. Moreover, the situation could deteriorate even further, provoking not only an additional reduction in the incomes of the workers, but also and simultaneously an unprecedented contradiction in employment levels. It is true that a drastic economic situation could have negative consequences for the working class in the sense that it could create differentiation between the layers that command the greatest trade-union power and the more defense less layers and between the employed workers and the unemployed, with all the consequences for the combativity and unity of the class or important sectors of it that we have seen in the past. Neverthe less, very recent events demonstrate that the masses retain a very high level of potential combativity, and in the present European and Italian context, the possibility of resignation to defeat, of acceptance of the blows of the employers and the government without hard and repeated struggle, seems remote. Certain striking incidents that occurred during the demonstrations for regional strikes between July 9 and July 12 confirm that a substantial vanguard continues to be actively present and that broad sectors of the masses have a critical attitude toward the opportunist choices that have been made by the trade-union leaderships. 5. We have never denied the importance that sectoral struggles -- or even struggles simply factory or workshop-based -can have under certain conditions. In a situation in which the employers will move toward restructuration and layoffs - - as they necessarily will, in various forms and at different rhythms -- openings for partial struggles will objectively appear, especially given the absence up to now of initiatives toward gen-
5
ITALY eralized struggles. Revolutionary militants will have to commit themselves on this field also, while trying in any case to put forward objectives that tie in with our more general orientation (distribution of available work among all, with no reduction in pay; workers control over the work pace and the employment rolls; rejection of any form of intensification of exploitation, etc.) and that point up the precarious character of every partial or sectoral solution. But having said that, we must decisively reaffirm that today we must place ourselves essentially on the field of struggles and objectives of a general character. The bourgeoisie has already struck hard blows and in fact has already imposed political-economic decisions that weigh heavily on the working class. If the trade unions want and are able to continue to impose the orientation that they have set down in these past months, if the masses are not mobilized powerfully, a defeat will be inevitable: the income of the workers will suffer a new and drastic decline and the level of employment will drop seriously. What is needed is a reversal of the present tendency. This can be carried out only through a massive response to the measures of the government and the employers immediately after the summer vacations. The workers mobilizations will have to culminate in a general strike, and this general strike must be conceived not simply as a demonstrative act or as a means of pressure, but as a test of strength between the classes. Thus, it will have to be a general strike not limited in duration at the outset (in this sense, there is no substantial di ference among the four-, eight-, and twenty-four-hour general strike), but must be prolonged until the essential objectives are won. 6. The platform of struggle for the period that has now opened up must be based around the following points:
--abrogation of the law-decrees of early July.
--against inflation, for an integral sliding scale of wages that compensates fully and immediately for all price increases and that is applied under workers control at all levels (From control of the prices of the costs of production to the verification of retail prices). The increases accruing under the sliding scale must be calculated on the basis of a base wage of 250,00C lire a month. So long as the present wage system remains in force, the equalization of wages at the level of the highest categories must be demanded even in partial struggles.
--against layoffs, for a sliding scale of hours; that is, divide the available work among all, with no reduction in personnel and no cuts in wages. No layoffs! No overtime! No speed-up! Workers control over the work pace and the employment rolls!
--for the defense of layers of the workers in weak unions in order to avoid the spread of deep differentiations in the working class; for a minimum wage cutting across all categories, not less than 200,000 lire a month and linked to the sliding scale.
--end taxes on wages. 7. 7. If the working class achieves success in the fight for such objectives, it would create the conditions for moving from an objectively defensive position to an offensive one. Within this perspective, transitional demands retain their full validity and 6 must not be limited to the level of propaganda. The essence of the transitional demands -- that is, demands able to stimulate an anticapitalist dynamic -- is present in the demand for the sliding scale insofar as it is conceived as integrally linked to workers control at various levels. The crisis that emerged in the autumn of 1973, especially the energy crisis and the shortage of certain consumer goods, provided the stimulus for extending our approach to other areas. The slogan of nationalization without compensation and under workers control of the oil trusts, the big food monopolies, and the large-scale distribution network was put forward then. It should be taken up again, and so should the demand for the abolition of secret banking and for the opening of the companies' account books. These slogans should help in transforming into antagonistic class terms conflicts that the bourgeoisie tries to present as exceptional and that the reformists falsely claim can be overcome through a rationalization of the system. Finally, workers control must be demanded -- in the form of control over the work pace and employment rolls -- in a struggle against capitalist restructuration, which is aimed at intensification of the rate of exploitation and elimination of jobs. 8. A general battle aiming at central economic and political decisions will create the conditions for posing the problem of the political leadership of the country, the problem of the government. It is significant that discussions on this question have been going on among the non-traditional far-left and that layers of workers have become sensitive to this problem. Revolutionary Marxists hold fast to their rejection of any solution that involves governmental collaboration between the workers organizations and the parties of the bourgeoisie. On this basis they reject the perspective of the so-called Historic Compromise as well as any other tactical or conjunctural version of this perspective. They reject any position favoring any sort of CP participation in the responsibilities of government. Such participation would in no way express a "workers program," and would certainly provoke divisions among the masses, thus facilitating restabilization or, at the very least, would make a comprehensive mobilization of the working class in response to the class enemy's measures and decisions much more difficult. The solution that must be fought for is a government that excludes all representatives, whether direct or indirect, of capitalist interests and that defends the interests of the proletariat and the other exploited layers. It must be a workers government whose anticapitalist social content is immediately asserted. It cannot be conceived of as an expression of the existing parliamentary institutions or the relationship of forces within them. It will have to be the expression of the self-development and maturation of a broad movement around general political objectives and will have to be based in the first place on organs of proletarian democracy that emerge or are reinvigorated in the struggle. The political components of this government -- the parties and organizations that will be part of it -- cannot be predicted in advance. In this sense, the perspective of a workers government has to be advanced, for the moment, mainly on the field of propaganda, as an outlet that corresponds to the requirements of this period of the crisis of the system but whose realization in the immediate future is blocked by the absence of the subjective conditions necessary for its fulfillment.
9. The GCR considers its main priority to be intervention in the workers struggles that are on the agenda for this autumn. The GCR will fight for the orientations that were worked out at its workers conference, held in Turin at the beginning of July, and explained once again in this resolution. We will continue to be present in the trade unions, and especially in the delegates councils, the most important field of intervention. We will fight for a revitalization of the delegates councils, which must play a more dynamic role and must constantly be renewed in a democratic manner. Insofar as we succeed in winning a consensus within the vanguard around our proposals and methods of struggle and organization, we will create the preconditions for the formation of a class-struggle tendency in the unions, which will oppose the bureaucratic leaderships and their conceptions and organizational practices. For our specific intervention we will launch workers collectives (or red mole collectives), which will be organizations composed of worker militants and sympathizers of the Fourth International, as well as people who agree with the orientation of our organization. These collectives will point out not only the directions necessary for the struggles in which the workers of a given factory or category are engaged, but will also advance the comprehensive political positions of the revolutionaries. Our experiences since the national conference -particularly in Turin and Taranto -- indicate that encouraging results can be achieved, provided systematic action is developed, conjunctural vacillations are avoided, and the entire organization is committed to the actions. In the present situation, construction of workers collectives is more than ever a priority task. 10 10. In the coming year, the student movement will be conditioned, probably more so than during last year, by the development of the general political situation and the general battles of the working class. The search for connections and convergence with the workers movement remains a fundamental requirement. The coming fight in the schools and universities against the normalization attempts represented by the government decrees can achieve success essentially in relation to the positive development of the general political battle. The objectives and forms of struggle of the revolutionary Marxists in the schools and campuses will be elaborated in a separate document. But it can be said here that revolutionary Marxists will reaffirm their rejection of any form of participation through 1SI FUORILESGE NOSTRI FRAN government appointment and to the functioning of the bodies called for by the government decrees. The most massive and intransigent response must be given to the government's attempt to put an end to a whole phase of politicization and radicalization of the students by choking off the anticopitalist dynamic of their struggle. 11. 11. The greater success the workers are able to achieve in the coming struggles, the more unfavorable conditions will become for any fascist or protofascist initiatives. Thus, a correct orientation in these struggles is a precondition for effectively conducting the battle against fascism itself. As for more specific orientations, revolutionary Marxists express their opposition to any conceptions of democratic antifascism or resistance that postulate unity between the workers parties and the bourgeois parties or groups. At the same time, we reject the re-raising by the major groups of the non-traditional left of certain themes and terminology used by the Communist party during the 1950s, the clearest expression of which is their call to make the request to utlaw the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italia. o -- Italian Social Movement, the largest neofascist organization) the axis of the antifascist mobilization. Such an orientation is illusory and dangerous: illusory because it can create illusions that legal measures taken by the ruling class can resolve the problem; dangerous because it erects an obstacle to the understanding of the central problem, which is that the battle against fascism can be won only through direct action and the mobilization of the working class. For this reason, revolutionary Marxists will continue to base their antifascist campnign around the two axe. of the workers united front and workers and students self-defense. 12. 12. The GCR will continue to make its contribution to anti-imperialist mobilizations and to active internationalist solidarity. We will support any initiative that can ensure united mass mobilizations -- in opposition to any sectarian utilization of anti-imperialist issues by particular groups or blocs -and, af the same time, we will push for the necessary theoretical and political confrontation. We must begin now to prepare for actions in September around the first anniversary of the Chilean coup.