Khrushchev'!s leadership" and merely urges that the boundary dispute be solved "in the spirit of the Colombo proposals. "
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KHRUSHCHEV'S HEIRS SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION
By Pierre Frank
Khrushchev's dismissal has been followed up, a month later, with expulsions from the Central Committee and new nominations to ; the. Presidium, On the eliminations there is little worth noting -they involve Khrushchev's closest collaborators who are now paying the price for their former prominence. It has not been reported whether Khrushchev himself was present at the Central Committee meeting where these measures were taken although it would be quite surprising if he were. Yesterday, the premier; today he no longer — exists -- did not even exist in the past,
Among the new nominations the most interesting are those involving the rise of younger figures like Alexander N,. Shelepin. For the first time, men are appearing in the ruling heights who, because of their youth, not only did not participate in the first years of the revolution even in an obscure way or in executive posts during the’ dark years of the Stalinist repression, but who during the war occupied minor posts at best. By formation and by occupation they are bureaucrats imbued with numerous concepts inherited’ from the Stalinist past, but they have lived under quite different conditions from those experienced by their predecessors, These anonymous faces emerging from the bureaucratic night are featureless, No one can say with the least certainty’ who they are, or what they may do-=- — > within thé bureaucratic framework, ‘naturally: which means, among other things, within the framework of the foreign policy of | "peace= ful coexistence" and "de-Stalinization" at home,
“The first’ move of the Soviet ambassadors in the capitalist countries was’ to reassure all the governments that "peaceful coexistence" would: be maintained. Up to now, however, no move has been undertaken of a positive character, However, it is probable that the new leading team has likewise reassured the Poles and the Czechs, who were nervous over some of Khrushchév'!s initiatives in the direction of Bonn.
In the field of Sino-Soviet relations, the first result of the change in teams in the Soviet Union was the resumption of negotiations with the Chinese. But up to now this has been about the sole result. It has been announced, although not officially, that the conference of twenty-six parties scheduled for December’ 15 will not be held. The fact is that a new phase: has opened in negotiations; the public polemic has virtually disappeared, or, rather, has taken a veiled form. That it would be extremely difficult for them to reach a common line, we said from the beginning; inasmuch as: the Chinese and Soviet bureaucracies were shaped by different: conditions that have given them opposing orientations on some of ‘the miin questions of our epoch, For the time being no known’ change: has’ occurred in the relations on the state level, although these-could be modified much easier than between the parties and should be arranged in order
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to establish a more normal situation between the two workers states.
It is in domestic policies that the new leadership reveals the weakness of its position, We will not discuss the two kilos of flour given every Muscovite;.this is reminiscent of: the gifts handed out in joyous celebration of the ascension of a new monarch, But it is-necessary to: note the concessions or the promises made to all layers of Soviet society. Do
First of all, the promise of a decrease in the price of goods, This is extremely important in:.view of the fact that Khrushchev's popularity declined heavily in the past year following the increase in the prices of meat and butter and the long queues at bakeries due to the shortage of flcur.
The population has been generally reassured with regard to the: production of consumers Goods 5 there's no intention of touching that, they have: been told, oe :
. ‘For the. peasants, certain measures. have been modified rela-_ ting. to their;.small plots and private livestock. Advances have been made to the: technocrats, oe
: For the intelloctuais, who have undoubtedly been the. most eritical with respect to the leaders, the new team have made re-.. assuring gestures (liberation of the poet Brodsky from prison,, criticism of Lysenko. .. +). Ilychev has. likewise been removed. =;;. under accusation of having displayed. too. great rigidity 1 toward: the writers and artists, Log
The November Central Committee, in addition, cancelled the reform of the Communist party put into effect. by Khrushchev at the. . end of 1962 which upset the former: structure. of the party by divid-. ing it into two branches, one:for industry the other for agriculture, a kind of division into a party of.city bureaucrats and a party of country bureaucrats. The former: system is now restored -=- which would lead one to suspect that the reform led to results. contrary to those counted on.
» In other worcs, in less than a month, the new leadership has shown that it is “proceeding to put administrative reforms into. effect; that it can grant concessions. This also means that it can cancel them, if necessary.:* But in no case is there any intention to move against the bureaucratic political regime, 7
This leadership is weak, however; much weaker than: the leaders who, from Malenkov to Khrushchev, succeeded Stalin. ,..It. is. weak in: face of a Soviet. society in which the old fear has disappeared. and in which the demands, not only on the material level but also... on the level of ideas, of freedom, is growing. And it is weak in.. | Lace of the workers states.and the Communist parties abroad where: the leeway of independence is constantly growing.
~ aD Baw
THE EDITOR TAL IN "RED FLAG"
; By Joseph Hansen
On November 20 Peking radio told the world to stand by for an important statement. This proved to be an editorial in Red Flag, the official journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party. The editorial, entitled "Why Khrushchev Fell," was a harsh attack against the former Soviet premier.
The tone of the attack and the arguments advanced have: been met with glee in Western circles, particularly Washington.’ It:‘has generally been interpreted as a warning to Khrushchev'ts heirs that they must accept unconditional surrender. The New York Times, for instance, voiced the editorial opinion [in the November 23. international edition] that the Kremlin can hardly avoid answering the: attack and yet will find it highly embarrassing to do so, The: ‘Dimes therefore concluded, "This is nothing less than the beginning of Chinese political warfare against the new Soviet leadership. What Peking now assails as the Khrushchev line is precisely what has been unveiled this month as the Brezhnev-Kosygin line."
The gloating in imperialist circles arises from the conclu-s sion that Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow ended in failure, that the attempt to patch up ‘the Sino-Soviet differences proved futile, and that the rift will now become deeper. The sigh of relief in these — quarters is quite audible, for they had earlier taken an opposite view. With Khrushchev gone, it appeared to them, the People's Republic of China:-and the Soviet Union might well find a way to compose their differences, at least on the state level, and succeed in presenting a common front against the Western powers.
It is true that the editorial is aimed at the Brezhnev-Kosygin team although the stick is ostensibly wielded on a dead horse. The. editorial even obliquely attacks those who hope for the continuation of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev"; and this gives substance to the elation of the Western experts. Nevertheless their conclusions appear rather simplistic, if not hasty, and are evidently affected by wishful thinking. Peking knows its Moscow and the editorial may have double aims, It does serve warning on Brezhnev-Kosygin; but it is premature to conclude that Mao has already written off Khrushchev's: heirs and has decided to try to sweep them into the same wastebasket in which their patron ended up.
The Main Charges
Twelve main charges are levelled against Khrushchev. These are as- follows:
“q) Under pretext of combatting the cult of the personality: Khrushchev attacked Stalin, using the foulest language. By doing this, he opposed Marxism-Leninism.
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(2) He sought general co-operation with American imperialism. He sent rockets to Cuba and then docilely withdrew them on the orders of the American pirates. He tried. to sell Cuba's sovereignty by agreeing to United Nations inspection of the island.
(3). He bowed to. American nuclear blackmail and sought. to pre= vent China from building. its own nuclear force. He injured the defense of the Soviet Union and signed a partial test-ban treaty.
(4) He sought in all ways to obstruct revolutionary movements in the capitalist countries, advising them to take the legal pariiamentary road to socialism. on
(5) He sought to oppose the national liberation movement and sabotaged it. When the U.S. cooked up the Tonkin Gulf incident, Khrushchev tried to cover it up under the banner of peaceful coex~ istence.
(6) He supported Tito, attempting to reverse ‘the 1960 condemnation of the "clique of the renegade Tito,' .
(7) He did everything he could to injure and undermine Alban-
are: (8) He spread innumerable rumors: ‘and slanders. about the Chinese. Commund st party and Mao Tse-tung.
(9) He took as his models the Common Market and the capitalist bloc, reducing the industries of the. “brother Communist coun= tries" to "mere subsidiaries."
(10) He used the congresses of his and other parties to launch.sweeping attacks against parties that remained faithful to Marxism-Leninism.
(11) He played. the role of a patriarch, deciding to convéke | an illegal meeting of the: -international Communist parties to split: the movement. wo ER
(12) He followed a series of revisionist policies leading -. toward capitalism; his blind direction of Soviet agriculture and . industry -provoking chaos in the national: economy and causing great difficulties for the Soviet people. Not Pro-Maoists o
.« There,is no doubt that the Western experts are correct in concluding that the publication of these charges runs @irectly counter to the explanations offered by Brezhnev-Kosygin for the ouster of Khrushchev.. They are also correct in concluding that Mao regards Brezhnev-Kosygin as Khrushchevists and not Maoists, One point at least would thus seem to be settled -- the superficial
speculation that Khrushchev was ousted by a pro-Peking grouping has. proved to be dead wrong.
Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that the editorial lists "de-Stalinization" as No, 1 in the crimes of Khrushchev. In the peculiar language of the Sino-Soviet conflict, "de-Stalinization" and "xhrushchevism" are synonomous, and praise of Stalin -- from Peking!s. viewpoint -- is only next to praise of Mao himself,
Careful examination of the charges in the editorial indicates that the authors have other people in mind besides Brezhnev-Kosygin. The: editorial is designed to reassure those who have rallied to Peking's banners, The firmness of tone tells them that Chou En-lai's negotiations do not mean a "sell-out" is contemplated, whatever agreement: or partial agreement Peking may eventually gain. The inclusion of the point about Albania is significant in this respect. The references to Cuba and to the "brother Communist countries" are to be taken in the same: light, All those inclined to back Peking, or to assert independent: views, are assured that Peking will not make any deal at their expense, This heartening news, of course, helps maintain the pressure, a prime requisite if hard bargaining is contemplated.
If this ts what is aimed at, then the warning itself seems more proportionate. Instead of the "beginning of Chinese political warfare against the new Soviet leadership," it can be read as a firm notice to Khrushchév's heirs that’ unlike Khrushchev they must recognize the growing weight.anhd::standing of the People's Republic of China. .if Brezhnev and Kosygin: imagined that Peking can be fobbed off with little more than a scapegoat, even one as plump as Khrushchev, they can disabuse themselves, Mao is not unmindful of the Kremlin awarding:him a prize, such as Khrushchev's scalp, but he also. wants something more substantial. pig ds
Peking requires, and feels entitled to, big economic aid from the USSR and on much more favorable terms than were granted ‘in the — past. Otherwise. .. The- Kremlin! s Dilemma
What the Chinese leaders. have done is to present Brezhnev~ Kosygin with the same dilemma faced by Khrushchev, They have added a request for an early reply. Khrushchev's heirs have thus found . the breathing space they sought through the ouster of their patron — and collaborator rather short, at least insofar as the Sino=Soviet conflict is concerned, Mao has nothing to gain by waiting. He is forcing the new team in the Kremlin to face up immediately to the dilemma which they won by taking over.
. The problem is how to ‘appease both Peking and Washington with. the relatively limited resources at the disposal of the Soviet.-bureau-~ cracy. To provide China with aid on the scale demanded (and required) would -- in the absence of cutting down the overhead cost of bureau-
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cratic parasitism -- mean immense sacrifices by the Soviet people, sacrifices on the scale of the Stalin era. This is what Mao appears. to be insisting on with his. ,omphasis on the "glories" of Stalints time and the "contributions" of the late paranoiac dictator. .
But ar Brezhnev-Kosygin decide they cannot meet Mao's. price, then they are threatened with continuation of the attack in the area where they, like Khrushchev, are most vulnerable -- ideology, where they have elearly revised Marxism, To outflank Peking in this field requires carrying "de-Stalinization" to its final conclusion, the revival of genuine Leninism. This would signify. the rehabilitation of Trotsky, the establishment of proletarian democracy and the resumption of the world-wide revolutionary program that guided Soviet -foreign policy in the time of Lenin. The bureaucratic caste cannot do this without destroying itself, something few of its members are willing to contemplate. Do
Moreover. it would mean a worsening of relations with imperlalist America..: But immense pressure from this quarter bears down on the Soviet Union. Due. to their social base and social ties, the characteristic response of the Soviet bureaucrats to imperialist pressure -- and they were trained in this personally by Stalin -- is not to mount a counteroffensive but to bend and, to concede, if bend= ing and conceding is: at adi possible. : “On ‘Thus the Peking. editorial,. even if it is not a signal of re= newed political war but simpiy:.a signal that Brezhnev-Kosygin are in for hard bargaining, can:cause perturbation in the Kremlin. If it-.is followed up before they: have: succeeded in: consolidating their -victory over Khrushchev, a new crisis in the:top circles of the Soviet bureaucracy and further convulsions ine the international Communist movement can be expected,
Where the White House Comes In-
However, there is still another ‘element that should not be lost sight of. American imperialism is very much involved in this situation, Not so strangely, expressions of regret over the downfall of Khrushchev were to be found in the American press, Was the shoe~wielding premier the worst figure, after all, to have as ruler of the USSR; that is, from Wall Street's viewpoint? If he was nok the worst, could it be said that every thing possible was done to: give him a hand in his difficulties? oa Ped
What we are referring to here is a “commonplace in: interna« tional politics. Khrushchev showed his awareness of it by discreetly indicating that as between Johnson and Goldwater he preferred the former in the White House, With Stalin, this was standard procedure, constituting in his politics a substitute for. revolutionary program. -America's rulers have not displayed comparable dexterity: on their side since the days of Roosevelt, who even went so farvas to help whitewash Stalin in the infamous Moscow frame-up trials, (He in-
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spired the notorious Hollywood film Mission:to Moscow.)
Now that Johnson has been settled in the White House with the biggest majority vote in modern times, he faces the problem of whether to continue in the brinkmanship style of Truman and Dulles or whether, in the tradition of Roosevelt, to attempt a policy of greater sophistication.
By embarrassing