Khrushchev's followers, the editorial in Red Flag gives the State Department and the White House a vigorous shake. What shall the policy of the "Great Society" be in relation to Mos-~ cow and Peking? Mere gloating over the discomfiture of Brezhnev and Kosygin? -Or shall active measures be undertaken to shore thom up as a "lesser evil"?
To operate .really effectively in this situation, however, a
seemingly very contradictory move is required; namely, U.S. recogni-~ tion of the People's Republic of China. Only through contact with both sides can Washington hope to mount a policy of playing them against each other; i.,e., favoring now one, now the other, with the aim of weakening both in the process. In the immediate situation, Johnson could relieve the pressure on Brezhnev-Kosygin by himself “pranting concessions to Peking and dang ling the bait of bigger possibilities.
But is Johnson fundamentally atrone enough to get away with an abrupt change of this type in U.S. foreign policy despite its being demanded for some time by significant sectors of leading bourgeols circles? Can he follow in the path blazed by de Gaulle? And in the long run will such a policy actually succeed?
True, from the viewpoint of American imperialism, certain aspects of Mao's propaganda are intriguing. Particularly noticeable are his expressions of admiration for Stalin, his praise of Stalin's policy of building "socialism in one country, ’t his repeated assurances of the correctness of Stalin's war on- Trotskyism, the program and movement pre-eminently identified with active development of world revolution. Imperialism can appreciate a genuine Stalinist. Ameri-~ can, British, French and German imperialism all found it possible to do profitable business with the original himself. And what other language can Mao resort to in talking across the walls of "fortress America" to the political translators in the State Department?
But Americats knowledgeable figures in this field must ask themselves whether it is really Mao's game to seek a base in the revolutionary struggles of today for bargaining purposes as Stalin did. If not a “mere agrarian reformer,” as he was once pictured to be, is Mao after all a mere Stalinist? And if so, can Mao really be depended upon to deliver the way Stalin did? Is it possible in the world of today for Mao, with the most honorable of intentions, to get away with betraying revolutions the way Stalin did? Hasn't the element of independent leadership, as exemplified by the Cubans, ©
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become so strong that recognition of China would simply strengthen . that tendency, not only in the long run but in the immediate future?
- Khrushchev's heirs consequently are not alone in facing a dilemma over China, Kennedy's heir has also been handed a hot. potato. What will he do with it?
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