cultural revolution," as was to be expected, has been on the left wing of the Japanese working-class movement, especially those groups which were traditionally pro-Peking in orientation and which have. felt compelled to reverse themselves. Other groups, which had previously been very critical, have now swung much closer to China.
Up until recently the Communist party had been Peking's most loyal ally, particularly after the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Now it has become an outspoken critic.
Its new attitude, it explains, follows from adherence to the principle that it is wrong for one Communist party to interfere in the internal affairs of another. But it seems that the CP leaders are a little embarrassed over their new role. They are reluctant to explain it. Little is to be found in their many publications dealing with the question.
. Im the January 24 Akahata, an article, "An Answer to Slanderous Charges Made by the Red Guards," sought to justify Japanese criticisms of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party and to rationalize the expulsion of members of the Japanese Communist party who had lined up with China. But not once did it venture into polemics over ideological differences or reveal what went on between the top leaders of the CCP and the JCP.
This half-hearted attitude raises a very serious and urgent question for the JCP. If the party has difficulty in elaborating its own attitude toward China, how can it possibly influence workers keenly interested in the "cultural revolution"? How can the leadership expel members of their own party because they support China, yet refrain from explaining the relations between the JCP and the CCP?
The crisis in the relationship between the two parties first came to the surface last year as the "cultural revolution" developed. As early as January 1966 the JCP began to advance its "independent" position in the international Communist movement.
At the national congress of presidents of party prefecture branches, General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto is reported to have stated that the JCP was not supporting the CCP for two reasons. One was the CCP's view that the Russian proposal for an international united front against U.S. imperialism was nothing but a "compromise with imperialism." The other was the demand of the CCP that the JCP launch an armed struggle in Japan.
The withdrawal of the JCP from the orbit of the CCP is rooted in the same causes that initially compelled the CCP leadership to precipitate the "cultural revolution."
One of the most important of these, aside from those offered officially, was the terrible defeat suffered by the Indonesian Communist party, which was under the influence of the CCP. It is also widely believed that the JCP brass were angered at the attempt of the Chinese to intervene in the affairs of their party at the time of the nationwide strike action April 17, 1965, in order to compel the JCP leaders to change their policies.
There is no doubt, too, that the war in Vietnam is a contributing factor.
Last February 9, Akahata published an important article entitled, "For International United Action and an International United Front against American Imperialism." This stood in sharp contrast to the Chinese position of hostility to joint action with the USSR.
Immediately after this article was published, the leaders of the JCP visited China, North Korea and North Vietnam. This coincided with a trip by representatives
of the Cuban government to the same places at the same time. The purpose of this move soon became clear.
A statement, issued in common with the Vietnamese Workers party, took as its central point the urgent necessity to establish an international united front of the workers states to defend the Vietnamese revolution.
In a speech in Korea, Miyamoto insisted that the policies of the Russian leadership have a dual nature -- revisionist and a side that is shifting away from revisionisn.
This proposal for an international united front was rejected by the CCP. It became clear to the Japanese leadership that a fundamental difference existed between them and their previous allies on the question of defending the revolution in Asia.
The conflict remained muted until the world peace conference in Japan last August when it flared into the open. Under the leadership of the JCP, the Gensuikyo [Antinuclear and Antihydrogen Bomb Association -- the body which sponsors an international antinuclear conference each year] had indicated where it stood in the Sino-Soviet conflict when it first became intense by expelling the pro-Russian wing of the organization. Last August another split occurred. The pro-Peking faction walked out.
In a message of greetings to the conference, Chou En-lai condemned the "Russian revisionists" and "reactionary elements"; and, much to the anger of the JCP, levelled an indirect criticism of them. The JCP leadership replied to Chou En-lai in an article in Akahata, counterposing their own position of appealing for an international united front.
The crises that plagued the world peace conference were not confined there. All the organizations where the JCP had any influence at all underwent similar experiences. We will return to these further on.
The reversal in line caused mem-— bers of the Communist party considerable difficulties. After publishing the article, "For International United Action and an. International United Front against American Imperialism" -- the article which first indicated that important differences existed -- Akahata began to make oblique references to and criticisms of a "certain dogmatic group" which "blindly follows a foreign party."
A target outside the party against which to launch public attacks was chosen. This was a small pro-Peking oup calling itself the "Communist Party (Liberation Front)," concentrated mainly in the Osaka region, headed by one Shigeo Shida. Ostensibly the JCP leaders were replying to a sharp critique which this tendency had made of both the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties, but from a pro-Peking point of view. Obviously, the JCP leaders were shooting at bigger targets since the group which they attacked is so small that it is difficult to obtain its literary material, its only available production being a circular addressed last February to all Communist organizations.
At the August 1966 world conference where the flare-up occurred, the pro- Chinese tendency was represented by the Yamaguchi Prefecture branch of the Communist party, which called itself a branch of the "Communist Party (Revolutionary Left)." In its three publications, this tendency had castigated the leaders of the party as "revisionists who flee when they face a crisis." They called the JCP itself "an opportunist party which is joining the anti-Chinese cabal." Leading members of the tendency were expelled shortly thereafter.
The new program of the party sought to codify for the first time "independence from Moscow and Peking." In the course of adopting it, two important Central Committee members were thrown out. One of them had voted against the new line and the other had abstained. This occurred at the Central Committee meeting of August 27-29.
The two involved in this were Ruji Nishazawa, well-known for his book, A Study of Mao Tse-tung's Thought, who voted against the resolution, and Yasuji Anzai, who abstained.
Members living abroad, many of whom were correspondents for Akahata, were not spared in the struggle over the new line. Expulsions took place in East Berlin and Hanoi and there were reprisals from the other side.
A supporter of the new line, living in Peking was subjected to hooligan treat-— ment by resident Japanese students of the pro-Peking tendency. At the Tenth National Conference of the party, these students were accused of blindly following "foreign forces" and committing a "shameful counterrevolutionary action." ;
In all this, perhaps the most surprising to those in Japan who follow Chinese affairs was the news that Koichi Saionji had been expelled from the JCP. He is well-known, not only because he is a Communist who came from a family that ranks high in the Japanese aristocracy, but because of his activities during | World War II when he gave assistance to Dr. Sorge, the Soviet intelligence agent executed by the Japanese militarist government.
Saionji had been in Peking for a decade as a representative of the Japan- China Friendship Association. Although it was evident that his interest in China was deep, it was relatively unknown, except in top circles of the party, that he held a party card.
Uninhibited by the harsh words uttered in the past, the Russian leaders have now made approaches to the JCP, attempting to take advantage of the break with the CCP. Their public attitude appears to be more fraternal than the one they display toward their own tiny ally, the pro-Russian CP of around only 1,000 members. Socialist Party Also Under Influence of Chinese Events
Those who were surprised at the reversal of the line of the JCP were astounded to discover that groups that did not even pretend to call themselves Communist were polarizing into differing postures on the "cultural revolution," with factions moving closer and closer to the CCP. This could already be seen at the world peace conference last August.
Representing the Study Meeting for Socialism group in the Socialist party, Yanosuke Narasaki and five other members of the party visited China and publicly expressed support for the "cultural revolution."
After the break between China and the Japan-China Friendship Association because of the latter's refusal to sign a common communiqué with the Chinese representatives during the Chinese Independence Celebrations, another Socialist party group, including Toshio Kuroda and other members of the Heiwadoshikai (Comrades for Peace) intervened, getting in touch with the CCP and signing the conmuniqué in place of the JCP to the satisfaction of the CCP representatives. After that they began to organize a new Japan- China Friendship Association.
These are but examples. In every mass organization in the country which is having internal difficulties because of the change in relations between the JCP and the CCP, there are strong pro-Chinese tendencies.
The present attitude of the Chinese Communist party to the Japanese Socialist party stands in glaring contrast to that of the period when the Sino- Soviet conflict first broke into the open.
Although formally the SP took a neutral position due to its sympathy for the line of "peaceful coexistence" and the program of structural reforms, it was partial to Moscow's side in the dispute. For example, Seburo Eda, general secretary of the Socialist party and Hiroo Wada, head of the SP's international affairs department, were denounced by the CCP as "colleagues of the American imperialists and the revisionists." There now appears to have been a switch on this.
The formal attitude taken at the SP's annual conference was that the "cultural revolution" in China was too unstable for a definitive position to be adopted; nevertheless, under the leadership of Kozo Sasaki, president of the party, who has always been sympathetic to China, the party is moving much closer to the CCP. . ;
The shift is due in part to the change in the SP leadership with the defeat of the Eda faction. This group had been in extreme opposition to the Communists and had bluntly refused to participate in any united-front organization around such questions as the Japanese- South Korean pact, etc. When the struggle erupted in Gensuikyo during the Sino-Soviet conflict, they seized the opportunity to abandon that organization, setting up their own antinuclear bomb association, the Gensuikin. They also split from the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association.
The Eda wing lost power to the Sasaki tendency at the national conference of the party in 1965. The Sasaki wing has a record of being more sympathetic to the Japanese and Chinese Communist parties. Because of the struggle now going on between these two parties, and because the SP is looking for new allies, the Chinese have adopted a very friendly attitude toward it.
As a result, the leadership of the SP has been subjected to severe attacks by the JCP and is being engaged by it in a factional struggle inside those mass organizations which are affected by the new line.
And what is remarkable in the midst of all this is that the old Eda faction's right-wing criticisms of the Sasaki SP leadership find a parallel in the criticisms the JCP leadership make against the pro-Chinese tendency.
What Will Be the Long-Term Effects
on the Japanese left?
At first glance, it appears very peculiar that each time turmoil is seen in a mass organization and a split occurs, the split is due to the pro-SP group pulling out and setting up a new organization, despite holding a majority in the old organization.
This was the case when Gensuikyo and the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association split at the time of the Sino- Soviet conflict. SP groups under Eda's
influence walked out.
And the same was true when the Japan-China Friendship Association and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee split during the recent Sino-Japanese Communist party division. Jiichiro Matsumoto, the president, and many other well-known leaders of the committee, such as Haruo Okada, walked out.
Why, since they held the majority, did they not expel the minority that supported the line of the JCP? The answer is simple. They knew they would have difficulty controlling the ranks, many of whom were Communist militants.
Now that the JCP has broken from the Chinese camp, the most serious problem before it will be its ability to keep its supporters on the "independent" line.
It is now more than likely that the JCP will become integrated into what has become known today in the international Communist movement as "the third tendency," which includes the Cuban and North Korean Communist parties. Its participation in this tendency will give new scope to the colonial revolution.
But it is necessary to pay close attention to those features of the Japanese Communist party that distinguish it from the other "third tendency" parties. For instance, nationalism as a program to mobilize the masses is possible in Korea and other developing countries. In Japan it is impossible. Yet the JCP is committed to this position, a legacy of the Stalinist influence upon it and the ideological basis of its reformism.
The JCP leaders are quite unlike the Cubans, who are firm internationalists. Unlike the Cuban CP, the JCP will be unwilling to participate wholeheart-— edly in international campaigns.
In the past, a mainstay of JCP strength was its depicting itself as the most reliable and loyal ally of the Russian and Chinese Communist parties in Japan. Will it be able to hold onto its support and maintain its prestige among militants now that it does not have the support of either Russia or China?
The difficulties that will confront the JCP can be foreseen when one looks at Gensuikyo. First there were the expulsions of "the revisionist delegates" who were under Russian influence; then came the turn of "the dogmatists" who supported the pro-Peking tendency.
As Gensuikyo is an international body, dependent on support internationally on Stalinist connections in the various peace committees and CP front groups all over the world -- a large proportion of the delegates in the past came from this source -- which foreign delegates, and how many, will be inclined to come to the next conference? How can it keep the conference going every August without the presence of substantial foreign delegations? Isn't it possible that its competitor, Gensuikin, which is under the control of the Socialist party, and which has kept a somewhat neutral posture on the questions that presently divide the world Communist movement, will be supported by many more foreign delegations?
And Gensuikyo will be unwilling to have delegates attend its conference if they have already participated in Gensuikin. The only solution, it would seen, that could ensure adequate representation from abroad would be to unite the two organizations. If this were to occur, the CP would lose whatever degree of leadership it has been able to maintain in this field.
In comparison to the Communist party, which is monolithic, the Socialist party now consists of several factions, some of them being strongly pro-Chinese and pro-Russian. The SP leadership now has important influence in most of the left mass movements, in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in the Japan- China Friendship Association, in Gensuikin and the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association, to name a few.
It is obvious that at each new level of development of the Sino-Soviet conflict and at each new stage in the antagonisms between the CCP and the JCP, the Socialist party is going to be deeply affected by the differences; and it, too, is going to be rent by factional struggles.
CUBAN CAPTURED IN VENEZUELA "FOUND" HANGED IN CELL
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